In Bidar, the plaintiff sustained injuries when, as a guest of a hotel, she grabbed a towel bar in her hotel room as support in rising from a toilet seat. 66 Haw. at 554, 669 P.2d at 160. The Birminghams cite three cases as authority for their contention that information in a publication is a "product": Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986); Saloomey v. Jeppesen Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983); and Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen Co., 170 Cal.App.3d 468, 216 Cal.Rptr. 68 (1985). The publications in these cases were aeronautical approach charts graphically depicting the instrument approach procedure for the particular airport as that procedure had been promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Brocklesby, 767 F.2d at 1294-95.

Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, which is required in judgment n. o. v. determinations, Unijax, Inc. v. Champion International, Inc., 683 F.2d at 684; Howes v. Great Lakes Press Corporation, 679 F.2d at 1030, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury, which was fully and fairly instructed on the agency theory, to find that Murfitt, not Arnold, was plaintiffs' representative for the purpose of insuring that the deal was proper. See Saloomey v. Jeppesen Co., 707 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1983) ("judgment notwithstanding the verdict should [be] granted only if there was but one conclusion reasonable people could have reached — in appellant's favor"). We note that even if Arnold was plaintiffs' agent, Arnold's knowledge of the true condition of the Equity National stock would not as a matter of law be imputed to plaintiffs if Arnold's interests in the deal were in fact adverse to those of plaintiffs.

However, "in a disaster befalling a plane aloft, the place of the crash is often random . . . and the sovereignty in which the accident occurs has little interest in applying its substantive law to the case." Pescatore v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 13 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing cases); see also Saloomey v. Jeppesen Co., 707 F.2d 671, 675 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The happenstance of an aviation accident in West Virginia as a result of appellant's map-making in Colorado should not alter the normal expectations of the parties."); Restat.2d, § 145(2) cmt. e ("Situations do arise, however, where the place of injury will not play an important role in the selection of the state of the applicable law.

According to defendants, the uniformity for which the court was waiting has emerged, at least in interstate aviation cases. In addition to calling the court's attention to the number of jurisdictions which have adopted and applied the dominant contacts approach since Winters and Great American, the defendants rely upon Halstead v. U.S., 535 F. Supp. 782 (D.Conn. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Saloomey v. Jeppesen Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983). Halstead arose out of a West Virginia plane crash which killed the pilot and the passenger, both Connecticut residents.

In Halstead v. United States, 535 F.Supp. 782, 786-87 (D.Conn. 1982), affd sub nom. Saloomey v. Jeppesen Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d. Cir. 1983) (tort), the court considered the Gibson dicta and concluded that the Connecticut Supreme Court would adopt the Restatement approach. The Restatement test in choice of law decisions has been adopted "for those cases in which application of lex loci would produce an arbitrary, irrational result."

Similarly, two federal district court cases have interpreted dicta in Gibson v. Fullin, supra, as contemplating circumstances in which Connecticut courts might deviate from the lex loci doctrine provided a "compelling reason" exists to do so. Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Sup. 782, 788 (D. Conn. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Saloomey v. Jeppesen Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983); DeForneaux v. Sturm, Ruger Co., 503 F. Sup. 2, 4 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 639 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908, 101 S.Ct. 1975, 68 L.Ed.2d 295 (1981). The relevant dicta in Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407, 411, 374 A.2d 1061 (1977), notes that "there has been some tendency recently to depart" from lex loci delicti in modern jurisprudence, citing, among other sources, the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws.

However, they were expressly so classified in decisions filed by two different districts of the United States Courts of Appeal after the trial in the instant case had been concluded. ( Brocklesby v. United States (9th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 794, 800; Saloomey v. Jeppesen Co. (2d Cir. 1983) 707 F.2d 671, 676-677. See also Aetna Cas. And Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen Co. (9th Cir. 1981) 642 F.2d 339, 342-343.

Id. at 684. Consequently, we will reverse a district court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial only for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Smith v. Lightning Bolt Productions, 861 F.2d at 370; Saloomey v. Jeppesen Co., 707 F.2d 671, 679 (2d Cir. 1983); Bevevino, 574 F.2d at 683-84. Based on the facts already discussed, we can not conclude that the district court's decision to grant a new trial was an abuse of discretion.

Several jurisdictions have held that charts which graphically depict geographic features or instrument approach information for airplanes are "products" for the purpose of products liability law. See Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying Restatement for the purpose of California law), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101, 106 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed.2d 918 (1986); Saloomey v. Jeppesen Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying Restatement for the purpose of Colorado Law); Aetna Casualty Surety. Co. v. Jeppesen Co., 642 F.2d 339, 342-43 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying Nevada law); Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen Co., 170 Cal.App.3d 468, 475, 216 Cal.Rptr. 68, 71 (1985) (applying California law). Plaintiffs suggest that The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms can be compared to aeronautical charts because both items contain representations of natural features and both are intended to be used while engaging in a hazardous activity. We are not persuaded.

This deferential standard also extends to a district court's conclusions gleaned from its interpretation of a state's conflict of laws principles. See O' Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 842, 847 (2nd Cir. 1984); Saloomey v. Jeppeson Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676 (2nd Cir. 1983); Riske v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 541 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1976). Here the district court thoughtfully analyzed the applicable principles and concluded that under Maryland conflict rules the Delaware statute of limitations must be considered procedural and, accordingly, that the Maryland statute of limitations applied to the Sokolowskis' action.