(7) The Legislature shall provide by law for the implementation of this section. In Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District v. Apache County, 172 Ariz. 337, 342-43, 837 P.2d 139, 144-45 (1992), our supreme court made it clear that Article 9, section 19 is not to be strictly interpreted, but broadly construed to accomplish its evident purposes. The court relied in part on its decision in Kerby v. Luhrs, 44 Ariz. 208, 214, 36 P.2d 549, 551 (1934), in which it stated that constitutions "are by necessity general in their nature, and presumably intended to remain in force for a long period of time," and must accordingly "be construed in the light of their purpose."
The "levy limit" is the annual cap placed on property taxes by this provision. Salt River Proj. Agric. Improv. and Power Dist. v. Apache County, 172 Ariz. 337, 338, n. 1, 837 P.2d 139, 140 (1992). ¶ 3 The constitution contains only three exceptions to the levy limit, none of which applies here.
See State v. Green, 248 Ariz. 133, 135 ¶ 8, 459 P.3d 45, 47 (2020) ("We must strive to construe a statute and its subsections as a consistent and harmonious whole." (cleaned up)); Salt River Project Agric, Improvement & Power Dist. v. Apache County, 172 Ariz. 337, 342, 837 P.2d 139, 144 (1992) (noting that common sense has a role in statutory interpretation). Therefore, the context in which "research" is used requires us to limit what constitutes "research" based on the subjects researched and the reasons for doing so.
But common sense dictates that voters in 1925 gave their own meaning to "injury" and "personal injury" in deciding whether to extend benefits without considering how their 1912 counterparts defined the terms. See Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Apache Cnty. , 172 Ariz. 337, 342, 837 P.2d 139, 144 (1992) ("[N]o matter what result might be reached by applying constructs contained in the various canons of statutory and constitutional construction, common sense must also inform our decision."). Returning to the 1912 meaning of those words, assuming it differed from the 1925 meaning, would metaphorically pull the rug from beneath the 1925 voters’ feet and should not be tolerated.
It is the power of taxation, not the imposition of a specific tax rate, that must be expressly delegated. Ariz. Sash, Door & Glass Co. , 80 Ariz. at 102, 293 P.2d 438 (stating that "the power of taxation under the constitution inheres in the sovereignty of the state and may be exercised only by the legislature except where expressly delegated to political subdivisions of the state"); see also Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Apache County , 172 Ariz. 337, 339–40, 837 P.2d 139, 141–42 (1992) (discussing tax levy distinct from tax rate); El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. State , 123 Ariz. 219, 221, 599 P.2d 175, 177 (1979) (discussing separate functions of levying a tax and computing a tax rate). ¶63 The legislature expressly delegated authority to levy a transportation excise tax in § 42-6106(A) : "If approved by the qualified electors voting at a countywide election, the [RTA] shall levy ... a transportation excise tax ...."
Respondents appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. For the reasons given in our opinion today in Salt River Project v. Apache County, 172 Ariz. 337, 837 P.2d 139 (1992), the judgment of the Arizona Tax Court is affirmed, and that portion of the court of appeals' opinion addressing the calculation of Maricopa County's 1987 property tax levy limit is vacated. MOELLER, V.C.J., and CORCORAN, ZLAKET and MARTONE, JJ., concur.
¶ 52 Courts also look to the policy behind a statute and the evil it was designed to remedy when ascertaining legislative intent. See Salt R. Proj. Agr. Improvement Pwr. Dist. v. Apache County, 172 Ariz. 337, 342, 837 P.2d 139, 144 (1992); Cohen v. State, 121 Ariz. 6, 9, 588 P.2d 299, 302 (1978). "The underlying purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act . . . is to compensate an employee for lost earning capacity and to prevent the injured employee and dependents from becoming public charges during the period of disability."
¶ 16 While Arizona's constitutional provision concerning antitrust violations does not contain an explicit statement concerning the rights of indirect purchasers to enforce its provisions, "we must choose an interpretation that will best serve and carry out the apparent goals and policies of those responsible for [its] adoption." Salt River Project Agric. Improvement Power Dist. v. Apache County, 172 Ariz. 337, 342, 837 P.2d 139, 144 (1992); see also Laos v. Arnold, 141 Ariz. 46, 47, 685 P.2d 111, 112 (1984) (constitutional provisions are to be construed liberally to carry out the purposes for which they were adopted). Where, as here, there is some doubt as to the meaning or scope of certain statutory language, it is the court's duty to reconcile that language with the corresponding constitutional provision.
Similarly, in order to effectuate the legislature's apparent goals and policies, we cannot interpret its grant of the right to counsel to be a meaningless gesture. See Salt River Project Agric. Improvement Power Dist. v. Apache County, 172 Ariz. 337, 342, 837 P.2d 139, 144 (1992). We therefore see no distinction based upon whether the right to counsel arises from the United States Constitution or from a statute adopted by the Arizona legislature.