Opinion
1086 CAF 18–00750
12-20-2019
DAVID J. PAJAK, ALDEN, FOR PETITIONER–APPELLANT. CENTER FOR ELDER LAW & JUSTICE, BUFFALO (DAVID A. SHAPIRO OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT–RESPONDENT. DAVID C. SCHOPP, THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (JANE YOON OF COUNSEL), ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD.
DAVID J. PAJAK, ALDEN, FOR PETITIONER–APPELLANT.
CENTER FOR ELDER LAW & JUSTICE, BUFFALO (DAVID A. SHAPIRO OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT–RESPONDENT.
DAVID C. SCHOPP, THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (JANE YOON OF COUNSEL), ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Memorandum: In these proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, petitioner mother appeals, in appeal Nos. 1 and 2, from two orders granting respondent grandmother's motion to dismiss the mother's petition seeking to modify a prior consent order awarding custody of the subject child to the grandmother. In appeal No. 3, the mother appeals from an order granting respondent father's motion to dismiss the mother's petition against him seeking custody of the child.
We dismiss the appeal from the order in appeal No. 2 because that order is duplicative of the order in appeal No. 1 (see Matter of Machado v. Tanoury, 142 A.D.3d 1322, 1322–1323, 38 N.Y.S.3d 356 [4th Dept. 2016] ; Matter of Chendo O., 175 A.D.2d 635, 635, 572 N.Y.S.2d 570 [4th Dept. 1991] ). Furthermore, while these appeals were pending, Family Court entered a subsequent order that, on consent of the parties, awarded sole custody of the child to the father. The mother has not disputed that fact, and the subsequent order "is a matter of public record of which we may take judicial notice" ( Matter of Kadyn J. [Kelly M.H.], 109 A.D.3d 1158, 1161, 972 N.Y.S.2d 752 [4th Dept. 2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Chloe Q. [Dawn Q.-Jason Q.], 68 A.D.3d 1370, 1371, 892 N.Y.S.2d 567 [3d Dept. 2009] ). We therefore conclude that the subsequent custody order renders these appeals moot (see Matter of Cullop v. Miller, 173 A.D.3d 1652, 1652–1653, 99 N.Y.S.3d 898 [4th Dept. 2019] ). We further conclude that the exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply (see generally Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714–715, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 [1980] ). Thus, appeal Nos. 1 and 3 must also be dismissed (see Matter of Nyjeem D. [John D.], 174 A.D.3d 1424, 1425, 103 N.Y.S.3d 330 [4th Dept. 2019] ).
It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed without costs.