Summary
In Salvaggio v. Candlewood Valley Bus Co., 6 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 156, 731-CRD-7-88-5 (1989) we reiterated our holding in Fuller v. Central Paving Co., 5 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 92, 655 CRD-1-87 (1988) that for a claimant to prevail on a Motion to Preclude the written notice of claim must strictly meet all the technical requirements of Sec. 31-294.
Summary of this case from Pereira v. State, D.C.Y.SOpinion
CASE NO. 731 CRD-7-88-5
MAY 1, 1989
The claimant was represented by Gary P. Cahill, Esq.
The Respondent-CIGNA was represented by Mark D. Leighton, Esq., Trowbridge, Ide, Courtney Mansfield, P.C.
The Respondent-Nationwide was represented by Richard Bartlett, Esq. and Ralph A. Russo, Esq. of McGann, Bartlett Brown.
This Petition for Review from the May 3, 1988 Order Granting Motion to Preclude of the Commissioner for the Seventh District was heard January 27, 1989 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Andrew Denuzze.
OPINION
Respondents' appeal attacks the Seventh District May 3, 1988 Order Granting Claimant's Motion to Preclude. They allege it was error to rule that the January 26, 1987 letter was a sufficient notice of claim in that the claimant's employer was not Candlewood Bus Company as indicated on the letter but Candlewood Valley Bus Company or Candlewood Valley Transportation.
Fuller v. Central Paving Co., 5 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 92 (1988), 655 CRD-1-87, holding that in order for claimants to avail themselves of the preclusion of defenses under Sec. 31-297(b), C.G.S., the notice of claim must strictly comply with Sec. 31-294's technical requirements is controlling.
Sec. 31-294, C.G.S., provides in pertinent part that
[a notice] [s]hall state the date and place of the accident and the nature of the injury resulting therefrom, or the date of the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease and the nature of such disease, as the case may be, and the name and address of the employee and of the person in whose interest compensation is claimed.
That statute also states "Any employee who has sustained an injury in the course of his employment shall forthwith notify his employer, or some person representing his employer, of such injury. . . ." (emphasis ours). This part of Sec. 31-294 requires notice to the employer and further infers a requirement that the employer be properly notified. Substantial compliance with these notice provisions may be sufficient to satisfy Sec. 31-294 time limitation requirements, but a stricter standard is necessary to effect Sec. 31-297(b)'s preclusion of defenses.
We therefore conclude that the granting of the claimant's Motion To Preclude was error. However, the claimant is free to pursue her claim on the merits. Timothy v. Upjohn, 2 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 1 (1983). We do not here resolve the other issues raised by respondents.
We therefore, reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Andrew Denuzze concur.