Opinion
E069396
07-27-2018
In re A.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.M., Defendant and Appellant.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and Adam E. Ebright, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. J270067) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Erin K. Alexander, Judge. Affirmed. Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and Adam E. Ebright, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
A.M. (Mother), who was a minor herself at the outset of the dependency case, is the mother of three-year-old A.R. A.R. was removed from Mother's care due to her unstable/unsafe lifestyle, criminal behavior, long history of running away from her caregiver for lengthy periods of time, and abandoning the child. Mother was missing or absent throughout most of the dependency proceedings. But through her attorney, she requested that A.R. be placed with the maternal stepgrandmother under a guardianship or, in the alternative, that she receive reunification services.
Following a jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the juvenile court sustained the allegations in the petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The court also removed A.R. from Mother's care, and provided Mother with reunification services. On appeal, Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the court's jurisdictional findings and its dispositional order removing A.R. from her care. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
A.R.'s father, L.R. (Father), is not a party to this appeal.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family came to the attention of the San Bernardino County Children and Family services (CFS) on February 23, 2017, due to a referral that was received alleging then 17-year-old Mother was a habitual runaway, who was sometimes gone for weeks at a time, leaving her one-year-old son with Mother's legal guardian/stepgrandmother, M.M. Mother had recently left a note stating she was leaving for good and was never coming back for the child. M.M. had made the referral because she had realized Mother was not going to be a fit parent for A.R.
On February 28, 2017, the social worker visited M.M.'s home to investigate the allegations. M.M. reported that Mother ran away months ago and that she did not have any way of contacting her. Mother was a juvenile dependent and had been living with M.M. since the age of 12 under a guardianship, but had always been a chronic runaway. M.M. also reported that Mother was involved in criminal activity involving a stolen car and a high-speed chase through Colton, Ontario, and in to Hollywood, where the tires of the car were shot out. M.M. also discovered stolen I.D.'s and credit cards in Mother's bedroom. M.M. further reported that on one occasion, Mother took A.R. with her when she ran away and her husband/maternal grandfather later found the child in the backyard of a home located in a bad neighborhood.
M.M. wanted legal guardianship of A.R., but the maternal grandfather also lived in the home and had a significant criminal history. The social worker explained that CFS would generally not recommend legal guardianship without first offering reunification services to Mother and opined that it was questionable whether M.M.'s home would pass the assessment process for A.R.'s guardianship due to the maternal grandfather's criminal history. M.M. responded that she would not allow Mother back in the home, and her husband would move out. The social worker informed M.M. that due to Mother "abandoning [A.R.] it was likely that CFS would be stepping in," but it was unlikely A.R. would be placed with M.M. due to M.M. having guardianship of Mother and M.M. being unable to relinquish Mother's guardianship due to Mother being a minor. M.M. was very upset and stated that A.R. had been with her since he was born. She also stated that she did not know how to relinquish the guardianship and that there was no one else in the family that was able to care for A.R. The social worker opined that having the maternal grandfather move out of the home would not cure the problem because he would remain in a marital relationship with M.M. and would have significant contact and visitation to the home.
On March 9, 2017, Mother contacted the social worker and told her that she wanted A.R. to stay with M.M. The social worker asked Mother why she had abandoned A.R. in the home if it was so bad there that she did not want to live there herself. Mother claimed that she had not abandoned him and that she had plans to parent A.R. at some point in the future. Mother did not want to stay in M.M.'s home but felt that A.R. was fine there. Mother also stated that she had a sister who could be considered for placement if M.M.'s home could not be cleared for placement.
On March 15, 2017, the social worker obtained a detention warrant for A.R. due to Mother running away and participating in criminal activities, as well as the fact that there was no legal custody to anyone caring for A.R., including M.M. who had no legal standing as to A.R. The social worker and a deputy thereafter responded to M.M.'s home to take A.R. into custody. M.M. and several of her daughters were present. M.M. was upset and angry, and she asked if A.R. could go with one of his maternal aunts. The social worker explained that A.R. could not be placed with one of his maternal aunts until CFS cleared a relative home for placement. Despite M.M.'s statement at a previous visit that no relative was available to care for A.R., a maternal aunt, D.R., asked to be assessed for placement of A.R. The social worker began the assessment process for D.R. that same day, and A.R. was subsequently placed in her home.
On March 17, 2017, a petition on behalf of A.R. was filed pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support). With regard to Mother, the petition specifically alleged that Mother's unstable/unsafe lifestyle and lack of parenting skills placed A.R. at a substantial risk of abuse and/or neglect (b-1); that Mother was involved in criminal activity placing A.R. at a substantial risk of abuse and/or neglect (b-2); and that Mother's whereabouts and willingness and ability to parent were unknown (g-4).
At the March 20, 2017 detention hearing, Mother and M.M. were present and represented by counsel. Mother's counsel argued that A.R. was not in any kind of harm in M.M.'s care and asked the court to consider a family maintenance plan or a section 360 guardianship. Initially, M.M.'s counsel indicated that a guardianship proceeding in probate court would be heard on the next day and the matter could be resolved. But when the court offered to continue the detention hearing briefly, counsel admitted that notice had not been completed correctly and that the probate matter would not actually take place until notice was perfected. The court explained that if the probate guardianship was likely to be resolved, the court would be willing to continue the detention hearing for a couple of days, but noted that it could not continue the detention hearing indefinitely. The court found that it was appropriate to proceed with the detention hearing but recommended that M.M. be immediately assessed for placement. The court explained that the removal was from Mother, not from M.M., and noted that Mother had left the child without a guardianship in the first place and, without the court's intervention, Mother or Father would be free to take the child away from the caregiver and move him to an unknown location at any time. The court formally detained A.R. from parental custody and ordered visitation for Mother and M.M.
The social worker recommended that the allegations in the petition be found true and that reunification services be provided to Mother. During the previous month, the social worker was unable to contact Mother and her whereabouts remained unknown. The family reported that no one had seen or heard from Mother since the March 20, 2017 detention hearing. When the social worker interviewed M.M., she described a long history of Mother running away and getting in trouble. Mother had stabilized for a brief period while she was pregnant with A.R., but soon became detached and continued to run away, sometimes taking A.R. with her and sometimes by herself, leaving A.R. behind. The social worker characterized the prognosis of reunification as poor and noted Mother could potentially benefit from parenting classes and individual counseling. However, because Mother was absent, the social worker could not gauge Mother's interest in participating in services.
The social worker eventually contacted Mother and filed an information packet on June 9, 2017, to update the court. Mother denied drug use or current criminal activity, but would not disclose to the social worker where she was living. She was not going to school, and there was no evidence to show she was employed or that she had provided for A.R.'s care. She reported that she was involved in a high-speed car chase in November 2016 and that she was present at a home that was being raided for a probation sweep in Riverside. Mother stated that she did not want to participate in reunification services and that she wanted M.M. and the maternal grandfather to raise A.R. The social worker explained that Mother would need to come to court if she wanted to waive services and that there was no guarantee that A.R. would be placed with M.M. because of the maternal grandfather's criminal history. Initial reports indicated that the maternal grandfather had spent at least 12 years in prison and had been convicted of three felonies and five misdemeanors. Dismissed charges included kidnapping for ransom and sex with a minor. In light of this history, it was questionable whether the maternal grandfather could obtain a certificate of rehabilitation in order to become eligible as a relative placement.
The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on June 12, 2017. The court found good cause to continue the dispositional hearing to allow more time to assess M.M.'s home as the assessment had not been completed. The court noted that the process for the maternal grandfather to clear his record would take a long time, but indicated that if he moved out of the home, a section 360 guardianship could be possible.
As to jurisdiction, Mother's counsel made an objection but presented no affirmative evidence. Specifically, Mother's counsel argued that the b-2 allegation was false because Mother had never been charged with any crimes and A.R. was never alleged to be with Mother when any of the crimes took place. Mother's counsel also argued that the g-4 allegation should be dismissed because Mother's whereabouts were no longer unknown. Mother's counsel further argued that Mother's unstable lifestyle and history of running away did not put A.R. at risk because he was in M.M.'s care at those times and he was appropriately being cared for by M.M. who provided for A.R.'s needs. Mother's counsel pointed out that there was no evidence A.R. missed any medical appointments or that he was not being fed or properly cared for.
Minor's counsel asked that the allegations in the petition be found true, arguing that A.R. would have been at great risk if he had been with Mother during the high-speed chase. Minor's counsel also argued that Mother's absences were chronic, dating back to age 12, and would last for weeks or months at a time. Minor's counsel further asserted that although Mother's whereabouts were now known, her ability and willingness to parent were still unknown, and that Mother had even left a note saying she was leaving and never coming back for A.R. Minor's counsel pointed out that during Mother's absences, there was no way for A.R. to receive medical treatment because Mother's consent would have been required for any medical procedures. Minor's counsel also stated that Mother had taken A.R. with her several times when she ran away from her legal guardian's home and, on one occasion, the maternal grandfather had found A.R. in the backyard of a home in a bad neighborhood. Counsel for CFS joined minor's counsel and added that Mother had not participated in visitation since January 2017, was associating with others who were involved in criminal activity, and was not providing care for her child but leaving A.R. in M.M.'s care.
Following argument, the court dismissed the b-2 and g-4 allegations, but found the b-1 allegation as to Mother true due to Mother's unsafe/unstable lifestyle, involvement in criminal activity, and frequently leaving the child for long periods of time. The court specifically cited the incident where Mother took A.R. with her when she ran away, leaving her guardians "concerned as to who the child was around and what [his] circumstances [were]." The court also explained that in addition to the unsafe/unstable lifestyle and lack of parenting, Mother leaving the child for long periods of time presented a risk to A.R. as demonstrated by M.M. contacting CFS seeking legal authority to protect A.R. from Mother and Father.
The social worker filed an information packet on September 8, 2017, indicating the maternal grandfather did not meet the requirements for an exemption for placement because he had only recently been discharged from parole. The social worker also reported that Mother had not visited A.R. since before his removal and that the services coordinator had made attempts to contact Mother on June 21, and July 7 and 17, 2017, in order to enroll Mother in services. However, Mother did not answer the phone, and the services coordinator was unable to leave a message. In August 2017, M.M. called the social worker and reported that Mother had resurfaced and provided a new number for Mother.
The court held the contested dispositional hearing on September 8, 2017. Mother was not present and still had not visited A.R. Minor's counsel asked the court to follow the social worker's recommendation, but to authorize placement with M.M. if the maternal grandfather moved out of the home. Mother's trial counsel requested a section 360 guardianship or, alternatively, reunification services for Mother if a guardianship was not possible. The court found that it could not consider a guardianship because Mother was not present to waive services. The court declared A.R. a dependent of the court, removed A.R. from Mother's custody, and granted Mother reunification services. The court also noted that it was concerned with the maternal grandfather's criminal history, but granted counsel's request for authority to place A.R. with M.M. upon approval.
On September 29, 2017, the court granted M.M.'s application for de facto parent status. This appeal followed.
III
DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdictional Findings
On appeal, Mother challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b). Mother specifically contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that she engaged in any neglectful conduct toward A.R. that placed the child at substantial risk of serious harm.
We review a juvenile court's jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) Substantial evidence is "evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value." (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.) Under this standard of review, we examine the whole record in a light most favorable to the findings and conclusions of the juvenile court and defer to the juvenile court on issues of credibility of the evidence and witnesses. (In re A.J. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103.) We determine only whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports the juvenile court's order, resolving all conflicts in support of its determination and drawing all reasonable inferences to uphold its ruling. (In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1124.) If there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's order, we must uphold the order even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion. (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 168 (N.M.).)
Jurisdiction is appropriate under section 300, subdivision (b), where the court finds "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. . . ." (§ 300, subd. (b).)
Three elements must exist for a jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b): (1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness to the minor, or a substantial risk of such harm or illness. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.) The third element requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdiction hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future. (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 829; In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1396.) " 'Before courts and agencies can exert jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), there must be evidence indicating that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.' " (In re David M., at p. 829.) "Although section 300 generally requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child [citation]. The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child currently needs the court's protection. [Citation.] A parent's ' "[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions" if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.' [Citations.]" (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1383-1384.)
In this case, the juvenile court found that jurisdiction over A.R. was proper under section 300, subdivision (b), because Mother engaged in neglectful conduct that placed A.R. at a substantial risk of serious physical harm. In particular, the court found that Mother's unsafe lifestyle, involvement in criminal activity, and frequently leaving the child for long periods of time placed A.R. at a substantial risk of harm. The court noted that "at times [M]other was taking the child and her guardians were concerned as to who the child was around and what circumstances." The court also found that "leaving the child for long periods of time did present a risk because as indicated by both counsel, this case came in because the mother's guardian who was caretaking needed some sort of legal authority to do so in order to exercise protective capacity against both the mother and father who weren't showing appropriate parenting skills and were clearly a risk to the child at the time . . . ." Based on the totality of the record, we conclude that the juvenile court's exercise of jurisdiction over A.R. was supported by substantial evidence.
Although Mother is correct that no evidence shows A.R. was exposed to her unsafe and criminal lifestyle, the record nonetheless demonstrates that she subjected A.R. to a substantial risk of abuse and/or neglect when she ran away with A.R. from her guardian's home for long periods of time. The evidence shows that Mother became involved with people who were engaged in criminal activities and that at times Mother took A.R. with her when she ran away. During one occasion, after Mother took A.R. with her, the maternal grandfather found A.R. in the backyard of a home in a bad neighborhood. Furthermore, the record reveals that M.M. had found stolen credit cards and I.D.'s in Mother's bedroom, indicating Mother had brought her criminal activities into the home with A.R.
Even if we find insufficient evidence supports the "unstable" and "unsafe lifestyle" allegation, Mother frequently left A.R. for long periods of time, placing the child at a substantial risk of harm. It is undisputed that Mother regularly left A.R. for long periods of time without provisions for his care. As minor's counsel noted, during Mother's absences, there was no way for A.R. to receive medical treatment because Mother's consent would have been required for any medical procedures. Although Mother desired that M.M. care for A.R. and knew A.R. was left with M.M., Mother subjected A.R. to a substantial risk of harm and/or neglect by not leaving written instructions for his care. There is also no evidence in the record to show that Mother provided A.R. with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment. Although M.M. presumably cared for A.R. in Mother's absence, there is no evidence that Mother left behind provisions for A.R.'s care during her absence. Rather, the evidence shows that Mother abandoned her son for long periods of time without adequate provisions, without regular contact with her guardians, and without any concern for A.R.'s well-being. The record also demonstrates that Mother had no job, was not in school, and her whereabouts were unknown for long periods of time. From this evidence, the court could reasonably conclude that Mother placed A.R. at a substantial risk of harm by failing to adequately supervise, provide for, and/or protect him. (§ 300, subd. (b).)
Mother argues leaving A.R. in the care of her guardian did not constitute neglectful conduct because A.R. was well cared for by M.M. and that Mother "had long ago left him in the capable hands of her guardian." As previously stated, although it is undisputed that Mother had left A.R. in M.M.'s care and that A.R. was being well cared for by M.M., Mother nonetheless abandoned her child without adequate provisions for his support.
Mother also asserts that it was not even "remotely likely" that she would show up and take custody of A.R. However, the record demonstrates that Mother had shown up to M.M.'s home in the past and taken custody of A.R. Mother had also reported that she had plans to parent A.R. at some point in the future, indicating it was likely Mother would show up and take custody of A.R. Furthermore, M.M. reported that sometimes Mother would run away by herself and sometimes she would take A.R. with her, leaving her guardians, as the court noted, "concerned" about whom he was around and what his circumstances were.
The fact that Mother was unable or unwilling to acknowledge that her actions created a substantial risk of harm to A.R. further supports the juvenile court's findings. (See In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1025-1026 ["In evaluating risk . . . , a juvenile court should consider . . . , among other things, evidence of the parent's current understanding of and attitude toward the past conduct that endangered a child."].) Mother initially refused to contact the social worker or her guardians, and she did not want any reunification services because, in her opinion, she had left A.R. with M.M. who was providing adequate care for A.R. Mother had also failed to visit A.R., inquire about A.R.'s well-being, disclose where she was living, and her whereabouts remained unknown for extended periods of time. Furthermore, Mother failed to attend the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings to waive her services, despite being informed by the social worker that Mother would need to come to court if she chose to waive her services. Mother's absences were chronic, dating back to age 12, and would last for weeks or months at a time without notice. During those absences, Mother failed to provide provisions for A.R., and there was no way for A.R. to receive medical treatment because no guardianship was in place. The record supports the finding that A.R. was at a substantial risk of harm due to Mother's failure to protect, supervise, and provide for him, and her abandoning him without proper provisions in place. (§ 300, subd. (b).)
Based on the foregoing, substantial evidence supports the court's determination that Mother's conduct was neglectful and placed A.R. at substantial risk of harm.
B. Dispositional Orders
Mother also challenges the juvenile court's dispositional order removing A.R. from her custody. Mother claims that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that A.R. was or would be in substantial danger without removal from Mother's care and that there were reasonable means to safely maintain A.R. with Mother. CFS asserts Mother forfeited her right to challenge the dispositional order. In the alternative, CFS argues there was sufficient evidence to support the court's dispositional order removing A.R. from Mother's care.
Section 361, subdivision (c), permits the removal of a child from the physical custody of a parent with whom the child was residing when the dependency petition was filed if the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that "[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being" of the child if he or she were returned home, and "there are no reasonable means by which the [child]'s physical health can be protected without removing" the child from the parent's custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) "A removal order is proper if based on proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the child and proof of a potential detriment to the child if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.] 'The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.' [Citation.] The [juvenile] court may consider a parent's past conduct as well as present circumstances. [Citation.]" (N.M., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at pp. 169-170.) "The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accordance with this discretion." (In re Jose M. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1103-1104.) An appellate court reviews a disposition order removing a child from parental custody for substantial evidence bearing in mind the heightened clear and convincing burden of proof that is required to remove a child from a parent's care. (In re D.G. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1574; In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1433; In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654.)
Initially, we agree with CFS that Mother has waived any challenge to the dispositional order removing A.R. from her care. At the contested dispositional hearing, Mother's counsel argued: "As we previously put on the record at the last hearing, [Mother's] wish was to waive services and have legal guardianship approved under 360. However, if that is not possible, [Mother] would like to have FR." In In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580 (Richard K.), the social worker recommended in her dispositional report that the juvenile court remove the children from their mother's physical custody based upon a finding of substantial danger to their physical health. (Id. at p. 587.) At the dispositional hearing, counsel for the mother submitted the matter on the recommendation of the social worker. The court followed the social worker's recommendation and ordered the children's removal from their mother's custody. (Id. at pp. 587-588.)
On appeal, the mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's removal order. The court concluded that when a parent at a dispositional hearing submits on the recommendation of the social worker, the parent's "submittal amount[s] to acquiescence" and precludes the parent from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the dispositional order. (Richard K., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 589.) As the court in Richard K. explained, "In our view, the mother's 'submitting on the recommendation' . . . recommended findings and orders, as distinguished from mere submission on the report itself. This is considerably more than permitting the court to decide an issue on a limited and uncontested record . . . . The mother's submittal on the recommendation dispels any challenge to and, in essence, endorses the court's issuance of the recommended findings and orders. [¶] In other words, the mother was not disputing that the court should adjudge her children dependents, order them removed from her custody and provide a reunification plan. If, as occurred in this case, the court in turn makes the recommended orders, the party who submits on the recommendation should not be heard to complain. As a general rule, a party is precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in the trial court. Any other rule would permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware. [Citation.] Similarly, in this case, by submitting on the recommendation without introducing any evidence or offering any argument, the parent waived her right to contest the juvenile court's disposition since it coincided with the social worker's recommendation. He who consents to an act is not wronged by it. [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 589-590, fn. omitted.)
Numerous courts have adopted the Richard K. court's analysis. (See, e.g., In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 136 ["[W]hen a parent submits on a social worker's recommendation . . . he or she forfeit[s] the right to contest the juvenile court's decision if it coincides with that recommendation"]; In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 565 ["a parent waives his or her right to challenge a juvenile court's order when the parent submits the matter on the social worker's recommendation"].)
In the present matter, as noted above, Mother's counsel stated that Mother desired to waive services and have legal guardianship approved under section 360, and if that was not possible, Mother wanted reunification services. As the juvenile court explained, because Mother was not present at the hearing to waive services, it could not consider a guardianship. Mother's counsel did not ask the court to place the child in her custody, and the court granted Mother's request for reunification services. Although the Richard K. case involved a mother submitting the matter to the juvenile court on the basis of the department's recommendation in this case, Mother acquiesced in the recommendation for reunification services. The social worker's report recommended that Mother receive reunification services and that A.R. remain placed in a relative's home. Mother did not ask the court to place the child in her custody. Mother's acquiescence in that recommendation constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the removal order under the rule that a parent or guardian who submits on the department's recommendation waives the right to contest the juvenile court's decision if it coincides with the social worker's recommendation. (Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 813, citing Richard K., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 590; see In re Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 886.)
Assuming arguendo the issue is not forfeited on appeal, the evidence in the record was sufficient to support a finding that Mother's conduct posed a substantial risk of harm to A.R. and that removal of the child from Mother's custody was the only reasonable means to protect him from that harm. The record reflects that A.R. was only two years old when these dependency proceedings commenced and that Mother left the child for long periods of time in M.M.'s care without provisions for support. Due to Mother's chronic absences, M.M. contacted CFS seeking legal authority to protect A.R. from Mother and Father. Although Mother had left A.R. in M.M.'s home, the home was not appropriate due to the maternal grandfather's serious criminal record. The maternal grandfather had spent at least 12 years in prison and had been convicted of three felonies and five misdemeanors. M.M. reported that she was willing to have the maternal grandfather move out of the home, but at the time of the September 8, 2017 dispositional hearing, it appeared that M.M. and the maternal grandfather were still living together.
In addition, although Mother indicated that she was not interested in participating in any reunification services and desired M.M. to have legal guardianship of A.R., the juvenile court was ready and willing to entertain a section 360 guardianship at the dispositional hearing. Nonetheless, Mother was not present at the dispositional hearing to waive reunification services, despite being informed by the social worker that she would need to come to court to waive her services in order to proceed with a guardianship. As such, it was Mother's failure to appear at the dispositional hearing that prevented the court from granting the relief Mother sought.
The record also shows that Mother failed to disclose her address, failed to cooperate with CFS, failed to remain in contact with CFS and M.M., and failed to visit her child. In fact, Mother had not visited A.R. since January or February 2017. The record also indicates that Mother was neither employed nor in school. During the dependency proceedings, Mother continued to minimize the seriousness of her conduct and the danger her abandonment posed to her young child. Based on her statements to the social worker, Mother did not believe that she had placed A.R. at any risk of harm when she left the child with M.M. or when she failed to remain in contact with M.M. while A.R. was in M.M.'s care for long periods of time. Mother left A.R. with M.M. for long periods of time without any paperwork or documentation to allow for his medical care, and she failed to inform M.M. when she would return. Based on the totality of the evidence, the juvenile court reasonably could find that Mother's conduct posed a substantial risk of harm to A.R. and that such risk could only be obviated by removing the child from Mother's custody. The juvenile court's disposition order was therefore supported by substantial evidence.
Mother argues that the juvenile court failed to satisfy its obligation to consider alternatives to removal. She asserts that the court could have placed A.R. with Mother while allowing M.M. to provide actual care to A.R. However, this alternative was not appropriate to protect A.R. This argument also ignores the purpose of disposition proceedings, which is to avoid harm to the child. (In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917.) The record demonstrates that Mother was unable and unwilling to provide regular, adequate care for the child at the time of the dispositional hearing. The evidence before the juvenile court established that Mother had abandoned her parental role over A.R. and that she did not assume care and control of him. The record here also includes a history of A.R. being left without adequate provision for support, such as documentation to provide for his medical needs. Under the circumstances of this case, the record does not support Mother's assertion that there were alternatives available short of removal.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding A.R. would be in substantial danger without removal from Mother's care, and no reasonable means existed to protect him without removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: McKINSTER
Acting P. J. SLOUGH
J.