Opinion
E079562
02-22-2023
In re B.R. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. E.G., Defendant and Appellant. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Tiffany Lok, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Nos. J274690 &J274691 &J274692 &J274693 &J274694, Annemarie G. Pace, Judge. Affirmed.
Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Tiffany Lok, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MILLER J.
E.G. (Mother) contends the juvenile court erred in denying her request to reinstate reunification services. (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 388, subd. (a)(1).) We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. BACKGROUND
There are five children involved in this case: J.R., a girl born in 2006; C.R., a boy born in 2009; A.R., a girl born in 2013; S.R., a boy born in 2014; and B.R., a girl born in 2015 (collectively, the children). On May 29, 2014, S.R., A.R., C.R., and J.R. were placed with Mother as their foster parent. On May 4, 2015, B.R. was also placed in Mother's home, in foster care. The children's biological parents did not reunify with the children, and Mother adopted the children on June 3, 2016. J.D. (Husband) was Mother's husband, but he was not part of the adoption process and therefore, in the instant case, he was found to be the children's alleged father.
We infer from the record that the children share the same biological mother, and their biological mother passed away.
B. JURISDICTION
At the jurisdiction hearing, in May 2018, the juvenile court found: (1) In January 2018, Mother severely physically abused J.R., causing J.R. to suffer blurred vision, a headache, and a bruised lip (§ 300, subd. (a)); (2) Mother punched C.R. in the mouth (§ 300, subd. (a)); (3) Mother struck S.R. causing him to suffer "bruises to his arms and a missing right upper central incisor" (§ 300, subd. (a)); (4) Mother struck A.R. causing A.R. to suffer injuries to her arms and a chipped tooth (§ 300, subd. (b)); (5) Mother and Husband engaged in domestic violence in the children's presence (§ 300, subd. (b)); (6) while in Mother's custody, J.R. was sexually abused and Mother knew or reasonably should have known of the sexual abuse (§ 300, subd. (b)); (7) Mother failed to protect J.R. from sexual abuse by Mother's father (Grandfather) (§ 300, subd. (d)); and (8) Mother's physical abuse of J.R. placed J.R.'s siblings at risk of similar abuse (§ 300, subd. (j)).
C. JUNE THROUGH DECEMBER 2018
In June 2018, Mother "completed her case plan services, which included individual therapy, domestic violence and parenting classes." That same month, the court added anger management and more individual counseling to Mother's case plan. Mother completed anger management in October 2018. In December 2018, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the Department) believed Mother "need[ed] time to demonstrate the skills she has learned through classes and therapy," and therefore, the Department requested "visitation to progress to overnights in order to continue to assess the progress [of] the mother."
D. 2019
The children were divided amongst two foster homes. B.R. and S.R. were placed together. In February 2019, the Department was informed of "sexual sibling abuse between the children S.R. and B.R." S.R. and B.R. were given wraparound services due to "hyperactivity, defiance and inappropriate sexualized behaviors." The attorney for B.R., S.R., and C.R. requested the juvenile court change its order granting overnight visits for Mother because the attorney had "received multiple referrals regarding inappropriate sexual touching between [the siblings, and that] behavior did not occur prior to Mother receiving overnight visits." In April 2019, the juvenile court changed Mother's visits with B.R., S.R., and C.R. to supervised visits.
On June 12, 2019, the juvenile court again permitted Mother to have overnight visits with B.R., S.R., and C.R. On June 14, 2019, the Department requested a copy of Mother's lease and saw that Grandfather was on the lease; Mother was financially dependent on Grandfather. Mother denied that Grandfather sexually abused J.R. The social worker questioned whether Mother had "truly benefit[t]ed from the services offered" and concluded that Mother "lack[ed] the protective capacity in order to further liberalize visitations." The juvenile court modified Mother's visitation to "unsupervised in a neutral setting."
In July 2019, the Department asserted that Mother had exhausted the statutory time period for reunification services. The Department recommended that reunification services be terminated, but that services then be granted under the children's permanent plans. The juvenile court followed the Department's recommendation.
E. 2020
In February 2020, S.R. had bruises on his arm. S.R. said Mother" 'did that to him.'" The juvenile court ordered that Mother's visits be supervised and take place once a month for two hours. The court did not terminate Mother's parental rights because the children were not "proper subject[s] for adoption at [that] time and a potential legal guardian has not been identified." In March 2020, the juvenile court terminated the services being provided to Mother under the permanent plans.
In May 2020, C.R. "asked [J.R.] to have sex with him." Also, C.R. took A.R. into "a room, pulled down his pants, and laid behind her. [A.R.] disclosed that during this incident [C.R.] touched her private parts on top of her clothes." The Department moved C.R. to a foster home without his siblings.
C.R. had trouble sleeping following joint counseling sessions with Mother. S.R. "exhibited defiant behaviors after every phone call with [Mother]. Phone calls were decreased to every other week in efforts to stabilize the child's mental and emotional state....[Since the reduction in phone calls, S.R.]'s behaviors have decreased drastically and he is going on over a month with no major behavior concerns."
F. 2021
Mother was criminally charged due to the abuse that caused the children to be removed from her care in 2018. In the criminal court, Mother "was ordered to pay a fine, complete 1 week of house arrest, and attend child abuse classes for 1 year."
On May 31, 2021, at approximately 2:15 a.m., S.R. screamed that "there were spiders on his bed sheets." S.R. was hallucinating. S.R. began hitting his head against the wall and pulling his hair. S.R. was taken to urgent care by ambulance. On June 7, 2021, S.R.'s foster mother reported that "[S.R.] kicked the family cat hard enough to cause bleeding from the mouth. [S.R.] picked up the cat by it[s] rear legs leaving the front legs on the floor, he bent the cat backwards and kicked the cat in the stomach causing the cat to screech and vomit. [S.R.] was holding the dog['s] paws and kicked the dog." On June 7 or 8, S.R. was admitted to a behavioral medical center for observation. S.R. had a roommate at the medical center, but S.R. bit the roommate and was moved to a single room.
In October 2021, 12-year-old C.R. punched a hole in the wall of his foster home because his foster parent forbade C.R. from wearing shoes that his biological mother gave to him before passing away. C.R. said he had thoughts of committing suicide by choking himself, and that he had attempted suicide "in the past with a small rope." C.R. was diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder. C.R. was placed in a residential therapeutic treatment home.
In November 2021, six-year-old B.R. was placed on a section 5150 hold after threatening to cut her foster parent's throat, wrist, and ankle, and striking her teacher. "[B.R.] admit[ted] to hearing voices that tell her to kill herself and others. At times, [B.R.] is not able to resist listening to these voices and feels that she will act out and attempt to hurt herself or others because of the voices." At the behavioral medical center, B.R. required one-on-one supervision "to keep [her] and others around her safe."
G. 2022
In February 2022, the juvenile court ordered a permanent plan of legal guardianship for J.R. and A.R. The court appointed J.R. and A.R.'s foster parents, with whom they had lived since 2018, as their legal guardians. The court also permitted Mother to continue having two hours of supervised visitation with J.R. and A.R. once per month. The juvenile court then dismissed the dependency petition and terminated jurisdiction as to J.R. and A.R.
Mother visited the children once per month. B.R.'s foster parents and S.R.'s foster parents "report[ed] [B.R. and S.R.] acting out, not following direction[s] or rules after visits." "[Mother] has been observed kissing the children on the lips during visits, [S.R.] sees this and wants to mimic this behavior and tell [B.R.] that she is his girlfriend. [Mother] does not correct the behavior." The Department concluded, "Although the children enjoy the visits, the visits are not necessarily beneficial."
In July 2022, Mother requested the juvenile court grant her six months of reunification services. (§ 388.) Mother asserted circumstances had changed because "Mother's therapist is very supportive of the children being returned to [M]other." Mother provided a letter from her therapist reflecting that Mother "clearly demonstrates her ability to be protective of the children in the future by providing specific examples of how she will exercise her protective capacity if given the opportunity to reunify with her children." Further, Mother contended that she completed 12 parenting classes, 12 domestic violence classes, 12 anger management classes, and attended individual and family therapy for 14 months. Mother asserted that she was employed, had her own residence, and "worked hard in her efforts to overcome the reasons for" the dependency.
The juvenile court summarily denied Mother's request and gave three reasons: (1) "the request does not state new evidence or a change of circumstances"; (2) "the proposed change of order . . . does not promote the best interest of the child"; and (3) "[t]he visits [with] Mother [with S.R. and B.R.] cause issues with the behavior of the children according to the reports."
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by summarily denying her request to reinstate reunification services.
" 'A juvenile court order may be changed . . . under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A parent need only make a prima facie showing of these elements to trigger the right to a hearing on a section 388 petition and the petition should be liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consider the parent's request.
" 'However, if the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child, the court need not order a hearing on the petition. [Citations.] The prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.'
"The appellate court' "will not disturb [a] decision unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination." '" (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 205.)
In Mother's juvenile court petition, as to changed circumstances, Mother cites to Exhibit A, which is the letter from Mother's therapist. Exhibit A sets forth Mother's therapist's opinion that "[Mother] has accepted responsibility for actions leading to the removal of the children. [Mother] clearly demonstrates her ability to be protective of the children in the future by providing specific examples of how she will exercise her protective capacity if given the opportunity to reunify with her children." The "specific examples" are not included in the letter/Exhibit A. Nevertheless, we will assume, for the sake of judicial efficiency, that Mother's acceptance of responsibility and her ability to be protective would constitute changed circumstances.
The People assert that Mother did not make a prima facie case for changed circumstances because the alleged changed circumstances in the instant petition are the same changes that were alleged in Mother's "prior section 388 petition filed in December of 2021." Because we are examining the juvenile court's ruling that Mother failed to make a prima facie case, we confine our review to Mother's current petition and "the facts established as without dispute by the court's own file ([for example, the children's] age[s], the nature of [their] existing placement[s], and the time [they] came into care as [wards of the court]). (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 461.) At this stage in the proceedings, we will not compare and contrast the allegations in separate petitions.
"The factors to be considered in evaluating the child's best interests under section 388 are: (1) the seriousness of the problem that led to the dependency and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of the child's bond with his or her new caretakers compared with the strength of the child's bond with the parent, and (3) the degree to which the problem leading to the dependency may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been." (In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 224.)
In Mother's petition, regarding why reunification services would be in the children's best interests, she wrote, "As stated in Exhibit A, [Mother] can now be protective of the children and the children want to be returned home to [M]other." In Exhibit A, Mother's therapist wrote, "Mother is able to articulate how her past decision making put the children in danger of neglect and abuse." Mother does not explicitly acknowledge the physical and sexual abuse the children suffered or explain the seriousness of the abuse.
As to the second factor, Mother failed to indicate the strength of the children's bonds with their caretakers and failed to compare those bonds to the children's bonds with Mother. Mother's therapist wrote, "[Mother] reports that the children frequently express a desire to be returned to her care and custody." In the petition, Mother wrote, "[T]he children want to be returned home to mother." The children's desire to return to Mother's care, if proven, does not address whether the children have bonded with their caretakers and may also like to stay in their care.
In regard to the third factor, Mother did not explain how easily the problems leading to the dependency could be resolved and whether they have been resolved. In her petition, Mother wrote, "[M]other can now be protective of the children." Mother's therapist explained that Mother had taken classes, attended therapy sessions, moved to a new house, became engaged to a different man, and was no longer financially dependent on Grandfather. If all of those things were proven true, there remains a failure to address whether they resolve the physical abuse, sexual abuse, and domestic violence that led to the dependency. For example, there is not an assertion of how Mother is avoiding domestic violence in her new romantic relationship. Further, Mother fails to explain how she can now parent multiple children suffering from mental health issues without resorting to physical violence.
In sum, Mother failed to address the three factors that are relevant to a best interests analysis. Therefore, the juvenile court did not err by summarily denying her petition.
On appeal, Mother asserts reunification services would be in the children's best interests because "[s]he is the only one that is willing to commit to a permanent plan." (Italics omitted.) The fact that Mother is willing to commit to the children does not mean such a commitment is in the children's best interests. Accordingly, we find her argument to be unpersuasive.
Next, Mother asserts "the children were doing significantly worse in foster care than they were doing when living with their mother." While in Mother's physical custody, the children were severely beaten, sexually abused, and witnessed domestic violence. Mother would need to provide far more than a conclusory statement to aid us in understanding her position that the children are suffering significantly more in foster care than they were in her care. Because such explanation is lacking, we are not persuaded by Mother's argument.
In sum, Mother did not make a prima facie showing that reinstating reunification services would serve the children's best interests. The juvenile court did not err.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: McKINSTER Acting P.J., FIELDS J.