Opinion
E053786
12-08-2011
In re L.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. D.C., Defendant and Appellant.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Danielle E. Wuchenich, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super.Ct.No. J233632)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Wilfred J. Schneider, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Danielle E. Wuchenich, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
D.C. (mother) appeals from juvenile court orders denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating her parental rights to her daughter, L.H. Mother contends the juvenile court violated her due process right to an evidentiary hearing on her section 388 petition. She also argues the juvenile court erred in rejecting the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
We conclude mother forfeited her objection to the hearing on her section 388 petition. Even if she did not forfeit her objection, it lacks merit. Mother's due process rights were not violated since she was afforded a full and fair hearing on her petition. We also conclude the trial court did not err in rejecting the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption. We affirm the judgment.
II
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother and L.H.'s father (father) met and married in 1996. At the inception of this matter in September 2008, mother and father were living together with their two daughters, L.H., who was then five years old, and C.H., who was nine years old. L.H. suffered from attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD). C.H. suffered from pervasive developmental disorder (PDD), intermittent explosive disorder, oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), attention deficit disorder (ADD), and high functioning autism. Mother's son and father's stepson, A.C., who was almost 13, was also living with the family. A.C. suffered from intermittent explosive disorder and ADHD. Father was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. Father was unemployed and received disability benefits. Mother was working as a telephone sex operator out of the family home. The family had a lengthy history with the San Bernardino County Department of Children and Family Services (CFS), with 13 prior reports of abuse or neglect made between August 2004 and the most recent report on September 21, 2008.
On September 21, 2008, the CFS received a child abuse hotline report that mother and father were sexually abusing L.H., C.H., and A.C., and physically abusing C.H. Mother and father reportedly also encouraged A.C. and L.H. to sexually abuse C.H. The social worker interviewed A.C. on September 24, 2008. He stated that C.H. inappropriately touched L.H. and "humped" L.H., with both girls' pants off. This had happened about 10 times. C.H. also "humped" A.C. Her pants were off and his were on. When asked about a bruise on his arm, A.C. said father had beat him in the past but his bruise was not from father. A.C. reported that mother worked at home, on the telephone and computer, helping ". . . men with adult problems."
L.H. reported to the social worker that C.H. and A.C. had touched her "privates." She also said that during the night a ghost went into her room and moved her blankets. When asked if anyone touched her privates, L.H. said mother, father, C.H. and A.C. did. She then denied that mother and father touched her but said mother was mean.
During C.H.'s interview at the Loma Linda Behavioral Medical Center (LLBMC), C.H. reported that mother slapped her face and mouth, hit her "booty" with a belt and touched her private area. Her parents tried to lick her "privates" and touched her privates with their hands. A.C. "humped" her with his pants off. Mother knew about it and told A.C. he could do it.
Based on the children's interviews, Deputy Stowell of the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department executed a search warrant on the family home and took the children into protective custody. Stowell reported he was familiar with the family, as were many other deputies who had had encounters with the family over C.H. running away and being violent with her parents.
On September 26, 2008, CFS filed a juvenile dependency petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d), alleging that mother and father failed to protect and provide regular care for L.H. Mother and father allegedly knew or should have known L.H. was being sexually abused and failed to protect her. In addition, father suffered from schizophrenia, placing L.H. at risk of being physically harmed by father. Father also engaged in domestic violence in L.H.'s presence.
On September 29, 2008, the juvenile court held a detention hearing and ordered L.H., C.H., and A.C. (the children) removed from the family home and each placed in separate foster homes. The court ordered weekly, supervised visitation with mother and father, as well as weekly sibling visitation.
On October 3, 2008, the social worker interviewed mother and father separately. Mother conceded she knew the children were sexually abused. She claimed she tried to get help and "they weren't helping me." Mother said she reported the sexual abuse in 2005. Mother said the abuse happened only three times, not 10 times, as A.C. claimed. Mother caught C.H. acting out sexually with L.H. three times and separated the girls. The girls' sexual acts with each other included oral sex and sleeping together naked. A.C. also acted out sexually one time with C.H. Mother denied that she and father sexually abused the children. Mother said that when she was a child, she was sexually and physically abused by her father, and her father and uncles were abused by their paternal grandfather. Her father and uncles were also having sexual relations with each other.
Father stated during his interview that he also was aware of the sexual behavior among the children. He told the children not to do it. Mother could not do anything about it. Father denied that there had been any domestic violence but admitted his relationship with mother was volatile and affected the children because he and mother argued in front of them. Father denied abusing the children.
CFS recommended in its jurisdiction/disposition report filed in October 2008, that the children remain in foster care, since mother and father were unable to protect the children from sexual abuse. In addition, mother and father had unresolved issues relating to sexual abuse, domestic violence, and mental health. Extensive services were needed to resolve mother and father's own issues before the children could be safely returned. L.H. had told her foster mother that father touched her privates.
CFS reported in the first addendum report that C.H. had said she was sexually abused by her parents and her stepgrandfather. L.H. reported her stepgrandfather touched her privates and mother hit her when she objected to her parents touching her.
In a second addendum report filed in November 2008, the CFS recommended the children remain placed in separate foster homes and L.H.'s parents receive reunification services. The CFS reported that father notified the CFS on October 27, 2008, that mother had left him and filed for divorce and a restraining order against him. The social worker observed during a supervised visit that L.H. appeared to be very bonded to mother. L.H. was placed in another foster home because her previous foster mother failed to intervene during father's visit with L.H., which appeared to have sexual overtones.
In a third addendum report filed in December 2008, the CFS again recommended the children remain placed in separate foster homes and L.H.'s parents receive reunification services. The CFS also recommended the children immediately begin therapy. The CFS reported that mother did not believe she needed parenting help. She completed an online parenting class, which she believed was sufficient. Mother told her therapist she believed she had resolved her issues regarding being sexually abused as a child. Mother visited L.H. weekly. The visits went well.
In a fourth addendum report filed in January 2009, the CFS reported that Detective Burgraff of the Crimes Against Children agency interviewed the children, mother, and the children's stepgrandfather. The children denied any sexual abuse. Their stepgrandfather denied he had sexually abused the children but said he was aware the children had committed sexual acts with each other. In February 2008, L.H. was moved to another foster home because of behavioral problems.
In a fifth addendum report filed in February 2009, CFS reported that mother had been participating in a child abuse prevention intervention and treatment program since November 2008. L.H. reportedly was hyperactive, easily distracted, lacked focus, and engaged in daily temper tantrums, lasting five to 45 minutes, but was very sweet and affectionate towards her foster parents. However, her foster parents requested her removal from their home and L.H. was placed in a new foster home in February 2009. CFS concluded, based on the children's behavior, that they had been sexually abused and mother needed to participate in therapy to address her history of sexual abuse and family incest. CFS recommended in the sixth addendum report filed in March 2009, that the children remain removed from their parents and the parents continue receiving reunification services. Mother reportedly had met with a therapist twice in February and was participating in parenting classes.
At a pretrial settlement conference in April 2009, the parents and CFS agreed, and the court found that L.H. came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d). The juvenile court further found that mother and father had not made any progress in alleviating the causes leading to the children's placement in foster care. The court ordered L.H. removed from mother and father's custody, and ordered services and supervised visitation.
The CFS reported in its status review report filed in October 2009, that mother and father divorced in June 2009, and mother had moved to Arizona to live with her new boyfriend. Mother was unable to visit L.H. weekly because of mother's health and transportation problems. Mother began therapy in Arizona in September 2009. L.H. reportedly had adjusted well to her new foster family. L.H. was taking psychotropic medication. She still had difficulty in school, with a poor attention span, and had temper tantrums. Mother believed the children should be returned to her but CFS concluded she still needed to work on protecting and supervising them appropriately. She had not assumed responsibility for the petition allegations, including the children's exposure to inappropriate sexual contact. CFS concluded that L.H. had severe emotional and behavioral problems, which interfered with her foster placements. She also had academic problems. L.H. required a great deal of monitoring and supervision. Mother complicated the reunification process by moving out of state and was not willing to return. Mother had completed some aspects of her reunification plan and was making adequate progress but had not completed therapy. Mother began visiting L.H. again in July 2009. At the six-month review hearing in October 2009, the juvenile court ordered that L.H. remain in foster care, with supervised weekly visitation with mother.
CFS reported in the 12-month status review report, filed in April 2010, that mother terminated therapy in January 2010 because of health insurance problems. CFS arranged for another therapy provider. Mother continued to live with her boyfriend in Arizona and had not maintained weekly visits with L.H. L.H. reportedly was still hyperactive, had temper tantrums, was having difficulty in school, was taking psychotropic medication, and was seeing a therapist. L.H. was doing well in her placement. Mother had visited the children only four times since the last hearing in October 2009, and the children were less bonded to her. During mother's visits with the children, she tended to ignore L.H. and spent most of the time focused on A.C. Arizona denied the interstate compact on the placement of children (ICPC) request. Mother was unemployed, she had not completed her therapy, she needed to work on protection issues, and she denied responsibility for the petition allegations of participating in domestic violence and failing to protect her children from sexual abuse. CFS recommended termination of reunification services.
CFS reported in an addendum report filed in June 2010, that mother had increased her visitation with the children during the last two months, with visits in April, May, and June. During the visits, mother spent most of the time talking to A.C. L.H. had stopped trying to get mother's attention during visits and did not appear excited to see mother. Mother's relationship with the children had changed. CFS had warned mother that moving to Arizona could impede reunification. Nevertheless, mother insisted on residing in Arizona. After mother was evaluated by a therapist in Arizona, the therapist notified CFS that individual counseling was not appropriate for mother because she was not "amenable" to individual sessions. The therapist noted that mother's progress in counseling appeared to be "minimal at best."
CFS further reported that mother had not completed her reunification plan and had not benefited from services. She had not completed individual therapy. L.H. reportedly was having fewer tantrums since taking medication but still was anxious, hyperactive, and did not follow directions. A second ICPC request, initiated in December 2009, was not completed because mother's boyfriend had a criminal record and had not completed restitution for his criminal offenses. Mother minimized the seriousness of this. According to mother, her boyfriend was convicted for stealing a debit card from his foster mother in 2007 and still owed restitution. CFS recommended that the court terminate reunification services and order a permanent planned living arrangement for L.H.
At the 12-month status review hearing in June 2010, mother testified that she had completed a parenting program while living in California and completed an online course. She also said that the children were happy to see her during visits and she shared her attention equally among them. In addition, she spoke to L.H. weekly on the telephone. Mother was living in a two-bedroom apartment and wanted only L.H. returned to her. Mother anticipated getting a three-bedroom apartment in August 2010, and then wanted her other two children returned to her as well. The juvenile court found that mother had failed to participate regularly in her case plan and had made minimal progress. The court further found that the children were not adoptable and ordered planned permanent living arrangement for L.H., with termination of mother's reunification services.
On August 31, 2010, the court authorized placing L.H. with a foster family with whom she had previously lived temporarily during respite care and extended weekend visits. The family requested long-term placement of L.H. with the family.
In November 2010, mother filed a section 388 petition to set aside the order terminating reunification services. Mother requested the children returned to her or, alternatively, reinstatement of reunification services. Attached to her petition was (1) a letter from her therapist stating that she had completed five outpatient individual sessions and 10 women's behavior modification group sessions, (2) completion certificates for a parenting class and women's behavior modification group, (3) verification of mother's one-year apartment lease, and (4) a letter confirming mother's "side-job," in which she earned $1,000 a month, as of October 2009, for "consulting services." The trial court summarily denied mother's section 388 petition without a hearing on the grounds there was no new evidence or changed circumstances and the requested order was not in L.H.'s best interests.
In the November 2010 status review report, CFS recommended setting a section 366.26 hearing to change L.H.'s permanent plan to adoption. L.H. reportedly was making progress. Her anxiety had decreased, her therapy sessions were reduced to twice a month, her temper tantrums did not last as long, and she was bonding well with her foster family. L.H. was taking psychotropic medications and performing at grade level. Her foster parents were both educators. The most recent ICPC, initiated in April 2010, was rejected. Since the last hearing in June 2010, mother's visits were sporadic. During mother's visits with the children in July, August and September 2010, mother paid more attention to A.C. than L.H. and ignored L.H. L.H.'s foster family stated they would like to adopt L.H.
At the review hearing in December 2010, the court ordered a section 366.26 hearing and supervised visitation for mother once a month. Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition challenging the order setting a section 366.26 hearing. Mother's attorney informed the court that he would not be filing a writ petition on mother's behalf because he found no legal or factual issues on which to base a writ petition. This court accordingly dismissed the matter. Following the December 17, 2010, review hearing, telephone contact between mother and L.H. stopped.
In April 2011, the CFS filed a section 366.26 hearing report, recommending terminating parental rights and implementing a plan of adoption for L.H. CFS reported that L.H.'s foster mother was home schooling L.H. L.H. was doing well academically and her behavior continued to improve. L.H. told the social worker she liked her foster home and wanted to be adopted. L.H. referred to her foster parents as "mommy and daddy" and had bonded with them. Mother's monthly visitation was sporadic because of transportation problems. L.H.'s prospective adoptive parents were committed to adopting L.H. and were willing to allow L.H. to maintain a relationship with A.C. and C.H.
In May 2011, mother filed a section 388 petition to set aside the June 2010 order terminating reunification services and return the children to mother or, alternatively, reinstate reunification services. Mother alleged she had completed her case plan, had appropriate stable housing and income, and had completed a parenting program and women's behavior modification counseling. Mother claimed granting her petition was in the children's best interests because she had maintained consistent contact with them, visits had gone well, and the children wanted to return to her. CFS opposed the petition.
The trial court ordered a nonevidentiary hearing on mother's section 388 petition. The hearing was set on the same date as the section 366.26 hearing. At the combined hearing on June 6, 2011, the court first heard mother's section 388 petition. The court accepted documentary evidence, including declarations, and heard oral argument. CFS argued there were no changes in mother's circumstances and section 388 relief was not in L.H.'s best interests. CFS noted mother's section 388 petition was essentially the same as her previous petition filed in November 2010, which the court summarily denied. The supporting certificates of completed programs and therapy were dated prior to the previous petition. Mother submitted on the petition. The juvenile court denied mother's petition, finding there were no changed circumstances and granting the petition was not in L.H.'s best interests.
The court then proceeded with the section 366.26 hearing. Mother testified she had been visiting L.H. monthly and L.H. was bonded to her. Mother claimed that over the past six months, L.H. had stated a desire to return to mother's care. Mother had stopped telephone contact with L.H. in December 2010 because L.H.'s foster mother stopped initiating L.H.'s telephone contact with mother and mother did not know whether she was permitted to ask for telephone contact. Mother denied she ignored L.H. during visits. Mother conceded L.H. had not requested to spend more time with her or have additional visits. Mother noted L.H. called mother "mommy" but also referred to her by her first name.
Mother's new husband (Mr. B.) testified that he and mother had been married two months. He had only observed mother and L.H. interacting when mother arrived for and departed from visitation. L.H. would say she loved mother. Mr. B. never heard L.H. say she wanted to go home with mother. At the last hearing, Mr. B. saw L.H. run to mother, hug her, and tell her she loved mother.
The social worker testified that L.H. was bonded to her prospective adoptive mother and called her "Mom." L.H. never told the social worker she wanted to return to mother. Since living with her prospective adoptive family, L.H. had become more disciplined and responsible. She also had fewer tantrums. In addition, L.H.'s behavior and focus on her studies had improved with homeschooling. The social worker concluded the benefits of adoption outweighed any benefit of maintaining mother's parental relationship with L.H.
During closing argument, mother's attorney argued the parent-child bond exception applied. The juvenile court found the parent-child bond exception did not apply and terminated parental rights.
III
SECTION 388 PETITION
Mother contends the trial court failed to conduct a full and fair evidentiary hearing on her section 388 petition, in violation of her due process rights. We disagree. Mother forfeited this objection by not raising it in the trial court.
On May 13, 2011, the trial court ordered a nonevidentiary hearing on mother's section 388 petition and set the hearing on June 6, 2011. The parties were permitted to submit written evidence, such as declarations, and provide oral argument, but there was to be no witness testimony. The parties did not object to this arrangement. At the pretrial status conference on June 2, 2011, the trial court reminded the parties that there would be no testimony at the hearing on mother's section 388 petition: "I expect it will be a hearing by way of argument and declarations, and any documents counsel wishes to submit at that time, so no one's caught by surprise." Mother did not object.
During the section 388 petition hearing on June 6, 2011, the court received into evidence CFS's section 366.26 report, mother's section 388 petition, and the CFS's response to the petition. Mother's attorney submitted on the petition and noted the petition was signed by counsel since mother was living in Arizona. Counsel for CFS argued that mother had not made a prima facie showing that she was entitled to section 388 relief. There was no showing of changed circumstances and it was not in L.H.'s best interest to grant relief. CFS also argued mother was collaterally estopped from receiving section 388 relief because the trial court previously denied essentially the same petition in November 2010.
The court noted the previous petition was denied without prejudice and therefore mother was not collaterally estopped from bringing the current petition. Nevertheless, the court denied the petition on the grounds there was no change in circumstances and it would not be in L.H.'s best interest to grant it.
Generally, "issues not properly raised at trial will not be considered on appeal." (In re Marriage of Olson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1, 15.) "A party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court. [Citations.] Forfeiture, also referred to as 'waiver,' applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion of the proceedings. [Citations.]" (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222.) During the section 388 hearing, mother failed to object to the manner in which the trial court conducted the section 388 hearing. Mother's attorney did not request to present any testimony or other evidence at the hearing, and neither mother nor father were even present to testify. Had mother objected at, or prior to, the section 388 petition hearing, the trial court could have addressed the objection at that time. Mother thus forfeited her objection to any deficiencies in the hearing. (In re Dakota H., at pp. 221-222; In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1081 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)
Even assuming mother did not forfeit her objection to the section 388 petition hearing, we would reject mother's claim that she was deprived of a proper evidentiary hearing on her section 388 petition. Section 388 provides, in pertinent part, that "Any parent . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made . . . . The petition shall be verified and . . . shall set forth in concise language any change of circumstance or new evidence that are alleged to require the change of order or termination of jurisdiction. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order . . . [or] termination of jurisdiction . . . the court shall order that a hearing be held . . . ." According to the express statutory language, a hearing is required if the section 388 petition alleges facts showing changed circumstances such that the requested modification would be in the best interests of the child. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415.) "The parent need only make a prima facie showing to trigger the right to proceed by way of a full hearing. [Citation.]" (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310.)
Here, the trial court found mother's petition presented a prima facie showing triggering the right to a full hearing and held a hearing on June 6, 2011. Unlike in In re Lesly G. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 904, 915, cited by mother, the juvenile court permitted the parties to submit written evidence, including declarations and reports. The court also heard argument from the parties. None of the parties objected or asked to present testimony. Under such circumstances, we conclude, as we did in In re C.J.W., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at page 1081, that mother was afforded a full and fair evidentiary hearing on her petition.
IV
THE BENEFICIAL PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in rejecting the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)). This exception is often raised but rarely applies. (In re Eileen A. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1255, fn. 5, disapproved on other grounds in In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413.) While the exception can have merit in an appropriate case (e.g., In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 296-301), this is not such a case.
Generally, at a section 366.26 hearing, if the juvenile court finds that the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights. (§ 366.26, subds. (b)(1) & (c)(1).) This rule, however, is subject to a number of statutory exceptions (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(A) & (c)(1)(B)(i)-(vi)), including the beneficial parental relationship exception, which applies when "termination would be detrimental to the child" because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
"When applying the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, the court balances the strength and quality of the parent-child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and sense of belonging that a stable family would confer on the child. If severing the existing parental relationship would deprive the child of 'a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated.' [Citation.]" (In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1234-1235.)
"'[F]or the exception to apply, the emotional attachment between the child and parent must be that of parent and child rather than one of being a friendly visitor or friendly nonparent relative, such as an aunt.' [Citation.]" (In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 938.) "'A biological parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child may not derail adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent. [Citation.] A child who has been adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court should not be deprived of an adoptive parent when the natural parent has maintained a relationship that may be beneficial to some degree, but that does not meet the child's need for a parent.' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 937.) "We must affirm a trial court's rejection of these exceptions if the ruling is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]" (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.)
"We . . . review[] the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and indulg[e] in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court's ruling. [Citation.]" (In re B.D., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235.) Because mother had the burden of proof, we must affirm unless there was "indisputable evidence [in her favor] no reasonable trier of fact could have rejected . . . ." (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 200.)
Despite evidence that mother appropriately interacted with L.H. and the visits generally went well, mother has not established that L.H. was so bonded with her that it would be in L.H.'s best interest to forego the benefits of adoption. The record shows that mother failed to maintain regular visitation and contact with L.H. Although mother initially visited L.H. weekly, in June 2009 mother moved out of state to Arizona, against CFS's advice, knowing that doing so would impede her ability to visit and reunify with L.H. Weekly visitations stopped at that point. Between April 2009 and October 2009, mother visited L.H. only three times, once in May, July, and September 2009. Between October 2009 and April 2010, mother visited L.H. four times, even though she was permitted to visit weekly.
The CFS social worker reported in the April 2010 status review report that mother's children had become "less and less bonded to her" because of mother's infrequent visitation. "The mother has failed to see that the move to Arizona has negatively impacted her chances for reunification. The visits have been sporadic . . . ." Visitation was supervised and, according to the social worker, mother generally paid more attention to A.C. than L.H., and tended to ignore L.H. CFS reported that mother increased visitation in April and May 2010, with one visit in April and two visits in May. But CFS reported in December 2010, that mother had only visited L.H. three times during the past six months; once in July, August and September. At the December 2010 hearing, the court ordered visitation reduced to once a month. Thereafter, mother's visits were sporadic and her telephone contact with L.H. stopped.
Unlike in In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, cited by mother, in the instant case mother did not maintain regular visitation and contact. In addition, in the instant case, there was no determination by a bonding study psychologist, therapist, or court-appointed special advocate that the benefit of the parental relationship outweighed the benefits of adoption.
Mother argues her bond with L.H. was strong and this was demonstrated by the fact L.H. called her "mommy," L.H. had lived with mother during the first five years of her life, and L.H. had said she wanted to return to mother and loved mother. But L.H. also reportedly referred to mother by her first name. In addition, the record shows that mother's parental bond with L.H. at the time of termination of parental rights in June 2011, had diminished over time, as mother's visitation became less frequent and sporadic, and L.H. formed new relationships with her various foster families.
At the time of the section 366.26 hearing in June 2011, L.H. had been living with her prospective adoptive family since August 2010, and had expressed a desire to be adopted. The family was committed to caring for and adopting L.H. Mother, on the other hand, had placed her own needs before L.H.'s. Mother moved out of state in June 2009, knowing this would jeopardize her ability to visit and reunite with L.H. Furthermore, after almost three years of reunification services, mother had not completed her case plan. She had not resolved her personal issues relating to sexual abuse and had not completed therapy. Under such circumstances, we conclude mother has not met her burden of establishing that the benefits of her bond with L.H. outweighed the benefits of adoption.
V
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Codrington
J.
We concur:
Ramirez
P.J.
McKinster
J.