Opinion
E075282
03-01-2021
In re E.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. G.G., Defendant and Appellant.
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and Michael A. Markel, Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. J284079) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Erin K. Alexander, Judge. Dismissed. Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and Michael A. Markel, Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 6, 2020, plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) took custody of E.A. pursuant to a detention warrant shortly after her birth. At the time, CFS had been informed that E.A.'s parents had two dependency cases involving E.A.'s older brother and half brother pending in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, and reunification services had already been terminated in at least one of those cases. On February 10, 2020, CFS filed a dependency petition on behalf of E.A. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 et seq., alleging abuse of a sibling, as well as the inability of E.A.'s parents to protect E.A. as a result of the events leading to the dependency proceedings related to her siblings.
Undesignated statutory references are the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On June 16, 2020, following a contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petition, ordered E.A. removed from parents' custody, granted reunification services to G.G. (Mother) and A.A. (Father), and ordered weekly visitation. Mother appeals from this order.
On November 4, 2020, during the pendency of Mother's appeal, the juvenile court heard and granted a petition brought by Mother pursuant to section 388; ordered E.A. returned to Mother's custody; dismissed E.A.'s dependency petition; and terminated its jurisdiction. CFS requests we augment the record to include this order and dismiss Mother's appeal as moot. Mother does not dispute the juvenile court's order has effectively provided her all the relief she seeks in her appeal, but she argues this court should still consider her claims of error because the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings might adversely impact her in some future, unspecified collateral action. Upon consideration of the record, we believe Mother's appeal is now moot and dismissal is appropriate in this case.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mother and Father are the parents of E.A. On February 6, 2020, E.A. was detained by CFS pursuant to a detention warrant shortly after her birth. At the time, CFS had been notified that both Mother and Father had two open dependency cases in Los Angeles County pertaining to E.A.'s brother and half brother. Reunification services had already been terminated with respect to E.A.'s half brother, and they were in the process of being terminated with respect to E.A.'s brother in the Los Angeles County proceedings.
Father is not a party to this appeal.
E.A.'s half brother was removed from Mother when she failed to comply with a no contact order prohibiting contact with Father. E.A.'s biological brother was removed when both he and Mother tested positive for marijuana at the time of his birth.
On February 10, 2020, CFS filed a dependency petition on behalf of E.A. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). With respect to Mother, the petition alleged an inability or failure to protect E.A. as a result of Mother's history of substance abuse; her failure to comply with a no contact order pertaining to E.A.'s half brother; and her failure to reunify with E.A.'s brother and half brother in separate dependency proceedings. The petition also alleged abuse of a sibling arising out of the events related to E.A.'s brother and half brother as a basis for jurisdiction.
On June 16, 2020, following a contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found true the jurisdictional allegations of the petition: (1) Mother had a history of substance abuse limiting her ability to adequately care and supervise E.A.; (2) E.A.'s half brother had previously been removed from Mother's custody and Mother failed to reunify in that case; and (3) abuse of a sibling, in that Mother failed to adequately protect E.A.'s half brother. At the time of this hearing, it was undisputed that the Superior Court of Los Angeles County had issued an order on September 17, 2019, terminating reunification services between Mother and E.A.'s half brother. Based upon its findings, the juvenile court ordered E.A. removed from Mother's custody; granted reunification services to Mother; and ordered weekly visitation.
The juvenile court did not sustain the allegations pertaining to E.A.'s brother.
On June 30, 2020, Mother filed her notice of appeal from the juvenile court's jurisdictional/dispositional order with respect to E.A.
On August 18, 2020, the Second District Court of Appeal granted Mother writ relief in the proceedings pertaining to E.A.'s half brother, vacating the juvenile court's order setting a permanency planning hearing in that case, and remanding the matter for further proceedings in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
On September 1, 2020, Mother filed her opening brief in this appeal, arguing the juvenile court's jurisdictional order must be reversed because (1) Mother was not provided adequate notice of the jurisdictional hearing and (2) the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Mother also argued the juvenile court's dispositional order should be reversed as moot because its jurisdictional order was erroneous.
On November 4, 2020, the juvenile court in this case granted a section 388 petition filed by Mother seeking modification of its prior jurisdictional/dispositional order. As a result, the juvenile court ordered that E.A. be returned to her parents' custody, dismissed the section 300 petition filed on behalf of E.A., and terminated its jurisdiction.
On November 9, 2020, CFS filed a motion to augment the record to include the juvenile court's November 4, 2020 order and requested we consider dismissal of this appeal as moot. On November 18, 2020, Mother filed an opposition to the request for dismissal, and on November 20, 2020, we issued an order reserving ruling on the request to be considered with the appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
"As a general rule, it is a court's duty to decide ' " 'actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.' " ' [Citation.] An appellate court will dismiss an appeal when an event occurs that renders it impossible for the court to grant effective relief." (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 58-59.)
"Juvenile dependency appeals raise unique mootness concerns because the parties have multiple opportunities to appeal orders even as the proceedings in the juvenile court proceed." (In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 59.) "As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot. [Citation.] However, dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, but 'must be decided on a case-by-case basis.' " (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) "[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error." (In re N.S., at p. 60.)
Here, neither party has seen fit to provide this court with a copy of Mother's section 388 petition, written submissions to the trial court related to that motion, or the transcript of proceedings related to it. Nevertheless, Mother concedes that her section 388 petition was granted, and the juvenile court returned E.A. to Mother's custody; dismissed E.A.'s dependency petition; and terminated its jurisdiction as a result. Thus, even if we were to assume the juvenile court erred with respect to some or all of its earlier jurisdictional or dispositional orders, there is no effective relief we could provide. Mother has already obtained the very relief she seeks in this appeal by way of her section 388 petition.
Mother argues the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings might adversely impact her in future dependency or family law proceedings and, as such, this court can still grant her relief by addressing the merits of these findings. However, the cases cited by Mother in support of this proposition involve situations in which the dependency proceedings had not concluded, an actual collateral family law proceeding was pending, or some order by the juvenile court continued to govern the rights of the parties with respect to some issue. In contrast, appellate courts have declined to consider an otherwise mooted claim where no actual collateral or future proceeding has been identified. (See In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1494-1495 [declining to address merits where the father "fail[ed] to suggest any way in which this finding actually could affect a future dependency or family law proceeding"]; In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 61 ["We see no reason to review the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings . . . on the basis of such speculation or caution."].) Absent any indication of a related collateral proceeding or that the juvenile court's prior jurisdictional or dispositional findings serve as the foundation for any continuing orders, we do not believe it appropriate to address the merits of Mother's appeal here.
The primary cases cited by mother in opposition to the request for dismissal are all distinguishable for this reason. In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544 addressed a jurisdictional order that continued to serve as a basis for restrictive visitation and custody orders in the parents' ongoing family law dispute. (Id. at pp. 1547-1549.) In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765 addressed an interlocutory visitation order where the underlying dependency proceeding remained active. (Id. at p. 769.) In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 involved a visitation order that continued to govern mother's interaction with her child even after the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 1488-1489.) Finally, in In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, the Court of Appeal noted that the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings could have a collateral impact on the parents' ongoing dissolution proceeding involving custody of their children. (Id. at p. 716.)
We are further persuaded by the fact that any hypothetical future risk of collateral consequences to Mother appear exceptionally minimal given the procedural posture in this case. Juvenile dependency records are generally confidential. (§§ 827, 828.) More importantly, Mother's challenge to the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders in this case were rendered moot by the same court's reconsideration of the issues upon a section 388 petition. While neither party has provided the underlying petition for our review, a petition under section 388 necessarily requests that the juvenile court "change, modify, or set aside any order of the court previously made or to terminate jurisdiction of the court" upon a showing of new evidence or changed circumstances. (§ 388, subd. (a).) Where the juvenile court has been invited to revisit its prior orders and, upon consideration of additional evidence, determined that changed circumstances no longer justify the orders originally made, any findings in its initial orders would seem to have little, if any, relevance or value to any potential future collateral proceeding.
Finally, we note there is no guarantee that this court's consideration of Mother's appeal on the merits will address the issues of primary concern to Mother in opposing dismissal. Specifically, Mother argues the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding that her history of substance abuse represented a substantial risk of harm to E.A. could have " 'severe and unfair consequences.' " However, " '[w]hen a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court's jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.' " (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773; see In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492.)
The juvenile court in this case made multiple jurisdictional findings, any one of which could be relied upon to affirm its order. Thus, even if we were to consider the merits of Mother's appeal, there is no guarantee any opinion by this court would address the specific finding that Mother claims might have some, unspecified consequence for her in the future. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Mother's appeal is moot and dismissal is appropriate in this case.
This principle might be particularly applicable in this case. One of the jurisdictional findings made by the juvenile court was that Mother failed to reunify with E.A.'s half brother in a different dependency action. At the time of the jurisdictional hearing in this case on June 16, 2020, it was uncontested that an order terminating reunification services had been made in the half brother's dependency action. The only argument asserted by Mother on appeal in challenging this finding is that the order terminating reunification services in the half brother's case was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeal on August 18, 2020. However, it is difficult to envision how the juvenile court could have erred by failing to consider evidence which did not exist at the time of its ruling.
IV. DISPOSITION
We grant the motion to augment the record filed on November 9, 2020, and order Mother's appeal dismissed.
On August 21, 2020 and September 1, 2020, mother filed requests for judicial notice of various matters from the appellate and trial court proceedings pertaining to E.A.'s siblings in support of her arguments on appeal, and we reserved ruling on these requests. However, because we now determine that mother's appeal is moot, these materials are not relevant to resolution of any dispositive issue in this appeal, and we deny the requests. (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482 ["We . . . may decline to take judicial notice of matters that are not relevant to dispositive issues on appeal."]; In re Alexander P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475, 491, fn. 16 [same].)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J. We concur: McKINSTER
Acting P. J. MILLER
J.