In contrast, plaintiff cited several cases that indicate that the public has the primary right to use the streets and sidewalks and that property owners cannot interfere with the public's rights in this regard. For example, in Salem National Bank v. City of Salem, 47 Ill. App.2d 279, 198 N.E.2d 137, 140 (5th Dist. 1964), the court stated that "[t]he general public has the paramount right to use the streets and sidewalks but the abutting property owner has the right to make all proper and reasonable use of the sidewalks not inconsistent with the paramount right of the public." Similarly, in Peoples Gas Light Coke Co. v. City of Chicago, 413 Ill. 457, 109 N.E.2d 777, 781 (1952), the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the "right of the people in the streets and highways of the State, whether inside or outside the municipalities thereof, is a paramount right.

Without negating in any way the discretion of a trial justice to withhold determination under § 9-30-6, a threshold question arises as to whether such determination may best be made on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. In Salem National Bank v. City of Salem, 47 Ill. App.2d 279, 198 N.E.2d 137 (1964), the court indicated there was a distinction between the granting of declaratory relief and the entertaining of the action. The court determined that the discretion was not one to entertain the action but was only one to enter or to decline entry of judgment.

While the Court has, under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, a great deal of discretion in deciding whether to grant declaratory relief, the Court does not have that discretion to dismiss such a claim. Redmond v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 120 R.I. 182, 186 (R.I. 1978) (citingSalem Nat'l Bank v. City of Salem, 47 Ill. App. 2d 279,198 N.E.2d 137 (1964)). The Court leaves an examination of the merits for another day.

) Incidental to the authority to regulate and prescribe the manner of constructing buildings within the corporate limits is the implied authority to require building permits. ( Salem National Bank v. City of Salem (1964), 47 Ill. App.2d 279, 284.) These two grants of authority are distinguished in the case of City of Chicago v. Miller (1963), 27 Ill.2d 211, 217-18.

" Accord, Salem National Bank v. City of Salem (1964), 47 Ill. App.2d 279, 198 N.E.2d 137 (driveway regulations). Similarly, in Ryan v. Rosenstone (1960), 20 Ill.2d 79, 82, 169 N.E.2d 360, 362, the court stated:

) An abutting landowner has a right to make reasonable use of sidewalks and driveways for the ingress and egress from his property. (See Sabath v. City of Chicago (1965), 56 Ill. App.2d 307, 319, 206 N.E.2d 286; Salem National Bank v. City of Salem (1964), 47 Ill. App.2d 279, 282, 198 N.E.2d 137.) The evidence at trial showed that Jubilee was using its drive for its intended purpose and there was no evidence that the use was unreasonable or interfered with pedestrian traffic.

All the cases cited as support for an adjoining property owner's special right of access to a street can be distinguished from the present case on several grounds. Either the streets to which the adjoining property owners sought access were already improved and opened by a city ( R.G. Lydy, Inc. v. City of Chicago (1934), 356 Ill. 230, 190 N.E. 273; Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake (1956), 10 Ill.2d 241, 140 N.E.2d 289; Department of Public Works Buildings v. Wolf (1953), 414 Ill. 386, 111 N.E.2d 322; Ryan v. Rosenstone (1960), 20 Ill.2d 79, 169 N.E.2d 360; Salem NationalBank v. City of Salem (1964), 47 Ill. App.2d 279, 198 N.E.2d 137; or the street in question was improved and in long time use by adjoining property owners when ingress and egress was obstructed by private parties ( Cook v. Mighell Construction Co. (1976), 40 Ill. App.3d 1032, 353 N.E.2d 43); or the dispute in the case centered on whether an area designated as a street could be used for purposes other than for which it was dedicated. Marshall v. Pfeiffer (1924), 314 Ill. 286, 145 N.E. 411; Gerstley v. Globe Wernicke Co. (1930), 340 Ill. 270, 172 N.E. 829; Romadka v. Schroff (1955), 7 Ill.2d 202, 130 N.E.2d 277.

However, such ordinance must spell out reasonable standards for the property owner to meet as a condition precedent to acquiring a driveway permit, and an ordinance which purports to authorize the outright denial of a permit depending upon the will of the City Council is not enforceable." Salem National Bank v. City of Salem (1964), 47 Ill. App.2d 279, 198 N.E.2d 137, 140. See also: Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake (1957), 10 Ill. App.2d 241, 140 N.E.2d 289. Accord: Park Hill Development Co. v. City of Evansville (1921), 190 Ind. 432, 130 N.E. 645.

The discretion is to enter or decline to enter the judgment. ( Salem National Bank v. City of Salem, 47 Ill. App.2d 279, 198 N.E.2d 137; Wolf v. Salem, 26 Ill. App.2d 262, 167 N.E.2d 820; Meyer v. County of Madison, 7 Ill. App.3d 289, 287 N.E.2d 159; Bathe v. Stamper, 75 Ill. App.2d 265, 220 N.E.2d 641.) "One way of exercising this discretion is to dismiss the complaint if it appears from the face of the complaint that there has accrued another existing and well-recognized form of action". ( Goldberg v. Valve Corp. of America, 89 Ill. App.2d 383, 233 N.E.2d 85; Meyer v. County of Madison, 7 Ill. App.3d 289, 287 N.E.2d 159.

The discretion is not one to entertain the action but to enter or decline to enter the judgment or decree. ( Salem National Bank v. City of Salem, 47 Ill. App.2d 279, 198 N.E.2d 137; State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co. v. Morris, 29 Ill. App.2d 451, 173 N.E.2d 590; Wolf v. Solem, 26 Ill. App.2d 262, 167 N.E.2d 820.) One way of exercising this discretion is to dismiss the complaint if it appears from the face of the complaint that there has accrued another existing and well-recognized form of action.