Salida v. Morrison

48 Citing cases

  1. Byrd v. People

    58 P.3d 50 (Colo. 2002)   Cited 37 times
    Discussing probation revocation proceedings

    We further note here that the public policies underlying the doctrine of issue preclusion — preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment from vexatious litigation — will influence our determination of whether its application would be fair to the parties and constitute sound judicial decision making. See Salida Sch. Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1163 (Colo. 1987); Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1227 (Cal. 1990). In addition to outlining the elements of the doctrine in Williamsen, we stated that the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1980) includes exceptions to the general rule of issue preclusion, and in certain circumstances, even if the elements are satisfied, courts should not preclude the relitigation of an issue.

  2. Bebo Constr. Co. v. Mattox O'Brien, P.C.

    990 P.2d 78 (Colo. 1999)   Cited 167 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that collateral estoppel may bind parties to an administrative agency's findings and conclusions, so long as certain conditions are satisfied

    The doctrine is intended to "'relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.'" Salida Sch. Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1163 (Colo. 1987) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue if:

  3. Maryland Casualty Company v. Messina

    874 P.2d 1058 (Colo. 1994)   Cited 26 times
    Recognizing that the determinations of "an administrative agency, acting in a judicial capacity, may be binding on the parties in a subsequent proceeding if the agency resolved disputed issues of fact which the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate," but concluding that the workers’ compensation proceeding and the civil action at issue did not involve identical issues

    See Bennett College v. United Bank of Denver, 799 P.2d 364, 366 (1990); City of Colorado Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 749 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1988); Salida School Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 517 P.2d 396, 399 (Colo. 1973).

  4. Shovelin v. Central N.M. Elec. Co-op

    115 N.M. 293 (N.M. 1993)   Cited 198 times
    Holding that decision is within court's discretion

    Even so, our assessment of the procedural differences between the agency and court actions discussed above leads us to conclude that the ESD decision was reached by an informal process, which militates against giving collateral estoppel effect to that decision in subsequent litigation in district court. Accord Caras v. Family First Credit Union, 688 F. Supp. 586, 589-90 (D.Utah 1988); Salida Sch. Dist. v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1164-65 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); McClanahan, 517 N.E.2d at 394-95; Board of Educ. v. Gray, 806 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Ky.Ct.App. 1991). Even though the trial court's refusal to preclude relitigation led to inconsistent verdicts, a weighing of the fairness factors enumerated in Silva leads us to conclude that Shovelin did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of whether he was voluntarily discharged at the ESD hearing.

  5. Colo. Division of Employment v. Hewlett

    777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989)   Cited 13 times
    In Hewlett, 777 P.2d at 707, we "emphasize[d] that the unemployment law is intended to provide a speedy determination of eligibility through a simplified administrative procedure.

    Colorado Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 749 P.2d 412, 414 (Colo. 1988); Salida School Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987). The Act is to be liberally construed to further its remedial and beneficent purposes.

  6. Carpenter, M.D. v. Young

    773 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1989)   Cited 52 times
    Holding summary judgment was entitled to preclusive effect because all criteria were met including the right to review, even though the parties "waived any right to such review when they entered into settlement agreement"

    In order for collateral estoppel to apply, the issue sought to be precluded must be identical to the issue actually litigated and necessarily decided at the prior proceeding, there must be a final judgment on the merits, the party against whom estoppel is sought must have been a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding, and the party against whom estoppel is sought must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Salida School Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1163 (Colo. 1987); Industrial Comm'n v. Moffat County School Dist. RE No. 1, 732 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Colo. 1987); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344, 350-51, 517 P.2d 396, 399.

  7. Williamsen v. People

    735 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1987)   Cited 26 times
    Concluding that "[t]he salutary purposes of informal traffic infraction hearings would be frustrated if [issue preclusion] were to be applied so as to limit a full and fair consideration of the issue in a criminal trial"

    Industrial Commission v. Moffat County School District Re No. 1, 732 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Colo. 1987); Salida School District R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987). See also People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 666 P.2d at 554; People v. Hearty, 644 P.2d at 312; Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344, 350-51, 517 P.2d 396, 399 (1973).

  8. A-1 Auto Repair Detail v. Bilunas-Hardy

    93 P.3d 598 (Colo. App. 2004)   Cited 25 times
    Affirming entry of summary judgment against the defendant when the doctrine of issue preclusion established the fact of theft based on former employee's criminal conviction of the same theft

    Issue preclusion is intended to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication."Bebo Constr. Co. v. Mattox O'Brien, P.C., 990 P.2d 78, 84 (Colo. 1999) (quoting Salida Sch. Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1163 (Colo. 1987), and Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980)). In Pomeroy, supra, the supreme court held that under issue preclusion, "the final decision of a court on an issue actually litigated and determined is conclusive of that issue in any subsequent suit."Pomeroy, supra, 183 Colo. at 350, 517 P.2d at 399 (emphasis added).

  9. Swineford v. Snyder County Pennsylvania

    15 F.3d 1258 (3d Cir. 1994)   Cited 229 times
    Holding that the government’s interest outweighed employee’s where the government adduced evidence that "office conditions became intolerable" and the employee’s conduct "had an adverse effect on the discharge of [her] duties"

    Our conclusion is bolstered by the similar treatment given to findings of unemployment compensation boards in other states. See Board of Educ. v. Gray, 806 S.W.2d 400, 402-03 (Ky.Ct. App. 1991) ("we simply do not believe that it would be equitable to allow the doctrine to be applied"); Shovelin v. Central N.M. Elec. Coop, 115 N.M. 293, 850 P.2d 996, 1004 (1993) (trial court did not err in refusing to give preclusive effect to employment Security Department finding); Ferris v. Hawkins, 135 Ariz. 329, 660 P.2d 1256, 1259 (App. 1983) (collateral estoppel cannot be asserted because action for unemployment compensation and action for reinstatement involve "`distinct' legal rights"); Salida Sch. Dist., R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1164-65 (Colo. 1987) (applying collateral estoppel to board findings "would be wholly inappropriate, and would frustrate the underlying purposes"); Storey v. Meijer, Inc., 431 Mich. 368, 429 N.W.2d 169 (1988) ("preclusive effect . . . would be incompatible with this legislative policy"). California's unemployment compensation board findings are denied preclusive effect by statute.

  10. Searcy v. United States

    Civil Action No. 16-cv-00395-PAB-MJW (D. Colo. Mar. 28, 2016)

    See Shepard v. Holder, 678 F.3d 1171, 1180-81 (10th Cir. 2012); In re Water Rights of Elk Dance Colo., LLC, 139 P.3d 660, 670-71 (Colo. 2006); Salida School Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987). The Court's order remanding this case will establish that the motion to quash is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).