Opinion
E081275
01-24-2024
In re A.R. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. L.R., Defendant and Appellant. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Monica Vogelmann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Tiffany Lok, and Landon C. Villavaso, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County Nos. J284400, J284401, J284402,J288507 . Cara D. Hutson and Erin K. Alexander, Judges. Affirmed.
Monica Vogelmann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Tiffany Lok, and Landon C. Villavaso, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
I. INTRODUCTION
L.R. appeals the juvenile court's order denying his repeated requests to represent himself in dependency proceedings concerning his four minor children. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because this appeal concerns only L.R.'s requests to represent himself, we provide only a brief overview of the dependency proceedings.
Plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) filed a petition under section 300 on behalf of L.R.'s three minor children. The juvenile court sustained the petition and declared the children dependents of the court in October 2020. L.R. subsequently had another child and CFS filed a section 300 petition on that child's behalf. The juvenile court sustained the petition and declared the child a dependent of the court in April 2021. The juvenile court eventually set the matter for a contested section 366.26 hearing, which was continued until May 16, 2023.
L.R. made five requests to represent himself throughout the dependency proceedings. His requests, each of which was denied, were made on September 29, 2022, January 25, 2023, February 22, 2023, March 27, 2023, and May 9, 2023. L.R. made his last request so that he could represent himself at the section 366.26 hearing. The court denied the request and continued the section 366.26 hearing until May 16, 2023.
Later that day (May 9, 2023), L.R. filed a notice of appeal, challenging only the juvenile court's order made earlier that day denying his request to represent himself.
III. DISCUSSION
L.R. argues the juvenile court erred by "denying his repeated requests to represent himself." Before turning to the merits, we must confirm our jurisdiction. (Kirk v. Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1061.)
A notice of appeal must identify each judgment or order appealed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).) Because "[o]ur jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from," (Polster, Inc. v. Swing (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 427, 436), we have no jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal. (Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 35, 46-47.)
L.R.'s notice of appeal mentions only the juvenile court's May 9, 2023 order denying his request to represent himself. We therefore may consider only that order.
We also lack jurisdiction over the juvenile court's orders denying L.R.'s requests to represent himself made in September 2022, January 2023, and February 2023, because L.R. did not timely appeal them. (See In re A.J. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 7, 16 ["The time for appeal of an order made in a dependency case is 60 days from the date of the order's pronouncement in open court."]; SaraM. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018 ["An appeal from the most recent order in a dependency matter may not challenge earlier orders for which the time for filing an appeal has passed."].) L.R. could have timely appealed the juvenile court's March 2023 order denying his request to represent himself, but we lack jurisdiction over that order because L.R. did not mention it in his notice of appeal. We note that L.R. did not challenge our jurisdictional conclusions at oral argument.
The Department, however, argues that we should dismiss L.R.'s appeal because it is not ripe. We disagree.
"The ripeness requirement, a branch of the doctrine of justiciability, prevents courts from issuing purely advisory opinions. [Citation.] It is rooted in the fundamental concept that the proper role of the judiciary does not extend to the resolution of abstract differences of legal opinion. It is in part designed to regulate the workload of courts by preventing judicial consideration of lawsuits that seek only to obtain general guidance, rather than to resolve specific legal disputes. However, the ripeness doctrine is primarily bottomed on the recognition that judicial decisionmaking is best conducted in the context of an actual set of facts so that the issues will be framed with sufficient definiteness to enable the court to make a decree finally disposing of the controversy." (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170.)
"In determining whether a controversy is ripe, we use a two-pronged test: (1) whether the dispute is sufficiently concrete to make declaratory relief appropriate; and (2) whether the withholding of judicial consideration will result in a hardship to the parties. [Citation.] Under the first prong, the courts will decline to adjudicate a dispute if 'the abstract posture of [the] proceeding makes it difficult to evaluate . . . the issues' [citation], if the court is asked to speculate on the resolution of hypothetical situations [citation], or if the case presents a 'contrived inquiry' [citation]. Under the second prong, the courts will not intervene merely to settle a difference of opinion; there must be an imminent and significant hardship inherent in further delay." (Farm Sanctuary, Inc. v. Department of Food &Agriculture (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 495, 501-502.)
In short, to be ripe, an issue must present a "'real and substantial controversy'" capable of "'specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character.'" (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 171.) An appeal that is not ripe is not justiciable and must be dismissed. (Id. at p. 170.)
Father requested to represent himself, which the juvenile court denied and which CFS argues was proper. This is an actual, specific legal dispute between the parties, not an abstract difference of legal opinion. (See Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 170.) The parties litigated the matter, the facts and issues are clear, and we can readily resolve the parties' dispute on this developed record without issuing a purely advisory opinion. (See ibid.) And if we resolved the issue in L.R.'s favor, then he could represent himself in further dependency proceedings, as he wishes to do. L.R.'s appeal therefore is ripe.
Parents in a dependency case have a statutory right to self-representation. (In re Angel W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1083.) The juvenile court, however, may deny a parent's request for self-representation if "granting the request would impair the child's right to a prompt resolution of custody status or unduly disrupt the proceedings." (In re A.M. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 914, 925.)
We review the juvenile court's ruling on a parent's request for self-representation for an abuse of discretion. (In re Angel W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085.) A juvenile court abuses its discretion when its ruling is "absurd or beyond the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances considered." (In re Ana C. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1326.)
The juvenile court here reasonably denied L.R.'s request to represent himself. The court denied L.R.'s fifth and final request in May 2023 on the ground that he could not "follow a simple order of the Court." This was a proper basis to deny L.R.'s request, and substantial evidence supports the court's underlying finding.
At a hearing in March 2023, the juvenile court explained that it had recently come to light that L.R. had secretly recorded the confidential dependency proceedings on his cell phone in violation of the court's orders, which L.R. was aware of. The court also recently learned that L.R. had also violated the court's orders by posting pictures of his children on social media along with confidential social worker reports. The court thus stated it would not proceed further unless L.R. relinquished his cell phone or waited outside.
The court then asked L.R., "are you going to take the phone out and set it on that ledge or not?" L.R. asked if he could ask a question, to which the court replied, "'Yes' or 'no'?" L.R. replied, "I will." The court repeated, "'Yes' or 'no'?," to which L.R. again replied, "I will." The juvenile court then asked the deputy to escort L.R. outside. The court explained to L.R.'s attorney that L.R. would not be allowed back in the courtroom if he "continue[d] to act" the way had just acted, and wanted L.R. to have "some time . . . to cool down so that when he comes back in he can make his appearance . . . in an organized and respectful way." The court then reminded L.R.'s counsel that the proceedings were confidential, so L.R. could not post about them on social media.
The juvenile court later put on the record that L.R. "kept on talking" and "talk[ed] over" the court during this colloquy, but the court reporter likely took down the court's words as instructed "when two people at talking at once."
Nonetheless, L.R. posted about the incident on social media days later. In his post, he stated that he followed the court's order to place his phone on the ledge, "did nothing wrong," and that the juvenile court was biased against him because she had already "made up her mind." When reporting this new social media post to the court, the social worker explained that the children's caretaker was "highly concerned" about L.R.'s prior posts with the social worker's report, which had been shared by other people, because it identified people in the caretaker's "support system."
Based on this evidence, the juvenile court reasonably found that L.R. would not follow the court's orders, which would unduly disrupt the proceedings. This provided the juvenile court valid grounds for denying his request to represent himself at the section 366.26 hearing. (See In re A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 925.) We therefore cannot say that the court's order was "absurd or beyond the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances considered." (In re Ana C., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326.)
The juvenile court had another valid reason for denying L.R.'s fifth request to represent himself. By the time of that request, the children's dependency case had been going on for over three years. L.R. had not received any court-approved reunification services because those services had been bypassed and not offered, in part because L.R. is a registered sex offender. (See § 361.5, subd. (b)(11), (12), (16).) When denying
L.R.'s fourth request to represent himself, in March 2023, the juvenile court denied the request because it was "interfering with the due process of these children." The court reasoned that the children "will never be placed, never find justice," and there will "never [be] a hearing" for their permanent placement if the court were to keep holding hearings on L.R.'s representation.
Although the juvenile court did not deny L.R.'s fifth and final request to represent himself under review on this basis, we may affirm a court's order on any basis presented in the record. (Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255.) Children in dependency proceedings have a right to a prompt resolution of their custody status, and the dependency system as a whole is geared toward promoting the best interests of children within the system. (§ 202; In re A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 926.) The juvenile court thus has discretion to deny a parent's request for self-representation if doing so would impair a child's right to a prompt resolution of their custody status. (In re A.M., supra, at p. 926.) Given that the dependency proceedings had languished for over three years, the juvenile court could have reasonably found that allowing L.R. to represent himself would have unduly prolonged the proceedings to the children's detriment. This would have been a reasonable exercise of the court's discretion. (Ibid.)
In short, the juvenile court had at least two good reasons to deny L.R.'s request to represent himself. We therefore conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
IV. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's May 8, 2023 order denying L.R.'s request to represent himself is affirmed.
We concur: FIELDS J. RAPHAEL J.