Opinion
E077702
03-22-2022
In re Ze.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. L.G.. et al., Defendants and Appellants. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, R.B. Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, L.G. Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Pamela J. Walls, Special Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Nos. J281811, J281812 & J281813, Erin K. Alexander, Judge. Affirmed.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, R.B.
Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, L.G.
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Pamela J. Walls, Special Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
FIELDS J.
INTRODUCTION
R.B. (mother) purports to appeal from a juvenile court order denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, in which she requested the court to reinstate her family reunification services and authorize unsupervised visitation with her children, Zy.G., Ze.G., and Zo.G. (the children). The children's father, L.G. (father), filed a letter brief joining in mother's brief. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the order denying mother's petition, since the notice of appeal she filed expressly stated she was appealing only from the order terminating her parental rights. Furthermore, because mother presents no reasoned argument why the court erred by terminating her parental rights, we conclude she has waived her challenge to that order. Therefore, we must affirm.
All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
We note that mother filed the section 388 petition in propria persona and only named Zy.G. in the petition. However, since the dependency involved all three children, we will assume mother meant to include Ze.G. and Zo.G. in the petition as well.
Therefore, we will only provide a brief recitation of the procedural background. Part of the background is taken from the appellate record in case No. E074009, which this court has incorporated in the instant case (case No. E077702), on our own motion. The underlying facts of this case are not germane to the dispositive question of this court's jurisdiction to review the order denying mother's section 388 petition.
The juvenile court found that the children came within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (b), specifically finding true the allegations that mother had an ongoing history of substance abuse, and that Zy.G. and Ze.G. were removed from her in prior dependency cases, which were later dismissed. The court declared the children dependents, removed them from the custody of mother and father (the parents), placed them in the custody of San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), and ordered reunification services for the parents, as well as supervised visitation. At a contested 18-month review hearing on March 29, 2021, the court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. It also continued supervised visitation.
The court held a section 366.26 hearing on July 27, 2021, and set the matter contested on behalf of the parents. On August 19, 2021, mother filed a section 388 petition, seeking to reinstate her reunification services and obtain unsupervised visitation. She alleged that she was now attending an outpatient substance abuse program, counseling, and other programs.
The court held a combined hearing pursuant to sections 388 and 366.26 on September 9, 2021. It denied an evidentiary hearing on the section 388 petition, noting that mother had made some positive strides, but the case was "on the eve of a .26" and she had failed in the past to demonstrate she could sustain her sobriety and stability over a period of time. The court then proceeded with the section 366.26 portion of the hearing and, after hearing testimony from mother, terminated parental rights and freed the children for adoption. Although mother and father were represented by appointed counsel, they both personally completed and filed a notice of appeal that same day, indicating they were appealing the order terminating parental rights.
DISCUSSION
This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Review the Order Denying the Section 388 Petition, and Mother Has Waived Any Challenge to the Order Terminating Parental Rights
Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it summarily denied her section 388 petition. She contends that she demonstrated changed circumstances and the relief she sought-reunification services and unsupervised visitation-was in the children's best interests. However, the record shows that mother did not actually appeal from the September 9, 2021 order denying her section 388 petition, and we cannot, for reasons set forth below, liberally construe the notice of appeal to include that order; therefore, we lack jurisdiction to address the merits of mother's argument. Moreover, although mother properly appealed from the September 9, 2021 order terminating her parental rights, we must affirm that order because she has failed to provide any reasoned argument why that order should be reversed.
" '[A]n appealable judgment or order is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal.'" (Hedwall v. PCMV, LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 564, 571.) "Because the right to appeal is strictly statutory, a judgment or order is not appealable unless a statute expressly makes it appealable. [Citations.] 'Appeals in dependency proceedings are governed by section 395 . . . .' [Citations.] Section 395 provides in pertinent part that '[a] judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed as an order after judgment.' (§ 395, subd. (a)(1); [citation].)" (In re Michael H. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1373, fn. omitted.) The judgment in dependency proceedings is the dispositional order. (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532.)
There is no question the September 9, 2021 order denying mother's section 388 petition was an appealable postjudgment order (In re Shirley K. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 65, 71), and mother's notice of appeal was timely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a).) The sole issue here is whether mother properly appealed from that order. A notice of appeal "is sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or order being appealed." (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.100(a)(2), 8.405(a)(3).)" 'Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from.' [Citation.] We have no jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal." (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170 (Faunce).)
Mother's notice of appeal (Judicial Council Forms, form JV-800), filed on September 9, 2021, indicates she was appealing only from the order entered that day terminating her parental rights. Under the heading, "I appeal from the findings and orders of the court (specify date of order or describe order)," mother wrote, "September 9, 2021 Termination of Parental Rights and adoption. I don't want proceeding." Under the heading, "The order appealed from was made under Welfare and Institutions Code (check all that apply)," mother checked the boxes for, "Section 366.26" and "Termination of parental rights." She did not check the catchall box for "Other appealable orders relating to dependency (specify)," and nowhere did she indicate on the notice that she was appealing the denial of her section 388 petition.
Generally, we must liberally construe a notice of appeal in favor of its sufficiency. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.100(a)(2), 8.405(a)(3).) A notice of appeal shall be" 'liberally construed so as to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced.'" (In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261, 272 (Joshua S.).) However, "there are limits to our ability to liberally construe a notice of appeal. 'The policy of liberally construing a notice of appeal in favor of its sufficiency [citation] does not apply if the notice is so specific it cannot be read as reaching a judgment or order not mentioned at all.'" (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 76 (J.F.); see Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154, 173.) "[I]t is well 'beyond liberal construction' to view an appeal from one order as an appeal from a 'further and different order.' [Citation.] 'Despite the rule favoring liberal interpretation of notices of appeal, a notice of appeal will not be considered adequate if it completely omits any reference to the judgment being appealed.'" (Baker v. Castaldi (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 218, 225.)
As indicated ante, mother's notice of appeal does not specify that she was appealing from the order denying her section 388 petition. Because the notice of appeal does not identify the juvenile court's order denying the section 388 petition, we lack jurisdiction to consider the propriety of that order. (J.F., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 78-79; Faunce, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 170; see Polster, Inc. v. Swing (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 427, 436 ["Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from."].)
In her reply brief, mother does not dispute that her notice of appeal completely omits any reference to the order denying her section 388 petition. Instead, she argues that we should liberally construe the notice to include the omitted order since CFS was not misled or prejudiced by her notice of appeal. However, the issue is not that CFS was misled by the language of the notice of appeal. "In fact, quite the contrary appears. The notice of appeal first, properly and in detail, describes the order appealed from." (Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d 54, 60.) The order appealed from is the order terminating mother's parental rights. As explained, the policy of liberal construction "does not apply if the notice is so specific it cannot be read as reaching a judgment or order not mentioned at all." (Filbin v. Fitzgerald, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 173, italics added.)
Furthermore, since we lack jurisdiction to review the order on the section 388 petition order, the only order properly before us is the court's order terminating mother's parental rights. However, although mother timely and properly appealed from the termination order, her brief provides no argument whatsoever as to why the court erred when it terminated her parental rights. Instead, she focused her arguments entirely on why the court erred by denying the section 388 petition.
The juvenile court's orders are "presumed to be correct, and it is appellant's burden to affirmatively show error." (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) "To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error." (Ibid.)' "When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.'" (In re A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 672.)
Because mother has not met her burden of demonstrating reversible error through reasoned argument, we deem the challenge to the order terminating her parental rights to be waived, and we affirm the order. (J.F., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 79-80.)
To the extent father joins in mother's brief, contending that if we were to reverse the judgment terminating her parental rights, we must reverse the judgment terminating his parental rights, we also affirm the order terminating father's parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MILLER Acting P.J., CODRINGTON J.