Opinion
No. C 04-1715 WHA.
September 20, 2004
ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
INTRODUCTION
In this civil action, petitioners Ed Salsedo and Save Orick Committee challenge certain camping restrictions. Respondent National Park Service moves to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. This order GRANTS respondent's motion to dismiss based on petitioner's lack of standing.
STATEMENT
In 1990, the NPS began leasing a parcel of land known as "the Spit," which is owned by the State of California, but is now administered as part of Redwood National Park. The technical lessor is the California Department of Transportation ("Caltrans") (Aida Decl. ¶ 3). NPS and Caltrans signed a five-year lease on April 17, 1990 ( ibid.). The 1990 lease made NPS' management of the Spit subject to a 1990 Management Plan ("1990 Plan") ( ibid.). The 1990 Plan allowed overnight camping ( ibid.). Four extensions of the lease were made since 1990 ( ibid.).
Then, on August 1, 2000, the parties signed a new five-year lease ( id. ¶ 4). The 2000 lease relieved NPS of its management under the 1990 Plan and instead required NPS to manage the Spit under the provisions of "approved management plans for Redwood National and State Parks" ( id. at Exh. F). The current approved management plan is the General Management Plan ("GMP") ( id. ¶ 4). It is disputed whether the 2000 lease terminated all provisions of the 1990 lease and the 1990 Plan. Respondent contends that the 2000 lease expressly canceled and superseded the 1990 lease and that the GMP now governs the Spit (Br. 5-6). In his opposition brief, petitioner Ed Salsedo argues that the GMP was merely "conceptual" and that the 1990 Plan still governs (Opp. 4). Since the GMP restricts camping in the Spit, this controversy revolves around the issue of whether the GMP governs the Spit.
On May 24, 1996, NPS published a notice of intent to prepare an environmental impact statement for the GMP (Aida Decl. ¶ 5). Numerous open houses were held and newsletters were sent to solicit public opinion for the GMP ( ibid.). Issues raised by the public included resource protection, visual quality, sanitation, safety and visitor services ( ibid.). The draft environmental impact statement considered three alternatives for management of the Spit: elimination of overnight camping, allowance of free camping to continue, and charging a fee for camping while limiting it to the northern portion of the Spit ( id. ¶ 6). The draft recommended day use only, thus eliminating overnight camping ( ibid.). After a three-month public-review and comment process, in which petitioners failed to participate, NPS chose to eliminate overnight camping ( id. ¶¶ 7-8). In response to public comments, NPS decided to gradually phase-out overnight camping over a period of three years ( id. ¶ 8). A record of decision was issued on April 6, 2000, and the Spit was converted to a day-use only area on January 12, 2004 ( id. ¶¶ 4, 8).
Petitioners filed an application for a writ of mandate in state court on April 6, 2004. Respondent NPS removed the case and filed this motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Petitioner Ed Salsedo filed an opposition to the motion. No other petitioners filed an opposition. At the hearing, petitioner sought remand of this case to state court.
ANALYSIS
The threshold issue in this case is one of standing. Respondent NPS claims that petitioners do not have standing. Standing is a threshold issue that must be decided before the merits of the case can be considered. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 109 (2001). The issue of standing involves limitations that stem from the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). Article III standing has three requirements: (1) an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
In his writ, petitioner failed to state an injury in fact. The sole injury alleged in petitioner's application for writ of mandate is a loss of income value to the taxpayers of California (Pet. for Writ 5). In fact, the first line of petitioner's application states that the current action is "brought by petitioners, in the Public Interest, who are California Taxpayers and Citizens . . ." ( id. at 1) (emphasis added). "Vindicating the public interest . . . is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (emphasis in original). A plaintiff "claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws" does not meet standing requirements. Id. at 573. The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to recognize such generalized grievances. See United States v. Hayes, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995) (noting that generalized grievances "against allegedly illegal government conduct" are insufficient for "standing to invoke the federal judicial power"). Even in his opposition brief, petitioner Salsedo fails to address respondent's contention that all petitioners in this case lack standing. Because petitioners fail to state any other claims for injury except loss of income as taxpayers, and an injury of public interest is considered a generalized grievance rather than a concrete or particularized injury as required for Article III standing, they have failed to state an injury in fact.
Because the issue of standing is dispositive, this order need not address any remaining procedural or substantive issues presented in this case. Although petitioner Ed Salsedo was the only party to file an opposition, this order and its reasoning apply to all petitioners. As such, the case is dismissed with leave to amend. Furthermore, with respect to petitioner Ed Salsedo's request to have this case remanded, being that respondent NPS is a government agency, the matter was properly removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Petitioner's request is therefore denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this order GRANTS respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint. Petitioners may file a motion for leave to amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies noted in this order. Any such motion shall be accompanied by a sworn declaration specifying in detail the facts supporting standing and shall be brought no later than OCTOBER 5, 2004. Should petitioner choose to not file such a motion, the clerk will close the file and a judgment shall so issue.