Therefore, the court held that the beneficiary was entitled to accidental death benefits. Similarly, in Salisbury v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 259 Or. 453, 454, 486 P.2d 1279, 1280 (1971) the decedent had cancer of the brain which "rendered him weak, spastic, and unable to control his movements fully or to stand by himself." He was confined to a nursing home.

But the policy does not unambiguously bar recovery where bodily infirmity or disease is merely a remote cause. See Huff v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 587 P.2d at 269 (unless policy effectively and unambiguously disclaims coverage where the disease or bodily infirmity was not the proximate cause of the loss, "the courts of this country uniformly would not bar recovery under the policy where the preexisting infirmity merely led to an accident which in turn produced a distinct injury of loss"); Salisbury v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 259 Or. 453, 486 P.2d 1279, 1280 (1971) (if defendant insurer "intend[ed] that policy not cover death caused solely as a result of injuries sustained in an accident where a cause of the accident is infirmity or disease, it should have more clearly expressed such intention."). As the court interprets Southern Farm's exclusion, it relates only to the cause of the death and not to the cause of the accident, for the cause of the accident is but a remote cause of the death.

Since there is no dispute that her death ensued "solely as a direct result, and independent of all other causes," of the bodily injury which she received in the fall, plaintiff is entitled to recover. This holding is supported by the decision in Salisbury v. John Hancock Mut. Life, 259 Or. 453, 486 P.2d 1279 (1971), in which the Supreme Court of Oregon expressly overruled one of its prior decisions in order to sustain recovery under an accident insurance policy which extended coverage for "death resulting directly and solely from * * * [a]n accidental injury" in a case in which the insured had a preexisting infirmity or disease which was a cause of the accident, but death was caused solely as the result of injuries suffered in the accident and not by virtue of the disease or infirmity itself. In the opinion in that case the Court said:

Metropolitan's denial of accidental death benefits to Arthurs must be reviewed under principles of this federal common law. Although the questions presented here — what constitutes an accident for the purposes of a double indemnity clause and whether a pre-existing health condition should prevent an insured from recovering accidental death benefits — have for years been the subject of litigation in numerous state courts, see, e.g., Graves v. Travelers Ins. Co., 66 Wis.2d 124, 224 N.W.2d 398 (1974); Salisbury v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 259 Or. 453, 486 P.2d 1279 (1971); Slobojan v. Western Travelers Life Ins. Co., 70 Cal.2d 432, 74 Cal.Rptr. 895, 450 P.2d 271 (1969) (in bank); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Smith, 248 Miss. 448, 160 So.2d 203 (1964); Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 327 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. 1959) (en banc); Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914 (1930) (all awarding accidental death benefits); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 554 S.W.2d 123 (Tenn. 1977); Merrick v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 88 Nev. 327, 497 P.2d 890 (1972); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Scott, 286 Ala. 10, 236 So.2d 328 (1970); Neeman v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 144, 153 N.W.2d 448 (1967); Horn v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 265 N.C. 157, 143 S.E.2d 70 (1965); Jackson v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 239 Ark. 576, 393 S.W.2d 233 (1965); Venable v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 366, 189 N.E.2d 138 (1963); Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 161 Tex. 391, 340 S.W.2d 787 (1960); Miller v. Prudential Ins. Co.,

However, in light of the change in Cuban law at the time, and in light of the fact that at the time of the agreement dollars and pesos had an equivalent value, we do not believe that it is clear as a matter of law that both parties intended the supplemental agreement to alter the face amount of the policy as well as the means of exchange. Plaintiff is also aided by the rule of construction that ambiguous insurance contracts, like other contracts, are construed most strongly against the company which draws them. See, e.g., Salisbury v. John Hancock Mut. Life, 259 Or. 453, 486 P.2d 1279 (1971); Reed v. Commercial Ins. Co., 248 Or. 152, 432 P.2d 691 (1967). Therefore, we conclude that this issue should have been submitted to a jury, as plaintiff requested, for a determination of the intention of the parties.

See 166 ALR, supra note 1, at 476 and 478. Salisbury v. John Hancock Mut. Life, 259 Or. 453, 486 P.2d 1279 (1971). See also Gowans v. N.W. Pac. Indemnity Co., 93 Adv Sh 730, 731, ___ Or ___, 489 P.2d 947 (1971); Hardware Mut. Cas. v. Farmers Ins., 256 Or. 599, 609, 474 P.2d 316 (1970); Jarrard v. Continental Casualty, 250 Or. 119, 126, 440 P.2d 858 (1968); and Ramco, Inc. v. Pac. Ins., 249 Or. 666, 674, 439 P.2d 1002 (1968).

Because of this equivalence, were the introductory paragraph of the exclusion in question to conclude absent the emphasized clause, this court in reaching its determination would be confronted with a direct split of authority on this issue. Two of the cases which clearly delineate this split in authority are Knowlton v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 146 Me. 220, 79 A.2d 581 (1951), and Salisbury v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 259 Or. 453, 486 P.2d 1279 (1971). In Knowlton, the insured had a convulsion caused by a disease (alcoholism).