Opinion
No. 4:02-CV-712-A
November 19, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
Came on for consideration the motion of defendant, City of Grand Prairie, Texas, to dismiss. Having reviewed the motion and the response of plaintiff, J.L. Byers, the court concludes that the motion should be granted. Defendant first urges that plaintiff's amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and second, that plaintiff has failed to invoke the court's jurisdiction. Def.'s Br. at 1-2. While the first ground might well be meritorious, the court need only address the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.
This court may only entertain causes of action where a federal question is involved, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or where there is diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, see, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As the latter does not apply to the present case, the court must determine whether this case involves a federal question. Plaintiff's amended complaint purports to allege a violation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Am. Compl. ¶ 5. Without addressing the merits of such claim, the court has determined that plaintiff's claim is not ripe for adjudication.
The ripeness doctrine addresses the time at which litigation may occur, and "is necessary to prevent courts from becoming entangled in abstract disputes by adjudicating an issue prematurely." Am. Med. Ass'n v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580 (1985)). It is well established that "a federal takings claim does not ripen until just compensation is denied," and that "for a federal takings claim to become ripe, the plaintiff is required to seek compensation through the procedures the state has provided unless those procedures are unavailable or inadequate." Vulcan Materials Co. v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985)); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001); Guetersloh v. State, 930 S.W.2d 284, 289-90 (Tex. 1996).
Texas law recognizes a cause of action for the infractions that plaintiff alleges, see, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17; Wilkinson v. Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd., 54 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex.App. — Dallas 2001, pet. denied), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1128 (2002) (citing Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 788-91 (Tex. 1980) and Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex. 1992)), and the procedures available in Texas state courts for obtaining just compensation are adequate, see, e.g., Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 935 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing cases). As plaintiff has not shown that he has availed himself of the appropriate procedures under Texas law to respond to the taking that he alleges, this action is not ripe for federal adjudication. Without a federal claim to sustain jurisdiction in this court, there is no basis to maintain plaintiff's supplemental state-law causes of action. See, e.g., id. at 934.
Therefore,
The court ORDERS that defendant's motion to dismiss be, and is hereby, granted.
The court further ORDERS that all of plaintiff's claims and causes of action against defendant be, and are hereby, dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.