We further note here that the public policies underlying the doctrine of issue preclusion — preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment from vexatious litigation — will influence our determination of whether its application would be fair to the parties and constitute sound judicial decision making. See Salida Sch. Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1163 (Colo. 1987); Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1227 (Cal. 1990). In addition to outlining the elements of the doctrine in Williamsen, we stated that the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1980) includes exceptions to the general rule of issue preclusion, and in certain circumstances, even if the elements are satisfied, courts should not preclude the relitigation of an issue.
The doctrine is intended to "'relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.'" Salida Sch. Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1163 (Colo. 1987) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue if:
See Bennett College v. United Bank of Denver, 799 P.2d 364, 366 (1990); City of Colorado Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 749 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1988); Salida School Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 517 P.2d 396, 399 (Colo. 1973).
Even so, our assessment of the procedural differences between the agency and court actions discussed above leads us to conclude that the ESD decision was reached by an informal process, which militates against giving collateral estoppel effect to that decision in subsequent litigation in district court. Accord Caras v. Family First Credit Union, 688 F. Supp. 586, 589-90 (D.Utah 1988); Salida Sch. Dist. v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1164-65 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); McClanahan, 517 N.E.2d at 394-95; Board of Educ. v. Gray, 806 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Ky.Ct.App. 1991). Even though the trial court's refusal to preclude relitigation led to inconsistent verdicts, a weighing of the fairness factors enumerated in Silva leads us to conclude that Shovelin did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of whether he was voluntarily discharged at the ESD hearing.
Colorado Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 749 P.2d 412, 414 (Colo. 1988); Salida School Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987). The Act is to be liberally construed to further its remedial and beneficent purposes.
In order for collateral estoppel to apply, the issue sought to be precluded must be identical to the issue actually litigated and necessarily decided at the prior proceeding, there must be a final judgment on the merits, the party against whom estoppel is sought must have been a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding, and the party against whom estoppel is sought must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Salida School Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1163 (Colo. 1987); Industrial Comm'n v. Moffat County School Dist. RE No. 1, 732 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Colo. 1987); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344, 350-51, 517 P.2d 396, 399.
Industrial Commission v. Moffat County School District Re No. 1, 732 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Colo. 1987); Salida School District R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987). See also People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 666 P.2d at 554; People v. Hearty, 644 P.2d at 312; Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344, 350-51, 517 P.2d 396, 399 (1973).
Issue preclusion is intended to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication."Bebo Constr. Co. v. Mattox O'Brien, P.C., 990 P.2d 78, 84 (Colo. 1999) (quoting Salida Sch. Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1163 (Colo. 1987), and Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980)). In Pomeroy, supra, the supreme court held that under issue preclusion, "the final decision of a court on an issue actually litigated and determined is conclusive of that issue in any subsequent suit."Pomeroy, supra, 183 Colo. at 350, 517 P.2d at 399 (emphasis added).
Our conclusion is bolstered by the similar treatment given to findings of unemployment compensation boards in other states. See Board of Educ. v. Gray, 806 S.W.2d 400, 402-03 (Ky.Ct. App. 1991) ("we simply do not believe that it would be equitable to allow the doctrine to be applied"); Shovelin v. Central N.M. Elec. Coop, 115 N.M. 293, 850 P.2d 996, 1004 (1993) (trial court did not err in refusing to give preclusive effect to employment Security Department finding); Ferris v. Hawkins, 135 Ariz. 329, 660 P.2d 1256, 1259 (App. 1983) (collateral estoppel cannot be asserted because action for unemployment compensation and action for reinstatement involve "`distinct' legal rights"); Salida Sch. Dist., R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1164-65 (Colo. 1987) (applying collateral estoppel to board findings "would be wholly inappropriate, and would frustrate the underlying purposes"); Storey v. Meijer, Inc., 431 Mich. 368, 429 N.W.2d 169 (1988) ("preclusive effect . . . would be incompatible with this legislative policy"). California's unemployment compensation board findings are denied preclusive effect by statute.
See Shepard v. Holder, 678 F.3d 1171, 1180-81 (10th Cir. 2012); In re Water Rights of Elk Dance Colo., LLC, 139 P.3d 660, 670-71 (Colo. 2006); Salida School Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987). The Court's order remanding this case will establish that the motion to quash is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).