Opinion
E072028
12-19-2019
In re S.C. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. W.M., Defendant and Appellant.
Daniel G. Rooney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and Svetlana Kauper, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.Nos. J276749, J276750, J276751 & J276752) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes, Judge. Affirmed. Daniel G. Rooney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and Svetlana Kauper, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant W.M., a former foster parent whose home had been decertified, and his wife K.M. (the M.'s or guardians) obtained temporary legal guardianship of D., Sh., G., and St. The San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) investigated several referrals involving D. Services were offered; however, W.M. did not participate; rather, he sought to separate and remove D. from his siblings. CFS detained the children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b), (c) (as to D. only) and (g). At the contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the juvenile court amended the allegations according to proof, terminated the legal guardianship, and ordered reunification services for the children's biological mother only.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
W.M. challenges the jurisdictional findings, the termination of the legal guardianship, and the denial of reunification services. We reject his contentions and affirm.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
A. Family History.
From June 2014 until April 2016, the children were dependents of the juvenile court and placed in a foster home belonging to the M.'s. During that time, CFS received several referrals, including: (1) K.M. had pressured the biological mother into relinquishing custody of G.; (2) the M.'s were very attached to the children, which could undermine the reunification process; (3) the M.'s had inflicted emotional and physical abuse on some of the children; (4) the M.'s tried to bribe the biological parents into signing over their parental rights as to G.; and (5) W.M. had stalked the family after the children were returned to the parents. Following disposition, their foster license was place on hold and later decertified.
The parents and children moved out-of-state; however, the M.'s maintained contact, providing assistance when needed. Because the parents continued to ask for money, on November 21, 2017, the M.'s sought and obtained legal guardianship over the children through the probate court. (Fostering the children was not an option because the M.'s had lost their foster license.) On March 29, 2018, CFS received a referral for general neglect of the children. The referral alleged D. was physically and sexually abusive toward his siblings. The M.'s complained they could not "function as a family," they believed "the problem could be solved by removing [D.] from their home," and they continually asked when CFS would take D. away.
On May 2, 2018, in an interview at the Children's Assessment Center (CAC), D. reported that K.M. had accused him of calling his parents, and K.M. was coaching G. and St. to say they were afraid of D. D. expressed fear that "[he] may go to a different home without [his siblings]." The social worker spoke with the children's therapist. The therapist had no complaints about D. and had no reason to believe the child was behaving badly. The therapist hypothesized that there was some coaching of the siblings, but was unable to identify a motive. On May 9, 2018, a child and family team meeting was held. The M.'s continued to express their inability to handle D.'s behavior, which involved not listening, screaming, and punching the walls; however, they agreed to participate in family therapy and parenting classes.
On June 6, 2018, CFS received a new referral alleging emotional abuse. In response, the social worker made an unannounced visit nine days later. W.M. denied any abuse, but explained they had separated D. from his siblings to protect them. W.M. reiterated the need to "take [D.] to another home." He stated they were not participating in family counseling because the children did not want anything to do with D. D. confirmed that he had been separated from his siblings; he expressed anger and sadness about the circumstances; and he admitted to hitting the walls and going to his room. He said he liked talking to the therapist and was open to having more sessions.
On June 21, 2018, a multidisciplinary team reviewed the case and voiced a concern that D. was being emotionally abused, and his siblings were being coached. The team also questioned the circumstances under which the M.'s had acquired guardianship.
B. Detention Hearing.
On June 25, 2018, CFS determined it was in the children's best interest to remove them from the guardians' home. Immediately following detention, the social worker observed the children interact with each other without fear or reservations, and noted they were exhibiting a healthy, positive attachment. CFS filed section 300 petitions under subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect), and (g) (no provision for support) on behalf of all of the children. The petition for D. also included an allegation that he had suffered serious emotional damage (§ 300, subd. (c)) due to his isolation from his siblings. At the July 2, 2018 detention hearing, the children's counsel recommended they be placed together despite the guardians' request to separate them. The juvenile court detained the children, removed them from the M.'s, and ordered conjoint therapy.
C. Contested Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearing.
According to the jurisdictional and dispositional report filed July 18, 2018, CFS recommended true findings on the allegations, and recommended reunification services for the guardians only, not the parents. The social worker noted the guardians had neglected the children's mental health needs even though they knew the children had experienced trauma due to being separated from, and abandoned by, their parents. The social worker opined the M.'s had segregated D. from his siblings, perpetuating a feeling of abandonment and separation, and had degraded D., which placed him at risk of psychological and emotional harm, as evidenced by his punching walls. The social worker also reported that the current foster parent had said the siblings were interacting appropriately with one another. D. did not participate in visitation with the M.'s; however, the other children appeared bonded to them. G. told W.M. that D. was not being "mean" to him in the new foster home and that the siblings were all getting along.
Pursuant to the June 29, 2018 findings of Dean Leav, Psy.D., a licensed psychologist, W.M. wanted to establish legal guardianship over Sh., G., and St. only. In individual interviews, all three children stated they enjoyed living with the M.'s because they were "nice." When asked about D., St. and G. uniformly described him as a "bad guy." Sh. and G. also said that D. was "mean." All three children reported that D. would hit them and they did not want to live with him. G. added that he was so scared around D. that he wanted him to go to jail. Dr. Leav opined that a bonding study was necessary to determine whether D. should continue to reside in the same home as his siblings.
From April through May 2018, the children underwent forensic medical examinations and interviews. G. referred to the guardians as "mommy and daddy." He appeared to be evasive at times, refusing to explain an injury or not remembering incidents involving D., despite claiming that D. had physically hurt him. He stated that he had learned of D.'s abuse toward him (G.) because "his mommy and daddy told him." According to G.'s forensic medical examination, W.M. reported that D. threatened his siblings, but W.M. could not provide any details. W.M. claimed D. had choked G., but G. could not corroborate the allegation. G.'s disclosures focused on prior physical or sexual abuse by the parents. G.'s "Healthy Homes Assessment" revealed that he would easily get angry, he was often sad, and he would isolate himself from his siblings. However, no mental health services were recommended. Sh. concurred in the allegations of physical and sexual abuse when living with the parents. The medical examinations of the children did not rule out prior abuse. Sh. also reported that D. would hit and punch walls, would not behave, and that the M.'s did not want him. St. reported that D. hit his siblings and was a "bad boy," and stated that G. "[broke] things" and "kick[ed] things." St. referred to the M.'s as "auntie and uncle." His physical examination revealed nonspecific bruises and scars. The examining physician expressed a concern about the multiple reports made by the M.'s involving D., the "11-year-old brother."
During his interview, D. appeared calm, maintained good eye contact, and was cooperative. He wished the M.'s would be "fair," stop accusing him of things he had not done, and allow him to play with his siblings. Because D. was "denied time with his siblings," he felt "sad and unhappy." D. admitted to hitting his brothers during play. He was concerned his siblings were susceptible to the suggestions made by the M.'s. When the M.'s or his siblings falsely accused D. of doing something bad, he would get angry and "hit[] the walls and go[] to his room, mad." His medical examination raised concerns that the social situation in the home was emotionally abusive toward him. According to a "Healthy Homes Assessment" conducted on July 10, 2018, D. stated the M.'s "'made [him] feel like they didn't care about [him],'" however, he felt "cared for" in his current foster home. The current foster parent reported no incidents of sadness or anger, characterized D. as a "very good boy," and did not observe any arguments between the siblings that were not age appropriate. No mental health services were recommended.
The social worker opined that it was in the children's best interest to preserve their bond given the trauma they had suffered during their prior removals, but indicated the M.'s were unable to preserve the sibling unit. The social worker recommended the children and the M.'s participate in therapeutic services to facilitate a healthy bond, and also recommended that the M.'s participate in parenting classes, which teach techniques to handle traumatized children.
On July 23, 2018, W.M. requested a contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing.
On August 31, 2018, CFS filed a motion to terminate the probate guardianship.
On September 6, 2018, CFS and the children's counsel requested a suspension of visitation because it appeared the M.'s were inappropriately influencing the children for their CAC interviews. The juvenile court granted the request. On October 9, 2018, CFS requested the suspension of visitation be maintained until completion of the CAC interviews. According to the social worker, in a meeting with W.M. on September 14, 2018, he reiterated his claim that D. was abusing his siblings; however, the children's current foster parent reported no issues of abuse between the children. In a visit on September 25, 2018, the social worker observed the children behaving in an age appropriate manner, and there were no reports of D. physically assaulting his siblings. On October 11, 2018, W.M. sought to resume visitation with the children, insisting D. had raped St. in the current foster home. W.M. claimed CFS informed the sheriff's department to close any investigation into the allegations of D.'s sexual abuse. The juvenile court denied W.M.'s request and continued the suspension of visitation.
In the first addendum to the jurisdictional and dispositional report filed October 24, 2018, CFS expressed a concern the guardians were manipulating the children. The allegation that D. had "raped" G. was made after the children were left alone with the M.'s. Sh. and St. denied any abuse, and G. was unable to provide any details. Instead, G. admitted he was not afraid of D. Neither D. nor Sh. wanted to reunify with the M.'s. Sh. confessed that the M.'s had coached her as to what to say to the social workers and police officers. G. claimed W.M. was his "best friend" and wanted to return to him, but CFS was concerned G. had been coached to make such a claim. CFS was afraid the M.'s had obtained guardianship to avoid the dependency process. CFS could not locate the parents to determine what lead them to transfer custody. The social worker added, "[T]he actions of the [M.'s] toward the children appear to be motivated by a desire to have the children in their care rather than to ensure their safety and well-being." The social worker was also apprehensive about W.M.'s relationship with G., opining it was "unhealthy" and not indicative of a parent-child relationship. CFS recommended the juvenile court terminate the guardianship, set a section 366.26 hearing, and establish legal guardianship with the current foster parents.
The November 14 and 15, 2018, CAC interviews confirmed (1) the social worker's concern that the M.'s had been coaching the children as to what to say, (2) the M.'s did not like D., and (3) D. was not abusing his siblings.
At a supervised visit on November 29, 2018, the M.'s showed up with bags of toys, clothes, and approximately $50 for each child, even though they had previously been informed about the rules of visitation. W.M. hugged G. and whispered something in his ear. The next day, the social worker reminded W.M. that he was not allowed to have covert conversations with the children. Because W.M. continued to coach the children and violate the court order to not discuss the case with them, CFS recommended the court find visitation detrimental to the children and terminate guardianship. W.M. objected.
On January 10, 2019, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, and considered CFS's motion to terminate legal guardianship. Supervising social services practitioner Renae Devolld testified that since the children's removal from living with the guardians, she had not observed any sibling problems caused by D. In Devolld's opinion, the guardians had manipulated the children into saying their parents were "bad." She believed the guardians were only interested in keeping G., and they considered D. "a problem." As to the abuse by W.M., Devolld opined that manipulation was a form of emotional abuse because it distorted the way children see their parents and each other. She noted that neither W.M. or K.M. had acknowledged doing anything that affected the children negatively, and they had not participated in or completed any predisposition services. Devolld recognized that G. and St. wanted to return to the M.'s; however, she believed it was best to keep all four children together because of their "strong sibling bond." The current foster parent was interested in keeping the children together.
Devolld testified that when D. lived with W.M., he was isolated from his siblings, experienced feelings of abandonment and separation, and was at risk of severe emotional harm. She found no truth in W.M.'s accusations against D., and she had no concerns about placing him with his siblings. The social worker accused W.M. of coaching the children and asking leading questions to confirm that D. was abusive. Devolld testified that CFS tried to keep the children with the M.'s, but they had refused to participate in family therapy and other services. She noted that following the suspension of their visitation, no allegations of sexual abuse were ever made.
Devolld recommended termination of the guardianship based on the fact that D. had been alienated from his siblings, and the children had received a warped image of their parents. While she acknowledged the parents had a substance abuse problem, she opined it was not in the children's best interest to see their parents as evil.
W.M. testified to the following: In May 2017, he and K.M. provided the parents with a temporary place to stay, a motel room, and welcomed the children into their home. When the M.'s became aware of the parents' drug use, they did not want to return the children to the parents, but they insisted. A few weeks later, the mother again requested, and received, financial help from W.M. For a period, G. and D. lived with the M.'s, and St. and Sh. lived with the parents. Eventually, the parents resumed custody of all four children, and the M.'s lost contact with the family until August or September 2017, when they again provided financial assistance. When W.M. received another call in October 2017, he drove to Idaho to collect the children and bring them back to California, where he called CFS and was informed that CFS could take the children into custody or he could seek legal guardianship. He sought guardianship. W.M. testified that upon learning the children had been abused, he and K.M. secured a CFS referral for weekly therapy. On cross-examination, he admitted they stopped taking the children to therapy, explaining he was working a lot and was told that therapy was not working for D. because he was abusing the children in the waiting room. W.M. denied locking D. in his room, and claimed he (W.M.) had observed D. choking and slapping his siblings.
At the close of evidence, CFS and the children's counsel moved to amend the allegations according to proof, and argued for termination of the guardianship. W.M. argued the allegations were not supported by the evidence. The juvenile court sustained the allegations and amended the allegations under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The court agreed that the guardians loved the children, but noted they had alienated D. from his siblings, "perpetuating the feeling of abandonment and separation." Focusing on their best interests, the court concluded it "would be a detriment to the children to offer services or even continue the guardianship." The court dissolved the guardianship and ordered reunification services for mother (who had been located), but not father (whose whereabouts remained unknown).
As amended, the section 300, subdivision (b) allegation reads: "[The M.'s] alienated [Sh., St., and G.] from his or her sibling [D.] by falsely attempting to convince [Sh., St., and G.] that [D.] posed a danger to them, thereby creating a risk of emotional and physical harm."
As amended, the section 300, subdivision (j) allegation reads: "[T]he sibling of the child, either [Sh., G., or St.], by legal guardians [the M.'s] has been isolated from his sibling, perpetuating the feeling of abandonment and separation, not allowing the child to adjust in the home, has been scapegoated and degraded, placing sibling [D.] at risk of severe psychological or emotional harm. These actions, in fact, also place the child at risk of severe psychological or emotional harm."
II. DISCUSSION
W.M. challenges the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings involving his conduct as unsupported by substantial evidence. Assuming we find merit to his challenges, he also argues the absence of the biological parents does not support jurisdiction because the M.'s would be returned to their predependency status and would be entitled to reunification services. CFS urges us to dismiss the appeal, arguing it fails to raise a justiciable issue since K.M. has not appealed. CFS further argues substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings, and the court properly terminated the predependency probate guardianship and denied reunification services for the M.'s. We exercise our discretion and reach the merits of W.M.'s challenges on appeal. Finding no merit to those challenges, we affirm.
A. W.M.'s Challenges Are Justiciable.
Before addressing W.M.'s contentions on the merits, we must decide whether this court can provide "'effective' relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties' conduct or legal status." (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1490.) The question of effective relief is known as justiciability. CFS correctly asserts that, in general, a jurisdictional finding involving one parent (or in this case one guardian) is good against both (id. at p. 1492 ["'"the minor is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring [him or her] within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent"'"]; In re X.S. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161 [a "'jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good against both'"]), and K.M. did not appeal. In this case, however, since the findings supporting jurisdiction primarily involve the conduct of W.M, arguably, vacating those findings could have a legal or practical consequence. We will therefore exercise our discretion and consider the merits of W.M.'s appeal.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional Findings.
W.M. contends there is insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings. As we explain, we reject his contention.
1. Standard of review.
We review jurisdictional findings to ascertain "'if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them.'" (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) "'"In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court."'" (Ibid.) W.M. has the burden to demonstrate there is no sufficiently substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's findings and orders. (In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 136.)
2. The evidence supports the section 300 , subdivision (b), findings.
W.M. contends the children are not persons described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1), because at the time they needed mental health services (1) they were in the custody of CFS or the biological parents, and (2) while in their custody, the children either received services or did not require services.
"Section 300, subdivision (b) provides a basis for assertion of dependency jurisdiction if '[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent [or guardian] . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . .'" (In re Jesus M. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 104, 111.) A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b), requires "(1) neglectful conduct by the parent [or guardian] in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) 'serious physical harm or illness' to the [child], or a 'substantial risk' of such harm or illness." (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.) "Before courts and agencies can exert jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), there must be evidence indicating that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness." (Id. at p. 823.) However, "[t]he court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child." (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 165.) Rather, the court may consider past events in deciding whether a child currently needs the court's protection. (Ibid.; In re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 461 [a parent or guardian's "'[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions' if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue"].)
Here, the record shows that when the M.'s were fostering the children, they were neglected. In October 2015, CFS received two referrals claiming the M.'s were emotionally and physically abusive toward the children. D. told his therapist that the M.'s alienated him from the family, yelled at him, and threatened to move him to another placement. D. also reported that he had been dragged into his room, locked outside, and blocked from accessing water. As a result of these referrals, the home was decertified as a foster home.
Two years later, the M.'s became temporary legal guardians through the probate court. The social worker expressed concern that W.M. had been negatively influencing the children about their parents, and the M.'s were circumventing the dependency system by becoming the children's guardians despite the decertification of their foster home. W.M. acknowledged the children had suffered from prior trauma, but failed to participate in CFS recommended preventative services because he did not believe the children needed therapy or services. When he finally agreed that the children needed counseling, he later rejected the treatment course despite the therapist's opinion that the children had suffered from a lot of trauma and required counseling. According to the social worker, "the actions of the [M.'s] toward the children appear to be motivated by a desire to have the children in their care rather than to ensure their safety and well-being."
Nonetheless, W.M. points out that according to the "Healthy Homes Assessment," D. and G. did not need any specialized mental health services. Thus, he asserts that he could not have neglected something that was not required. However, the assessment was conducted after the children had already been removed from the home. Prior to their removal, the record shows Sh., G. and St. were coached by the M.'s to accuse D. of being abusive, and the M.'s alienated D. from his siblings, which caused him to act out physically by punching walls. Also, G. acted out by breaking and kicking things. The social worker opined that removing the children from the home had alleviated concerns associated with the guardians, and preserving the sibling unity was "of utmost importance" given the trauma the children had suffered throughout their young lives.
W.M.'s unrelenting denial of the children's need for services, coupled with his coaching and manipulation of the children and his adamant belief in the need to separate D. from his siblings, demonstrated the need for the juvenile court's protection to maintain the sibling unit, to prevent D. from being targeted by the M.'s, to stop W.M. from manipulating Sh., G., and St. into alienating, marginalizing, and degrading D., and to end the physically violent outbursts engaged in by D. and G.
3. Section 300, subdivisions (c) and (j), findings.
W.M. contends substantial evidence does not support the section 300, subdivision (c), finding that D. was placed "at risk of severe psychological/emotional harm" and, since his and K.M.'s actions "did not place [D.] at risk, it follows the other children were not at risk of psychological or emotional harm" under subdivision (j).
Subdivision (c) of section 300 states that a child who is described as follows falls within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and may be adjudged a dependent thereof: "The child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian . . . ." Under section 300, subdivision (c), when the allegations involve a parent's (or in this case a guardian's) fault, CFS must prove "(1) the offending parental [(or guardian)] conduct; (2) causation; and (3) serious emotional harm or the risk thereof, as evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward aggressive behavior." (In re Alexander K. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 549, 557; see In re Roxanne B. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 916, 921.)
"It is clear from the overall scheme that the parental [or guardian] conduct branch of [section 300,] subdivision (c) seeks to protect against abusive behavior that results in severe emotional damage. We are not talking about run-of-the-mill flaws in our parenting styles—we are talking about abusive, neglectful and/or exploitive conduct toward a child which causes any of the serious symptoms identified in the statute. 'Abuse' means 'to ill-use or maltreat; to injure, wrong, or hurt.'" (In re Alexander K., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 559.) "[T]he fact that a child is currently protected from further abuse simply because the child already is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court cannot preclude the court from finding, based upon new evidence of past abuse, that the child remains at risk of abuse. The question to be asked in such a case is whether, in the absence of the state's intervention, there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused." (In re Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 795, 806.) A parent's (or guardian's) failure to acknowledge the abuse or the harm he or she has caused makes it "likely that he [or she] would continue to abuse the child[] if he [or she] had access to [him]." (Ibid.)
Here, the evidence amply supports the order sustaining the petition as to D. under section 300, subdivision (c). The record shows multiple instances where the M.'s coached and manipulated D.'s siblings to falsely accuse him of assaultive behavior, and the M.'s alienated D. in order to emotionally traumatize him. When the M.'s or his siblings falsely accused D. of assaultive behavior, he would become depressed, and would act out aggressively and withdraw into his room. (As noted, ante, when D. became angry, he would "hit[] the walls and go[] to his room, mad.") In October 2015, CFS received referrals because of emotional and physical abuse of D. by the M.'s, including denying time with his siblings (which made D. feel sad), not speaking to him, yelling at him, telling him that he would be placed outside their home, dragging him to his room, locking him outside the house, and blocking his access to water. In March 2018, over two years later, W.M. falsely accused D. of beating his siblings, sexually assaulting them, and inflicting physical and emotional pain on them; however, W.M. could never provide any specifics to support his accusations. After undergoing a forensic medical examination and interview, the examining doctor opined that D. was being targeted by the M.'s and subjected to emotional abuse. Sh. and G. both confirmed this opinion when they confessed that the M.'s had manipulated and coached them as to what to say to the social workers and police officers. Nonetheless, the M.'s denied they had emotionally abused D. or his siblings, claiming they were protecting Sh., G., and St. from D. Further, the M.'s refused to participate in therapy designed to address the emotional damage their actions were causing the children.
The verbal abuse and alienation of D. by the M.'s, along with W.M.'s coaching and manipulation of D.'s siblings, provide substantial evidence to support the section 300, subdivision (c), allegation.
Having concluded there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's determination that the children came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b) or (c) (as to D. only), we need not address W.M.'s claim that there was insufficient evidence to find jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (j). Section 300 contemplates that jurisdiction may be based on any single subdivision. Even if we consider the claim, we would find substantial evidence to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (j). As noted ante, D. was isolated, dragged into his room, locked outside, and blocked from access to water. D. was the oldest child and thus more independent than his siblings. As the younger children become older and less likely to listen to the M.'s, there is a substantial risk they will receive the same treatment as D.
Section 300, subdivision (j), describes a child whose "sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision[s] (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions. The court shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative in determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child."
C. The Juvenile Court Properly Terminated the Guardianship and Denied Reunification Services.
W.M. challenges the termination of the guardianship and the denial of reunification services. We find no merit to his challenges.
The M.'s had custody of the children pursuant to a guardianship established under the Probate Code. Probate Code section 1601 authorizes the termination of a guardianship "[u]pon petition of the guardian, a parent, [or] the minor ward . . . if the court determines that it is in the ward's best interest to terminate the guardianship." (Prob. Code, § 1601.) "A guardianship of the person created under the Probate Code may also be terminated by the juvenile court in a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 dependency proceeding pursuant to [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 728. Section 728 states, in pertinent part: '(a) The juvenile court may terminate or modify a guardianship of the person of a minor previously established under the Probate Code, . . . if the minor is the subject of a petition filed under [Welfare and Institutions Code, s]ection 300, . . . ." (In re Xavier R. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1412; see In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 253 [Welfare and Institutions Code section 728 "gives the juvenile court the authority to terminate a Probate Code guardianship at any stage in the dependency proceeding, including at the detention hearing or the jurisdictional hearing"].) The motion to terminate guardianship may be made by CFS or the minor's counsel, and the "hearing on the motion may be held simultaneously with any regularly scheduled hearing held in proceedings to declare the minor a dependent child or ward of the court, or at any subsequent hearing concerning the dependent child or ward." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 728, subd. (a).)
Here, CFS filed the requisite motion to terminate the guardianship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 728. The juvenile court granted that motion, thereby terminating the probate guardianship after finding clear and convincing evidence it was in the children's best interests to do so, in accordance with Probate Code section 1601. The court's order is amply supported by the evidence. (In re Merrick V., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 254.)
Having terminated their guardianship, the juvenile court was not required to order reunification services to the M.'s. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. (a) ["the juvenile court shall order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and the child's . . . guardians"]; In re Merrick V., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 253 ["Notwithstanding the mandatory language of [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 361.5, subdivision (a), a predependency or Probate Code guardianship may legally be terminated before reunification services are offered to the guardian."].)
III. DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
Acting P. J. We concur: SLOUGH
J. MENETREZ
J.