a v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (factual sufficiency standards); King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (legal sufficiency standards). In order to obtain a conviction for resisting arrest, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally prevented or obstructed a person she knew was a peace officer from effecting an arrest of appellant or another by using force against the peace officer or another. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 38.03(a). In a single point of error, appellant claims that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish that she used force against a peace officer or another. We disagree. The Texas Penal Code provides no definition of "force." See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07 (general definitions), § 38.01 (definitions specific to resisting arrest offense). Case law indicates that evidence is sufficient to establish resisting arrest when the defendant struck an officer ( See Sample v. State, 626 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) and Burke v. State, 692 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no pet.)); pushed, shoved, struggled, and fought with an officer ( see Jones v. State, 620 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980)); pushed and struck an officer ( see Humphreys v. State, 565 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978)); and dragged an officer ( see Washington v. State, 525 S.W.2d 189, 189 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975)). In this case, the record reveals that appellant's actions rose to the level of using force to resist arrest in accordance with the aforementioned case law. See Sample, 626 S.W.2d at 517; Humphreys, 565 S.W.2d at 61; Washington, 525 S.W.2d at 189. Officer Singletary testified that the appellant "swatt[ed]" at him and struggled with him for a period of time. Officer Garcia additionally testified that appellant dug her nails into and twisted his arm as he tried to subdue her, fought, and pushed away from the officers with her buttocks. Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have con

The facts of record establish that appellant directed a forceful shove at Officer Landrum. Such a blow falls clearly within the category of uses of force sufficiently directed toward the officer to support conviction for resisting arrest. See, e.g., Sample v. State, 626 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (opinion on motion for rehearing) (punching arresting officer in the face is sufficient force); Humphreys, 565 S.W.2d at 60 (repeatedly pushing arresting officer to the ground and striking officer's arm to dislodge his grip is sufficient force); Washington, 525 S.W.2d at 190 (dragging two officers across the street is sufficient force); Mayfield v. State, 758 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1988, no pet.) (using elbows and shoulder to shove arresting officer out of moving car is sufficient force); Schrader, 753 S.W.2d at 736 (kicking, hitting and biting officers is sufficient force);

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (general definitions), § 38.01 (Vernon 2003) (definitions specific to obstructing governmental operation). Case law indicates that evidence is sufficient to establish resisting arrest when a defendant strikes an officer, Sample v. State, 626 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981), or when a defendant has pushed, shoved, struggled, and fought an officer, Jones v. State, 620 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). Further, "a person who uses force in order to shake off an officer's detaining grip, whether by pushing or pulling, may be guilty of resisting arrest."

However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has considered the validity of an information charging resisting arrest which alleged that the defendant did "prevent and obstruct I.D. Phillips, a person that Defendant knew to be a peace officer from effecting the arrest of the [sic] Rayford Odell Sample, by striking I.D. Phillips with his fist." Sample v. State, 626 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982) (op. on reh'g). The Court held that the quoted language constituted "a sufficient allegation of `force.'"

The evidence is insufficient to establish resisting arrest where the accused merely pulls away from the arresting officer. Young v. State, 622 S.W.2d 99, 100-101 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); Raymond v. State, 640 S.W.2d 678, 679 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1982, pet. ref'd). However, the evidence has been held sufficient to establish force against a peace officer where the accused struck an officer with his fist, Sample v. State, 626 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (opinion on motion for rehearing), struggled with and drug officers about eight to ten feet, Washington v. State, 525 S.W.2d 189, 190-91 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975), pushed and shoved officers and struggled with officers by "thrashing" about with his arms and feet, Boughton v. State, 631 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1982, pet. ref'd), pushed, shoved, grabbed, and jerked the arm of an officer, Jones v. State, 620 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981), and struck, pushed, and struggled with an officer. Humphreys v. State, 565 S.W.2d 59, 61-62 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Here, once appellant knew he was to be arrested, he attempted to drive away.

That is the question appellant raises here. We are unable to reconcile Sandig with Sample v. State, 626 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982) (en banc) in which the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a charge alleging that defendant obstructed arrest "by using force" did not enlarge on an indictment alleging that defendant obstructed arrest "by striking [the officer] with his fist." We need not determine whether the present charge presents an error of the second or the third type discussed in Cumbie, since we conclude that it is either one or the other. If we consider the next to last paragraph of the charge above quoted, which instructs the jury on what must be proved to convict appellant of theft, then there is error of the second type because the charge substitutes the theory of appropriation by deception for the theory of appropriation without the owner's assent in fact, as alleged in the indictment.