While a bank in which a deposit has been made in the names of two or more people is protected under Code § 13-2039 in paying out all or any portion thereof to either of the persons in whose name the deposit may have been made, this Code section is primarily for the protection of the bank and does not conclude the matter of ownership as between the depositors themselves.Clark v. Bridges, 163 Ga. 542, 546 ( 136 S.E. 444); Nash v. Martin, 90 Ga. App. 235 ( 82 S.E.2d 658). Whether a joint tenancy, a tenancy in common, or some other relationship was intended to be created by the depositors as between themselves will appear from a contract, express or implied, between them, and this may be shown by circumstances such as the language on the signature card creating the deposit and indicating who is authorized to withdraw funds therefrom. Taylor v. C. S.Bank of Ga., 226 Ga. 15 ( 172 S.E.2d 617); Sams v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 119 Ga. App. 96 ( 166 S.E.2d 394). And see Clark v. Bridges, 163 Ga. 542, supra, s. c. 36 Ga. App. 377 ( 136 S.E. 825); Bowen v. Holland, 182 Ga. 430 ( 185 S.E. 720); Guest v. Stone, 206 Ga. 239 ( 56 S.E.2d 247); Jackson v. Jackson, 206 Ga. 470 ( 57 S.E.2d 602); Jackson v. Jackson, 209 Ga. 85 ( 70 S.E.2d 592); Culpepper v. Culpepper, 18 Ga. App. 182 ( 89 S.E. 161); Moore v. Citizens Bank of Ashburn, 21 Ga. App. 183 ( 94 S.E. 90); Wade v. Edwards, 23 Ga. App. 677 ( 99 S.E. 160); First Nat. Bank of Thomasville v. Sanders, 31 Ga. App. 789 (3) ( 122 S.E. 341). There is statutory provision making the deposit a joint tenancy as to persons in whose names joint deposits are made in savings and loan associations, and this is not made dependent upon a contract therefor between them. Code Ann. § 16-431.

Furthermore, ownership vested immediately upon the death of the joint tenant. See Sams v. First Nat. Bank, 119 Ga. App. 96 (1) ( 166 S.E.2d 394) (1969); and Sams v. McDonald, 117 Ga. App. 336 ( 160 S.E.2d 594) (1968). The decisive question, then, is whether the security agreement executed by the husband defeated the wife's survivorship interest.

Although these facts can show some indication of an intent that the accounts remain part of the estate, see James v. Elder, 186 Ga. App. 810, 811, 368 S.E.2d 570 (1988), they are not clear and, convincing evidence of such intent. Sams v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 119 Ga. App. 96, 100-101 (2), 166 S.E.2d 394 (1969) (joint tenant entitled to account despite fact that she did not deposit any funds into account and money was to be used for decedent); see also Willig v. Shelnutt, 224 Ga. App. 530, 532 (1), 480 S.E.2d 924 (1997) (where none of the evidence established decedent’s intent at the time the accounts were created, there was no clear and convincing evidence to overcome the statutory presumption). The very fact that the probate court had "concerns" about Lillian’s intent essentially negates its finding of clear and convincing intent to overcome the presumption that the accounts belonged to Karen. OCGA § 7-1-813 (a), (e).

A joint depositor's interest in a joint account with right of survivorship terminates upon his death ( Sams v. McDonald, 117 Ga. App. 336 ( 160 S.E.2d 594)), and there is an immediate vesting of the account in the surviving depositor. Sams v. First Nat. Bank, 119 Ga. App. 96 ( 166 S.E.2d 394). It follows that a mere lien upon a joint depositor's interest terminates upon the death of that depositor and that the survivor succeeds to the entire account.

" Hull v. Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co., 79 Ga. 93 (1a) ( 3 S.E. 903). But see General Acc. c. Corp. v. Fountain, 100 Ga. App. 802, 806 ( 112 S.E.2d 630), reversed on other grounds in 215 Ga. 897 ( 114 S.E.2d 120), and Piedmont c. Life Ins. Co. v. Gunter, 108 Ga. App. 236, 241 ( 132 S.E.2d 527). "A demand properly made as to form, time and place, is effective when made by one lawfully authorized to make it." Sams v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 119 Ga. App. 96, 101 ( 166 S.E.2d 394). (b) While it is true that when, as here, the policy contains no provision making the policy void upon failure of the insured to furnish proof of loss within 60 days after the loss, yet if the proof is not furnished within the 60 days as called for, a refusal of the insurer to pay after expiration of that time will not operate as a waiver of the proofs.

Deponent further says that no request was ever made upon her by anyone for the making of any withdrawal on said account prior to Mr. Billups' death." In Sams v. First National Bank, 119 Ga. App. 96 ( 166 S.E.2d 394), the same evidence was held sufficient to pierce the same "inceptive fraud" allegations with respect to a joint bank saving account. In that case evidence presented by the executor, which is also presented in the present case, was held insufficient to create a material issue in rebuttal to the evidence piercing the executor's pleadings.