Opinion
1:21-cv-00324-RAL
02-03-2022
LARRY RAFIQ SAMUELS, Plaintiff v. (FRM) SUPERINTENDENT M. OVERMYER, SUPERINTENDENT DEREK OBERLANDER, LT. WALKER, LT. DICKEY, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION ECF NO. 8
RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Report
Plaintiff Larry Rafiq Samuels (Samuels) has filed a “petition for injunctive relief” seeking an “emergency transfer” from his current prison to another facility and a “z-code” custody designation. ECF No. 8. This motion is on referral to the undersigned for Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is respectfully recommended that this motion be DENIED.
II. Recommendation
A. Introduction
Samuels is an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) currently incarcerated at its State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest). His pro se complaint asserts civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four Defendants employed by the DOC-former SCI-Forest superintendent Overmyer, current SCI-Forest superintendent Oberlander, corrections officer Walker, and corrections officer Dickey. He alleges that the Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
These claims arise out of an altercation between Samuels and an inmate named Milas. The two initially argued and then escalated to a physical fight during which Milas bit off a portion of Samuels' ear. ECF No. 7 (Complaint), ¶ 10. Samuels was transported from the prison to a hospital for treatment. When he returned, officers screened him for contraband using a scanner. After the scanner indicated an object on or within his person, Walker interrogated Samuels about how his ear had been amputated. Id., ¶ 68. Samuels claimed he sustained the injury when he slipped and fell. Samuels was untruthful because he feared being labelled a snitch if he disclosed the actual cause of the injury. After this conversation, Walker directed corrections officers to take Samuels to a dry cell. Id., ¶¶ 18-19, 63-64.
A dry cell is one without running water from a sink or toilet. It is designed to allow corrections officers to screen an inmate's bowel movements for contraband. The inmate must provide defecations into a plastic bag in a bucket over a period of days, and then corrections officers examine the contents for contraband. Samuels was in the dry cell for nearly four days. After three bowel movements where no contraband was found, Samuels was removed from the dry cell, screened in a body scanner, and taken to the restricted housing unit (RHU). Dickey's only alleged involvement with Samuels' dry cell time is that approximately one month after Samuels had been released from the cell, he sent Dickey a request slip asking him to investigate the decision to place him there and requesting information regarding the inmate whom he had fought. Id., ¶ 35. Samuels notified Oberlander of the same issue in a request slip and received no reply. Id., ¶¶ 36, 70. Samuels filed a grievance about Walker's placing him in the dry cell, and Oberlander upheld the denial of the grievance. Id., ¶¶ 39, 55, 61.
At a subsequent misconduct hearing regarding Samuels' involvement in the fight, a hearing examiner found Samuels guilty because he admitted to lying to staff and trying to hit the other prisoner. The hearing examiner sentenced him to thirty days of cell restriction. Id., ¶¶ 21- 23. His appeal to the Program Review Committee (PRC) was denied, and Oberlander upheld the PRC's denial on further appeal. Id., ¶¶ 32-33, 52.
The complaint also details Samuels' efforts to get a z-code, which would have authorized Samuels to be housed in a cell without a cellmate. Id., ¶¶ 24-30. Dickey's only alleged involvement in this matter is that Samuels sent him a request slip seeking a z-code, and Dickey responded that he should start the process “at the unit-team level.” Id., ¶ 28. Eventually, the PRC denied his request for a z-code. Id., ¶ 30. Samuels' complaint does not identify the members of the PRC who denied him the z-code.
Samuels also intimates that he is claiming that Overmyer, Oberlander, Walker, and Dickey failed to protect him from Milas when they improperly allowed him to be housed with general population inmates. Samuels asserts that the Defendants had control over where Milas was housed and knew of his violent history, mental health issues, and prior history of biting. Id., ¶¶ 43-44, 71.
Samuels' complaint seeks various equitable relief, including that the DOC clear him of his misconduct for fighting and expunge the finding of guilt for that misconduct, restore the privileges, including his prison job, that he lost as a result of the misconduct, prohibit racial discrimination, and undertake an independent investigation of all Defendants' current and past abuses of authority. He also asks for compensatory and punitive damages along with costs. Id., ¶¶ 88-94. His complaint does not request an order that he be given z-code status.
Samuels' one-page motion for injunctive relief seeks a transfer to another prison and z-code status. ECF No. 8. He claims that he needs the transfer because he fears future retaliation from SCI-Forest staff in general, although he does not allege any facts to support that he has experienced retaliation since he filed this lawsuit. Instead, he alleges that he is “still going through emotional, physical, and psychological trauma from the assault and fear that retaliation will be brought against him if he stayed in SCI Forest.” Id. He says he “does not feel safe or protected by SCI Forest staff.” He also claims entitlement to z-code status because he went through the proper channels at the prison and needs a single cell because of his “severe anxiety and paranoia struggles” since the events alleged in his complaint.
While it is not entirely clear from Samuels' motion whether he is requesting z-code status (and thus a single cell) at SCI-Forest or another prison he hopes to be transferred to, this ambiguity does not change the analysis or conclusion.
B. Analysis
Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Rather than seeking to preserve the status quo, Samuels' motion seeks mandatory injunctive relief in the form of an order directing his transfer to a different correctional institution and a designation entitling him to single cell housing status. “[A] request for some form of mandatory proactive injunctive relief in the prison context ‘must always be viewed with great caution because judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). A mandatory preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which courts should grant sparingly. Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 139 (3d Cir. 2013) (describing heightened standard for mandatory preliminary injunction). The Court may grant a mandatory preliminary injunction only in the most unusual cases where the movant's right to relief is “indisputably clear.” Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 409 U.S. 1235 (1972) (describing a mandatory injunction as an “extraordinary remedy [to] be employed only in the most unusual case.”); Talbert v. Corr. Dental Assocs., 2019 WL 6460499, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2019)
In deciding whether to grant injunctive relief, the Court considers four factors: (1) the likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits; (2) the extent to which the movant is being irreparably harmed by the conduct complained of; (3) the extent to which the non-moving party will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued; and (4) whether granting preliminary injunctive relief will be in the public interest. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 2010). As the moving party, Samuels bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. Id.; Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
Samuels has not demonstrated a reasonable correlation between the equitable relief he requests in his motion and the claims he asserts in his complaint. He also has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of any of his claims. Samuels' claim that Oberlander discriminated against him based on his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is premised on Oberlander's decision to uphold the grievance officer's guilty finding at the misconduct hearing. But he does not allege any facts to support a finding that he faces the threat of ongoing or future race discrimination necessitating a transfer to another institution or z-code status. Because his race discrimination claim is disconnected from the relief he requests in his motion, it does not support such relief. See Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting injunctive relief where it “is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit”) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)). Samuels also has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of this claim. He has not alleged any facts to support that any decision at issue in this case was based on race or that any Defendant engaged in actionable conduct relative to this claim. A claim under § 1983 requires that the plaintiff show the personal involvement of each defendant in actionable conduct, and merely denying an inmate's grievance appeal, as Samuels alleges Oberlander did here, does not support such personal involvement. See, e.g., Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 Fed.Appx. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n officer's review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate's grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal involvement.”); Hoopsick v. Oberlander, 2020 WL 5798044, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2020) (defendant upholding denial of plaintiff's grievance); Fortune v. Hamberger, 2007 WL 2782320, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2007) (citations omitted) (“participation in a prison's other administrative appeals processes, such as misconduct and prison review committee appeals, is an insufficient basis for personal involvement).
Samuels' cursory reference to the Fourth Amendment claim is unlikely a viable claim because “the Fourth Amendment right to privacy, to be free from unreasonable searches, is fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration.” Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)).
Samuels' claim based on denial of z-code status also fails because “[i]t is well established that the United States Constitution does not confer any right upon an inmate to any particular custody or security classification.” Henderson v. Thomas, 2012 WL 4434750, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2012) (citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976) (“Congress has given federal prison officials full discretion to control” various “conditions of confinement, including “prisoner classification” and “the discretionary transfer of state prisoners”). And, even if Samuels had met the criteria under DOC policies for a z-code as he claims, see ECF No. 8, those policies do not create a right enforceable under the Constitution or §1983. See Lee v. Schrader, 2014 WL 2112833, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 20, 2014) (“[T]he simple fact that state law prescribes certain procedures does not mean that the procedures thereby acquire a federal constitutional dimension”) (citing United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1981) (other citations omitted).
Samuels' failure to protect claim fares no better. First, the injunctive relief Samuels seeks does not correlate to the merits of this claim. His motion does not allege that he needs to be transferred to another institution or housed without a cellmate because he faces an ongoing threat of harm by Milas or any other inmate. Thus, the relief he seeks by his current motion is unmoored from this claim. Therefore, even if Samuels' duty to protect claim had potential merit, it is based on an alleged failure to protect him from a threat that existed in the past but that is not alleged to be ongoing. Because the purpose of an injunction is to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable future harm, Samuels' failure to protect claim provides no support for Samuels' motion. Furthermore, Samuels has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of this claim. While prison officials have a general duty to “protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners, Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)), they will not be liable for failure to protect unless they evince deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm which then causes the plaintiff to suffer harm. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020). Samuels' statements that Defendants knew of Milas' prior history of violence is insufficient. Compare Tate v. Lindsay, --- Fed.Appx. ---, 2021 WL 5492810 (3d Cir. Nov. 23, 2021) (reversing dismissal of failure to protect claim when defendants knew of disputes between plaintiff and his inmate-assailant but disregard the likelihood of physical harm), with Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 371 (the risk that “an inmate with a history of violence might attack another inmate for an unknown reason” was too speculative to state a claim of deliberate indifference).
Samuels' conditions of confinement claim based on his time in the dry cell similarly does not support his request for a preliminary injunction. Regardless of the propriety of the prior decision to place Samuels in a dry cell, his motion does not allege that he faces any imminent threat of being returned to such a cell in the future. Samuels also has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of this claim. To prevail against prison officials on a claim that an inmate's conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment, the inmate must meet two requirements: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious, ” and (2) the “prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The sufficiently culpable state of mind is deliberate indifference, that is, the prison official knew of and disregarded constitutional violations. Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001). As to a dry cell, “even though administrative confinement in a dry cell is unpleasant and often unsanitary, so long as the conditions of that confinement are not foul or inhuman, and are supported by some penological justification, they will not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 362 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000)). Here, it appears Walker had a reasonable penological purpose in placing Samuels in a dry cell because the body scanner indicated possible contraband. See United States v. Holloway, 128 F.3d 1254, 1256 (8th Cir. 1997) (use of dry cell reasonable when activities indicated inmate was smuggling contraband); Thomas, 948 F.3d at 139. Samuels also has not met his burden to show that the conditions of his four-day confinement in the dry cell were sufficiently severe to support a viable conditions of confinement claims. Compare Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 365 (3d Cir. 1992) (“When viewed in their totality, the alleged actions of Lewisburg prison officials-not allowing Young to leave his cell more than once to defecate or urinate over a period of several days, not providing Young with a plastic urinal for 29 hours, not allowing Young to empty his urinal more than twice, not allowing Young to wash his hands before eating, not allowing Young to bathe or shower, not providing Young with toilet paper despite his diarrhea, not providing Young with water to drink, suggesting instead that he drink his urine, and the mocking taunts by guards and their threats to chain Young to a steel slab if he complained about his conditions-would if proved demonstrate a violation of the basic concepts of humanity and decency that are at the core of the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment.”), with Gilblom v. Gillipsie, 435 Fed.Appx. 165, 168 (3d Cir. 2011) (denying conditions of confinement claim when inmate spent “approximately 36 hours” in dry cell with his own excrement which he searched for contraband). See also Manama v. Fed. Bur. of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 374 (3d Cir. 2019) (viable conditions of confinement claim where inmate “deprived of his clothing, provided only ‘paper like' coverings instead, denied bedding, and exposed to low cell temperatures and constant bright lighting for four days”).
Walker is the only Defendant Samuels alleges had personal involvement in conduct related to his conditions of confinement claim. As for Walker, Samuels alleges that he ordered that officers place Samuels in the dry cell.
Samuels has also failed to show irreparable harm. He has not alleged that the Defendants are currently retaliating against him or that he faces an imminent threat of such retaliation. He likewise has alleged no facts to support that he faces the threat of a new attack by Milas or any other inmate. See Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B&B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969) (A preliminary injunction is not a vehicle to be used “simply to eliminate the possibility of a remote future injury.”).
Finally, Samuels' request for an injunction ordering the DOC to grant him z-code status is procedurally defective, factually unsupported, and facially invalid. While his complaint sought a transfer as relief, it did not include a request for z-code status. Because preliminary injunctive relief is intended to prevent irreparable injury pending resolution of the underlying claims on their merits, “the injury claimed in the motion for preliminary injunctive relief must relate to the conduct alleged and permanent relief sought in the plaintiff's complaint.” James v. Varano, 2017 WL 895569, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017). As such, the injunctive relief Samuels requests is not available in this action. See Kaimowitz, 122 F.3d at 43. Furthermore, preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiff's confinement simply because they are in court.” Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Because the defects in Samuels' request for equitable relief appear on the face of his motion and pleadings, no hearing is necessary. See Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1175-76 (3d Cir. 1990) (hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction is unnecessary if “the movant has not presented a colorable factual basis to support the claim on the merits or the contention of irreparable harm” or “if the movant is proceeding on a legal theory which cannot be sustained”) (citations omitted).
C. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny Samuels' petition for preliminary injunction at ECF No. 8.
III. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, any party may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).