When confronted with the question of whether a legal instrument has conveyed a property right, a court's job "is to ascertain the true intent of the parties as expressed by them in the deed, lease or other written instrument under consideration." Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum, 175 W. Va. 296, 300, 332 S.E.2d 597, 600 (1985) (quoting Davis v. Hardman, 148 W. Va. 82, 88-89, 133 S.E.2d 77, 81 (1963)). "The language of the instrument itself, and not surrounding circumstances, is the first and foremost evidence of the parties['] intent.

So, we conclude that the circuit court’s interpretation impermissibly broadened the scope of the reservation at issue, and, in effect, erroneously rewrote it.Sally-Mike Propertiesv. Yokum, 175 W. Va. 296, 300, 332 S.E.2d 597, 601 (1985).Faith United Methodist Church, 231 W. Va. at 443-44, 745 S.E.2d at 481-82 (quoting Murphy v. Van Voorhis, 94 W. Va. 475, 480, 119 S.E. 297, 299 (1923)).

See W. Va. Code § 36-3-4. [14, 15] With regard to description, this Court stated in Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum, 175 W. Va. 296, 332 S.E.2d 597 (1985), that [a] deed of conveyance, in order to pass title, must contain a description of the property being conveyed which sufficiently identifies the land, either by the language of the granting clause itself or by reference to extrinsic facts which render the description certain.

Syl. pt. 1, Cotiga Development Company v. United Fuel Gas Company, 147 W. Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626 ([1962])." Syllabus point 1, Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum, 175 W. Va. 296, 332 S.E.2d 597 (1985). 4.

The clause speaks of facts and circumstances which render the description ascertainable." Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum , 175 W. Va. 296, 302, 332 S.E.2d 597, 602–03 (1985). A finding of ambiguity opens up the factfinder to consideration of extrinsic evidence to give meaning to the deed language and "render the description ascertainable."

" Petitioners argue that "[a] deed of conveyance, in order to pass title, must contain a description of the property being conveyed which sufficiently identifies the land, either by the language of the granting clause itself or by reference to extrinsic facts which render the description certain." Sally-Mike Props. v. Yokum, 175 W. Va. 296, 301-02, 332 S.E.2d 597, 602 (1985). According to petitioners, the subject deed "stated[,] in the paragraph immediately following the identification of the parties, what was being conveyed: ' . . . the following described real estate, whose Tax Map Number is 21, Parcels 4, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20. . . .'"

See also Syllabus Point 3, W.Va. Dep't of Highways v. Farmer, 159 W.Va. 823 , 226 S.E.2d 717 (1976) ("Where an ambiguity exists in a deed, the language of such deed will be construed most strongly against the grantor.”); Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum, 175 W.Va. 296 , 300, 332 S.E.2d 597 , 601 (1985) ("[I)n cases involving reservations and exceptions, any remaining doubt as to intent should be resolved in the grantee’s favor,”).

Countering this position, the appellees jointly argue in support of the lower court's decision by employing the following reasoning. The appellees claim that the reservation language in the 1959 deed to lot six did not provide information regarding the location, dimensions, boundaries, or markers of the area to be reserved as the Belcher cemetery and the law requires that the land sought to be reserved must be described with particularity. Syl. Pt. 1, Highway Properties v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 189 W. Va. 301, 431 S.E.2d 95 (1993); Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum, 175 W. Va. 296, 301-302, 332 S.E.2d 597, 602 (1985); Syl. Pt. 2, Hall v. Hartley, 146 W. Va. 328, 119 S.E.2d 759 (1961). While the appellees acknowledge that certainty may be established by reference to extraneous documents or facts, they contend that the purpose of the reference in the 1959 lot six deed to the map was solely to identify the seven subdivisions of the sixty-nine-acre tract because the paragraph setting forth the reservation of a cemetery and the roads leading to the cemetery did not specifically refer to the map.

We concluded that title to the burial ground had been excepted and that the description was sufficient. We therefore held that Sally-Mike had not established its ownership of the property in question and, consequently, was not entitled to obtain the statutory relief. Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum, 175 W. Va. 296, 332 S.E.2d 597 (1985). After this Court's ruling the defendants presented in the trial court their motion for dismissal of the action.

It is well-established that construction of a deed should give effect to the intention of the parties. Totten v. Pocahontas Coal Co., 67 W. Va. 639, 642, 68 S.E. 373, 374 (1910); Bruen v. Thaxton, 126 W. Va. 330, 339-40, 28 S.E.2d 59, 64 (1943); Wellman v. Tomblin, 140 W. Va. 342, 347, 84 S.E.2d 617, 620 (1954); Kell v. APCO, 170 W. Va. 14, ___, 289 S.E.2d 450, 456 (1982); Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum, 175 W. Va. 296, ___, 332 S.E.2d 597, 600 (1985). The appellants contend that the finding of the trial judge with respect to Mitchell's intention is contrary to the evidence.