¶ 9 Defendants moved to strike plaintiffs' request for attorney fees, arguing that section 11–13–15 of the Illinois Municipal Code applied to suits for injunctive relief and not to actions such as plaintiffs' seeking solely monetary damages. Plaintiffs responded that, if they succeeded in establishing a violation of the excavation ordinance, they were entitled to attorney fees under the express terms of the Illinois Municipal Code, the excavation ordinance and Illinois case law as set forth in Sampson v. Miglin, 279 Ill.App.3d 270, 215 Ill.Dec. 884, 664 N.E.2d 281 (1996). In Sampson, the appellate court affirmed an award of attorney fees under section 11–13–15 for costs the plaintiff had incurred in successfully pursuing monetary compensation for damage her building sustained as a result of improper excavation in the neighboring building.

¶ 89 Determining the reasonableness of attorney fees rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Sampson v. Miglin, 279 Ill.App.3d 270, 281 (1996). We will not reverse a judgment on attorney fees unless we determine that the fee award was" 'so inadequate as to amount to a clear abuse of discretion by the court.'" Id. (quoting Warren v. LeMay, 142 Ill.App.3d 550, 582 (1986)).

In assessing the reasonableness of fees, the trial court should consider several factors, including the skill and standing of the attorneys, the nature of the case, the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the responsibility required, the usual and customary charge for such services in the community, and the connection between the services rendered and the fees charged. See Sampson v. Miglin, 279 Ill. App. 3d 270, 281 (1996), citing Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 248 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1072 (1993). It should also consider the entire record before it and its personal knowledge of the cause.

This court has held that "because the determination of reasonable attorney fees rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, `[e]ven where the trial court has, in its calculations, included improper fees or excluded recoverable fees, this court will not disturb the judgment unless "the total fees and costs awarded * * * was [so excessive or] so inadequate as to amount to a clear abuse of discretion by the court." [Citation.]'" Guerrant, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 273, quoting Sampson v. Miglin, 279 Ill. App. 3d 270, 281, 664 N.E.2d 281 (1996), quoting Warren v. LeMay, 142 Ill. App. 3d 550, 582, 491 N.E.2d 464 (1986). We conclude that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the fees attributable to the time the petitioner expended objecting to the fee petitions of the other attorneys for the co-administrator and other beneficiaries.

Guerrant, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 262-63, 777 N.E.2d 502. "Even where the trial court has, in its calculations, included improper fees or excluded recoverable fees, this court will not disturb the judgment unless 'the total fees and costs awarded *** was [so excessive or] so inadequate as to amount to a clear abuse of discretion ***.' " Sampson v. Miglin, 279 Ill. App. 3d 270, 281, 664 N.E.2d 281, 288 (1996) (quoting Warren v. LeMay, 142 Ill. App. 3d 550, 582, 491 N.E.2d 464, 485 (1986)). "An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court."

Since Klein did not sign RTKL's proposal or otherwise agree to any provision for prejudgment interest, the circuit court erred in awarding RTKL prejudgment interest on its quantum meruit claim. Sampson v. Miglin, 279 Ill. App. 3d 270, 277 (1996). ¶ 24 RTKL contends that the circuit court erred in finding that no written contract for architectural and interior design services existed between the parties.

This court reviews a circuit court's award of attorney fees and costs for an abuse of discretion. Sampson v. Miglin, 279 Ill.App.3d 270, 281, 215 Ill.Dec. 884, 664 N.E.2d 281 (1996). ¶ 54 The trial court awarded plaintiffs $1,636,700.80 in attorney fees, which was calculated by applying a 40% contingent fee to an Illinois Securities Law damage award of $4,091,752.19.

To the extent certain services could even be considered "aggregated," we would note that aggregation alone is insufficient to warrant reversing a fee award, and regardless, the entries provided were adequate to determine the reasonableness of the time spent on the tasks. See Sampson v. Miglin, 279 Ill. App. 3d 270, 281-82 (1996); cf. Lasday v. Weiner, 273 Ill. App. 3d 461, 467 (1995) (case remanded for hearing on reasonableness of fees where itemized statement provided only the total amount of time expended for a particular day and a general description of the tasks performed). Viewing the record as a whole, Saluja's claim must fail.

Moreover, D'Ancona Pflaum has not specifically addressed the trial court's decision regarding the court reporter fee of $100. As to D'Ancona Pflaum's contentions regarding the trial court's purported mathematical errors, the record indicates that the issue was not raised below by either party to afford the trial court the opportunity to correct any purported mathematical errors in calculations. We have previously held that because the determination of reasonable attorney fees rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, "[e]ven where the trial court has, in its calculations, included improper fees or excluded recoverable fees, this court will not disturb the judgment unless `the total fees and costs awarded * * * was [so excessive or] so inadequate as to amount to a clear abuse of discretion by the court.' [Citation.]" Sampson v. Miglin, 279 Ill. App. 3d 270, 281, 664 N.E.2d 281, 288 (1996). Accordingly, we shall not disturb the trial court's decision as to these expenses.

Defendant, however, argues that the abuse of discretion standard applies to the court's award of attorney fees. See Sampson v. Miglin, 279 Ill. App. 3d 270 (1996). Moreover, it cites case law that holds that a reviewing court ought not conduct a de novo review of a fee petition to provide a second opportunity to address its reasonableness.