In Price, "the evidence against one co-defendant was deemed to be so overwhelming and the evidence against the other so slight that the 'spillover' effect of the evidence against the former was viewed as an important factor in the latter's conviction." Saleem v. State, 169 Ga. App. 952, 954 (2) ( 315 S.E.2d 487) (1984). In this case, the evidence against Taborn was indeed overwhelming, but the evidence against Thomas was equally compelling.

The appellant was convicted of numerous offenses in Dooly County Superior Court in 1983. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal the next year. Saleem v. State, 169 Ga. App. 952 ( 315 S.E.2d 487) (1984). In the present case, the appellant asks us to review the Dooly County Superior Court's denial of the appellant's petition for writ of mandamus.

Thus, we conclude that no fair potential for spillover effect has been demonstrated. Saleem v. State, 169 Ga. App. 952, 954 (2) ( 315 SE2d 487) (1984); compare Price v. State, 155 Ga. App. 844, 846 (1) ( 273 SE2d 225) (1980). Nor do we find that Anderson's defense was antagonistic to Glass' rights.

155 Ga. App. 844 ( 273 S.E.2d 225) (1980).Saleem v. State, 169 Ga. App. 952, 954(2) ( 315 S.E.2d 487) (1984).Thomas v. State, 274 Ga. 156, 159(2) ( 549 S.E.2d 359) (2001).

155 Ga. App. 844 ( 273 S.E.2d 225) (1980).Saleem v. State, 169 Ga. App. 952, 954(2) ( 315 S.E.2d 487) (1984). It is true that the quantum of evidence against Baskin was greater, in that the victim identified him and stolen items were found in his pocket.

Mustafa Nasir Saleem was convicted of two counts of kidnapping with bodily injury, two counts of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault and one count of theft by taking. His conviction was affirmed by our court in Saleem v. State, 169 Ga. App. 952 ( 315 S.E.2d 487) (1984). Since then he has filed various actions in both the federal and state courts.

There, the evidence against one co-defendant was deemed to be so overwhelming and the evidence against the other so slight that the `spillover' effect of the evidence against the former was viewed as an important factor in the latter's conviction." Saleem v. State, 169 Ga. App. 952, 954 (2) ( 315 S.E.2d 487) (1984). On the other hand, in this case, the evidence against Anthony Baugher was strong.

The State argues that this evidence was admissible for two purposes: first, to show appellant's identity, and second, to impeach appellant regarding his defense of coercion by showing that he and Lackey regularly spent time together, and were, in fact, partners in crime Contrary to appellant's argument, evidence of other crimes may be admitted to prove identity. Saleem v. State, 169 Ga. App. 952, 953-954 (1) ( 315 S.E.2d 487) (1984). We agree with appellant, however, that there was no question of identity here, since appellant admitted committing the crimes as charged but claimed he was coerced.

Its prejudicial nature outweighed its probative value in tending to prove the crime, in these circumstances. While there are situations where such evidence is relevant, as in Saleem v. State, 169 Ga. App. 952 ( 315 S.E.2d 487) (1984), that is not the case here. Saleem denied being involved or present and the evidence of the independent crime was found probative of guilt in that it showed identity. Under those circumstances, the evidence was not objectionable.

Thus, the evidence of the other criminal act, indecent exposure, was admissible to show the appellant's identity, motive and bent of mind at the time of the commission of the criminal acts set forth in the petition. Johnson v. State, 242 Ga. 649, 652 (3) ( 250 S.E.2d 394); Saleem v. State, 169 Ga. App. 952, 953 (1) ( 315 S.E.2d 487); Garmon v. State, 167 Ga. App. 781, 783 (5) ( 307 S.E.2d 298). Appellant's first enumeration of error is without merit. 2.