Opinion
23-CV-1403 JLS (DEB)
08-19-2024
ORDER (1) ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS; (2) GRANTING THE PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; AND (3) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION
(ECF NOS. 8, 8-2, 11, 14)
HON. JANIS L. SAMMARTINO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Presently before the Court are Defendant L. Terronez's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (“Mot.,” ECF No. 8) and her supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“Mem.,” ECF No. 8-1). Plaintiff Justin Salmen filed an Opposition to the Motion (“Opp'n,” ECF No. 10), and Defendant submitted a Reply (“Reply,” ECF No. 12). Additionally, both Parties submitted Requests for Judicial Notice (“Def.'s RJN,” ECF No. 8-2) (“Pl.'s RJN,” ECF No. 11), and Defendant filed Objections to Plaintiff's Request (“Def.'s Objs.,” ECF No. 13). Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Butcher has issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R,” ECF No. 14) advising the Court to grant the Requests for Judicial Notice and to grant in part and deny in part Defendant's Motion. Neither Party filed objections to the R&R.
BACKGROUND
Judge Butcher's R&R contains an accurate and thorough recitation of this case's background, see R&R at 1-2, which this Order incorporates by reference.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district court's duties in connection with a magistrate judge's R&R. The district court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673-76 (1980); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). However, in the absence of timely objections, the Court “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974)).
ANALYSIS
No party filed timely objections to the R&R. See R&R at 11 (allowing objections to be filed on or before August 14, 2024). The Court thus reviews the R&R for clear error.
I. Requests for Judicial Notice
The Parties seek judicial notice of weather-related facts. Defendant asks the Court to judicially notice (1) the location of Richard J. Donovan Correctional Center (where the alleged events took place); and (2) the temperature at the Center on May 21, 2023 (the date in question). Id. at 3 & n.3. Defendant provides a “printout from www.almanac.com,” indicating that it was between 57.9- and 71.1-degrees Fahrenheit that day. Id. at 3-4. Meanwhile, Plaintiff requests judicial notice of the UV Index rating for May 21, 2023, and provides a “screenshot from the word-weather.info website” to that effect. Id. at 4-5.
The R&R advises the Court to grant both Requests for Judicial Notice on the ground that weather data, like temperatures and UV Index ratings, “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Id. at 3-5 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)).
II. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1)-which brings claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983-on three grounds: “(1) it does not plead a cognizable Eighth Amendment violation; (2) qualified immunity protects [Defendant] from suit; and (3) [Defendant] is impermissibly sued in her official capacity.” Id. at 3. The Court reviews the R&R's discussion of each issue in turn.
A. Eighth Amendment Claim
The R&R notes that pleading an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim requires a plaintiff to allege that “prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm,” an element that has objective and subjective components. Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998)). The objective prong demands that “conditions of confinement pose ‘a substantial risk of serious harm.'” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). As to the subjective piece, a plaintiff “must prove the prison official inflicted the deprivation with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,' that is, with ‘deliberate indifference to [the plaintiff's] health or safety.'” Id. at 7 (alteration in original and one set of internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
Defendant first argues the Complaint fails to satisfy the objective side of the EighthAmendment equation. Id. at 5. Defendant allegedly caused Plaintiff to suffer a second-degree burn by forcing him to sit on a metal bench in the sun, even though Plaintiff had pointed out the burn risk to Defendant. See id. at 6. The R&R states that a “second-degree burn is serious,” and that the Complaint's allegations-if true-suffice to show Defendant “created a substantial risk of that harm.” Id. (citing cases). Defendant contends that the purportedly mild temperature (“a high of 71 degrees”) makes Plaintiff's version of events implausible. Id. But, per the R&R, this argument cannot prevail at the pleading stage given Plaintiff's allegations of prolonged sun exposure. See id. The R&R similarly rejects another of Defendant's arguments-that Plaintiff was clothed and unrestrained-on the ground that such issues of fact are not resolvable at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Id.
Next, Defendant targets the test's subjective prong. See id. at 7. Defendant allegedly “‘ordered' [Plaintiff] to sit ‘directly in the sun with no shade'” and “failed to abate” the risk of sunburn even after Plaintiff said he was “‘burn[ing] up' from the direct sun exposure.” Id. at 7 (quoting Compl. at 3). The R&R concludes these allegations suffice for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and advises the Court to deny the Motion as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim. See Id. B. Qualified Immunity
Additionally, Defendant asserts qualified immunity. See id. The R&R explains that “[q]ualified immunity shields government actors from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless ‘(1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.'” Id. at 8 (one set of internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018)). The R&R further notes that qualified immunity applies when existing precedent “squarely governs” the facts at issue and “place[s] the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. (first quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018); and then quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)).
The R&R recommends denying Defendant's qualified immunity argument. See Id. at 9. Defendant allegedly subjected Plaintiff to sun exposure unnecessarily; she was purportedly motivated by a desire to deprive Plaintiff of the chance to send a photograph to his family, not by “penological or safety” concerns. Id. And, per the R&R, decades-old decisions from both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit clearly establish that such conduct violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. (first citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002); and then citing Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2000)). The R&R also rejects Defendant's attempt to distinguish these authorities on the ground that the Complaint alleges only “temporary deprivations,” as Plaintiff claims the exposure lasted long enough to cause a second-degree burn. Id. at 9 n.4 (quoting Mem. at 6).
C. Plaintiff's Official Capacity Claim
Finally, Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff's “claim against her in her official capacity.” Id. Defendant argues said claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Id. The R&R notes that “[a] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity . . . is no different from a suit against the State itself,” id. (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)), and that the “Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages against states and their agencies under § 1983,” id. at 10. As Plaintiff-who is suing Defendant in both her individual and official capacity-seeks compensatory damages, and California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to § 1983 claims brought in federal court, the R&R concludes Plaintiff's official-capacity claim is jurisdictionally barred. See id. The R&R further advises the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's official capacity claim with prejudice because amendment could not cure the above jurisdictional defect. See id.
Typically, dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be without prejudice. See, e.g., Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999). However, the Ninth Circuit has found that an action can appropriately be dismissed with prejudice on Eleventh Amendment grounds when providing leave to amend would be futile. See, e.g., Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 891 F.3d 1147, 1153-54 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2018).
The Court finds no clear error in the R&R. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS Judge Butcher's R&R (ECF No. 14), GRANTS the Parties' respective Requests for Judicial Notice, and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion (ECF No. 8). Plaintiff's official capacity § 1983 claim is thus DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; the Motion is otherwise DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.