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In re S.L.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Jun 23, 2020
E074461 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 23, 2020)

Opinion

E074461

06-23-2020

In re S.L. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.T., Defendant and Appellant.

William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and David Guardado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.Nos. J266845-J266848) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes, Judge. Affirmed. William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and David Guardado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

S.T. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights and selecting a permanent plan of adoption for four of her children, D.L., A.L., T.L., and S.L. She contends the order terminating her parental rights should be reversed because two factual findings by the juvenile court in support of the order were not supported by substantial evidence: (1) the finding that her children were adoptable; and (2) the determination that mother did not occupy a parental role in her children's lives sufficient to support the parental bond exception to termination of parental rights set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We find substantial evidence supports both of these findings, and therefore affirm the juvenile court's order terminating mother's parental rights.

Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Facts and Procedural History

S.T. is the mother of six children, Ar.L., C.L., D.L., A.L., T.L., and S.L. In August 2016, her children were detained following various reports involving domestic violence between mother and the children's father, methamphetamine and marijuana use in the home, and potential neglect of the children. The San Bernardino Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed petitions on behalf of each child pursuant to section 300, et seq. In October 2016, the juvenile court found the allegations of the petitions true; and the children were subsequently removed. Mother was ultimately unable to reunify, and the juvenile court terminated reunification services at the 12-month review hearing on November 13, 2017.

In March 2018, the juvenile court held a permanency planning hearing and selected a permanent plan granting legal guardianship over Ar.L. and C.L. to the paternal grandparents. With respect to the four other children, the juvenile court determined there was a compelling reason against immediately setting a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 and instead directed the Department to explore the possibility of placement and adoption with various relatives.

In December 2018, D.L., A.L., T.L., and S.L. were placed with their maternal grandmother. In March 2019, the juvenile court held another permanency planning review hearing at which time it was represented that the maternal grandmother was interested in adopting the four children. As a result, the juvenile court set the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26. B. Section 366.26 Contested Hearing and Termination of Parental Rights

On November 4, 2019, the juvenile court held a contested permanency selection and implementation hearing for D.L., A.L., T.L., and S.L. Both mother and father were present for the hearing. The Department's section 366.26 reports dated November 4, 2019, and July 8, 2019, were admitted into evidence.

Mother appeared via video conference.

1. July 8, 2019 Section 366.26 Report

The Department's July 8, 2019 section 366.26 report merely recommended a 120-day continuance to allow time for the Department to further assess the maternal grandmother's potential for adoption of the children. Specifically, the Department documented several instances where the maternal grandmother allowed or sought permission for mother to engage in family activities with the children. As a result, the Department expressed concern with the maternal grandmother's ability to protect the children and maintain appropriate boundaries between the children and mother.

2. November 4, 2019 Section 366.26 Addendum Report

The Department's November 4, 2019 addendum report recommended termination of parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption for the children. According to the information in the report, D.L. was 11 years of age with no serious medical or dental concerns. He was on track to meet his developmental milestones. He enjoyed playing outside, playing games on his phone, Lego blocks and cars, and was on his school's football team. The Department continued to provide therapy for D.L., but did not believe he needed any other services. D.L. displayed the ability to appropriately express his needs and emotions, as well as had a close bond with his siblings and maternal grandmother.

While the report stated D.L. was 10 years of age, it identified D.L.'s date of birth as occurring in October 2008.

The report noted A.L. was nine years of age with no serious medical or dental concerns. She was on track to meet her developmental milestones and enjoyed drawing, painting, and playing with dolls. She displayed the ability to appropriately express her needs and emotions and was closely bonded to her siblings and maternal grandmother. The Department did not consider A.L. in need of any services.

The Department reported T.L. was six years of age with no serious medical or dental concerns. Like his siblings, he was meeting his developmental milestones, enjoyed playing outdoors, playing with friends at the park, and playing video games and Legos. He appropriately expressed his needs and emotions and was bonded to his siblings and maternal grandmother. Other than individual counseling services, the Department identified no other needs or services for T.L.

Finally, the report noted S.L. was a healthy and active five-year-old boy with no serious medical or dental concerns. He was meeting his developmental milestones and enjoyed age appropriate television shows, playing outside, and playing with his toys. He was not receiving any services, but displayed close bonds and attachment with his siblings and maternal grandmother.

The Department reported that mother had been consistent with court-ordered visits consisting of two hours of visitation per week monitored by the maternal grandmother. The maternal grandmother reported that the visits go well and the children look forward to having them each week.

The children had been placed with the maternal grandmother for the past six months and expressed a desire to be adopted by the maternal grandmother. The maternal grandmother expressed a desire to pursue legal adoption of all the children, displayed an understanding of her potential role as an adoptive parent, and has been informed of the application process for adoption. The Department noted the children made positive adjustments and were thriving in the maternal grandmother's home and the maternal grandmother has demonstrated a commitment to the children and demonstrated an ability to meet their developmental, medical, educational, emotional, and social needs.

The maternal grandmother was reported to be 57 years of age with no serious medical issues that would hinder her ability to provide or care for the children. The Department noted that the approval process for evaluation of the maternal grandmother's home was still ongoing, but that the maternal grandmother had cleared initial criminal background checks and that the size and location of the maternal grandmother's home appeared appropriate for raising the children.

3. Mother's Testimony

Mother acknowledged the children had not been in her care for the past three to four years, but testified that when they were last in her care she provided and cared for them on a daily basis. Over the past six months, she participated in regular visits with the children consisting of a few hours of visitation every weekend. The visits were supervised by the maternal grandmother and mother would play games and read with her children. Mother did not attend any of the children's medical appointments, but did attend a recent parent-teacher conference at the children's school. She expressed the opinion that her children were happy to see her during visits; that the children were sad when visits ended; that her children did not want to be adopted; and that she would prefer a lesser permanent plan such as legal guardianship.

4. Juvenile Court's Findings and Orders

The juvenile court found the children were both generally and specifically adoptable. With respect to the parental bond exception, the juvenile court found that mother had been consistent with regular visitation, but failed to show her relationship with her children rose to the level of a parental role. As such, the juvenile court issued an order terminating mother's parental rights and selecting a permanent plan of adoption for the children.

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, mother argues the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights must be reversed because (1) substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding her children were adoptable, and (2) substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding that mother's relationship with her children did not rise to the level of a parental role sufficient to support the application of the parental bond exception to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports both findings, and as a result affirm the orders. A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that the Children Were Adoptable

"The juvenile court may terminate parental rights only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the child will be adopted within a reasonable time. [Citations.] In making this determination, the juvenile court must focus on the child, and whether the child's age, physical condition, and emotional state may make it difficult to find an adoptive family. [Citations.]" (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 400 (Erik P.).) "A child's young age, good physical and emotional health, intellectual growth and ability to develop interpersonal relationships are all attributes indicating adoptability. [Citation.] . . . [Further], a prospective adoptive parent's willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family. [Citation.]" (In re Gregory A. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1562 (Gregory A.), italics omitted.)

"[T]he statutory scheme and case law require a determination of the adoptability of a child as an individual . . . ." (In re I.I. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 857, 872.) Usually, the individual child's relationship with his or her siblings is not a factor in determining whether a child is generally adoptable. (Erik P., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 401.)

"In reviewing the juvenile court's order, we determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing evidence that [the child] was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. [Citations.]" (Erik P., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 400; see Gregory A., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1561-1562.)

Here, the Department's section 366.26 report represented that each of the children had no serious medical issues and were meeting their individual developmental milestones. The report noted that the three older children were able to appropriately communicate their needs and emotions and identified no need for significant ongoing services for any of the children other than therapy for D.L. and individual counseling for T.L. Additionally, the report noted the maternal grandmother had clearly expressed a willingness to adopt all four of the children. Thus, the record contains substantial evidence upon which the juvenile court could rely to conclude the children were likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. Mother has identified nothing in the record to suggest that any child's age, physical condition, mental state, or developmental history would present an impediment to adoption within a reasonable time.

In reply, mother concedes that the issue of adoptability is determined on an individual basis, but argues that the existence of a sibling set is a relevant factor for consideration. Even if the existence of a large sibling set is a factor weighing against adoptability, it does not provide grounds for reversal. "The issue of sufficiency of the evidence in dependency cases is governed by the same rules that apply to all appeals. If, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. [Citation.] We do not pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence, or evaluate the weight of the evidence. Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record most favorably to the juvenile court's order, and affirm the order even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion. [Citation.]" (In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 251.) Thus, on review it is not our task to reweigh the evidence. The fact that the existence of a large sibling set might weigh against a finding of adoptability does not provide grounds for reversal where other evidence in the record supports such finding. Since the juvenile court's finding that each child was generally adoptable was supported by substantial evidence, we decline to reverse the order terminating parental rights on this ground. B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that the Parental Bond Exception Does Not Apply

Once a child is deemed generally adoptable, the juvenile court need not consider whether the child is specifically adoptable. (In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1061 ["If the child is considered generally adoptable, we do not examine the suitability of the prospective adoptive home."]; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1526 [same].) --------

Finally, mother argues the order terminating her parental rights must be reversed because substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's determination that the parental bond exception set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply.

"One of the statutory exceptions to termination is contained in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), which permits the court to order some other permanent plan if '[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.' The exception requires the parent to prove both that he or she has maintained regular visitation and that his or her relationship with the child ' " 'promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.' " ' [Citations.]" (In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 646 (Breanna S.).)

"A showing the child derives some benefit from the relationship is not sufficient ground to depart from the statutory preference for adoption. [Citation.] No matter how loving and frequent the contact, and notwithstanding the existence of an ' "emotional bond" ' with the child, ' "the parents must show that they occupy 'a parental role' in the child's life." ' [Citations.] Factors to consider include ' " '[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the "positive" or "negative" effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs.' " ' [Citation.] . . . '[I]t is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement.' [Citation.] [¶] The parent has the burden of proving the statutory exception applies. [Citations.]" (Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 646-647.)

The juvenile court's determination that the parental bond exception does not apply is reviewed under a hybrid standard of review. "Underlying factual determinations—such as whether a parent has maintained regular visitation or whether a beneficial parental relationship exists—are properly reviewable for substantial evidence. [Citations.] In contrast, a juvenile court's determination whether such a relationship provides a compelling justification for forgoing adoption 'is based on the facts but is not primarily a factual issue.' [Citation.] Rather, it is a 'quintessentially' discretionary decision, which calls for the juvenile court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the child of adoption.' [Citations.] Intrinsic to a balancing of these interests is the exercise of the court's discretion, properly reviewable for abuse. [Citations.]" (In re Caden C. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 87, 106, italics omitted.)

Here, it is undisputed mother engaged in consistent visitation with her children, but the juvenile court determined that mother's relationship with them did not rise to the level of a parental role, likening it more to that of a " 'friendly visitor.' " Mother challenges this factual finding as a ground for reversal. Under the hybrid standard of review, we review the juvenile court's factual findings for substantial evidence and conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding in this case.

At the time of the hearing, the children had already been removed from mother's care for more than three years. Considering the oldest child was11 years of age at the time and the youngest only age five, this represented a substantial portion of their lives in which mother did not act as their primary caregiver. Further, mother admitted she was not regularly involved with her children's medical or educational needs, having not regularly attended any appointments. This was substantial evidence upon which the juvenile court could reasonably rely to conclude mother's relationship with her children did not rise to the level of a "parental role." Where the juvenile court concludes that the nature of the relationship between a parent and child does not qualitatively resemble that of a "parental role," the statutory exception does not apply and there is no occasion for the juvenile court to weigh the benefits of continuing such a relationship against the benefits of adoption.

Additionally, we note that "to establish the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception the parent must show the child would suffer detriment if his or her relationship with the parent were terminated. [Citation.]" (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.) It was mother's burden to establish the application of the statutory exception below, but nothing in the record here suggests mother put on any evidence to suggest what detriment any of the children would suffer as a result of the termination of mother's parental rights. Since the juvenile court's finding in this case is supported by substantial evidence, we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court's order terminating mother's parental rights.

IV. DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS

J. We concur: MILLER

Acting P. J. CODRINGTON

J.


Summaries of

In re S.L.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Jun 23, 2020
E074461 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 23, 2020)
Case details for

In re S.L.

Case Details

Full title:In re S.L. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

Date published: Jun 23, 2020

Citations

E074461 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 23, 2020)