(Citation omitted.) Salahat v. F.D.I.C., 298 Ga.App. 624, 625, 680 S.E.2d 638 (2009). So viewed, the record shows that on January 29, 2007, River Forest executed and delivered to FirstCity Bank a promissory note in the principal amount of $971,000 (the “Original Note”).

Compare Austin v. Bank of America, N.A., 293 Ga. 42, 45–46(1), 743 S.E.2d 399 (2013) (lender gave notice of default, lender's right to accelerate, and last day to cure). BAC relies on Salahat v. Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp., 298 Ga.App. 624, 680 S.E.2d 638 (2009) for the proposition that a premature demand for accelerated payment can constitute sufficient notice if the debtor is given adequate time to cure the default and fails to do so. In Salahat, the relevant provision of the note required the lender to give notice that the debtor was in default before accelerating the loan, but did not require any further notice prior to acceleration, and did not require the notice of default to include a demand for payment or spell out the debtor's right to cure within ten days.

Because these letters advised Borrower of all that was required by the terms of Section 22 of the security deed with respect to payment default, it matters not whether, as Borrower claims, the April letter provided insufficient notice of the tax lien default by failing to properly identify such liens. Compare Salahat v. FDIC, 298 Ga.App. 624(1), 680 S.E.2d 638 (2009) (although the note required notice and ten-day opportunity to cure before the lender could accelerate the note, it also established that the principal and interest became immediately due upon default without notice; thus written notice of default was all that was required and a notice letter that demanded immediate payment was sufficient to permit the lender to accelerate and collect all sums due after the expiration of the ten-day cure period). Similarly, it does not matter whether, as Borrower claims, the May letter provided insufficient notice and opportunity to cure the due on sale default by specifying a date to repay the full amount of indebtedness that was less than 30 days from the date of the letter, as required by Section 18 of the deed to secure debt, or whether the June letter provided insufficient notice of acceleration of the full amount due because it relied upon and referred to the notices given in the April and May letters.

Therefore, this notice letter was not sent 60 days before Howe initiated his right to foreclose on the property. Compare Salahat v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 298 Ga. App. 624, 627-628 (1) ( 680 SE2d 638) (2009) (holding that, where ten-days notice was required before accelerating the promissory note, but the notice letter sent by the bank demanded immediate payment, the notice letter was still sufficient because the bank did not accelerate the debt until ten days had lapsed). Since no notice was sent by Howe to Old Roswell 60 days before the initiation of the power of sale, then the foreclosure process was not properly commenced and is thus invalid.

Thus, there could be no departure from the terms of the contract for purposes of OCGA § 13–4–4 if, as alleged, Mbigi complied with Wells Fargo's instruction not to make payments on the loan. See Salahat v. FDIC, 298 Ga.App. 624, 628(3), 680 S.E.2d 638 (2009) (finding no mutual departure under OCGA § 13–4–4 where debtor ceased making payments after the Bank promised the debtor the “loan would be reworked”); Gibson v. Gainesville Bank & Trust, 226 Ga.App. 679, 681, 487 S.E.2d 460 (1997) (“While a quasi-new agreement may arise where the parties mutually depart from the terms of an executory contract, to support such a departure there must be some evidence that money was paid or received under such departure.”) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, the first and second letters did not meet the notice requirements of paragraph 22 of the Deed. Compare Austin v. Bank of America, N. A., 293 Ga. 42, 45-46 (1) (743 SE2d 399) (2013) (lender gave notice of default, lender's right to accelerate, and last day to cure). BAC relies on Salahat v. Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp., 298 Ga. App. 624 (680 SE2d 638) (2009) for the proposition that a premature demand for accelerated payment can constitute sufficient notice if the debtor is given adequate time to cure the default and fails to do so. In Salahat, the relevant provision of the note required the lender to give notice that the debtor was in default before accelerating the loan, but did not require any further notice prior to acceleration, and did not require the notice of default to include a demand for payment or spell out the debtor's right to cure within ten days.

Duncan v. Lagunas, 253 Ga. 61, 62(1), 316 S.E.2d 747 (1984). See Circle K Stores v. T.O.H. Assoc., 318 Ga.App. 753, 755–756(1), 734 S.E.2d 752 (2012) (noting that the mutual departure defense ordinarily raises a jury question but granting summary judgment in the absence of evidence to support the defense); Salahat v. FDIC, 298 Ga.App. 624, 629(3), 680 S.E.2d 638 (2009) (granting summary judgment).Here, Pierre argues that the School's historically flexible execution of contracts demonstrates its departure from enforcing the notice requirement for the withdrawal of her students from the School.

This was competent evidence that BB & T was the holder of the note and guaranties. See Salahat v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 298 Ga.App. 624, 628(2), 680 S.E.2d 638 (2009). After Stabilis Fund's motion to substitute itself as the real party in interest was granted by the trial court, Stabilis Fund filed a renewed motion for summary judgment to which it attached the affidavit of its representative, Salman A. Akbar Khan, in which he attested that BB & T had assigned on March 3, 2011, its rights to the security deed related to the property to Stabilis Fund. While Stabilis Fund did not provide an affidavit or testimony stating that it was in possession of the note or guaranties, the attached copy of the Assignment of Security Instrument stated that “all of the Grantor's right, title and interest in and to those Loan Documents described [in the deed] and also the indebtedness described therein and secured thereby ... the notes evidencing said indebtedness ” were transferred to Stabilis Fund. Although the language does not include “guaranties” along with “notes,” this Court previously has determined that “transfer of the underlying

" (Citation omitted.) Salahat v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 298 Ga. App. 624, 625 ( 680 SE2d 638) (2009). So viewed, the record shows that Shenkman and Hiller were married and had one child together. During their marriage, Hiller was employed in a marketing position at Shenkman's medical practice, Coastal Neurological.

" (Citation omitted.) Salahat v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 298 Ga. App. 624, 625 ( 680 SE2d 638) (2009). So viewed, the record shows that Radiology Associates of Atlanta, EC. is a professional corporation organized under the Georgia Professional Corporation Act, OCGA § 14-7-1 et seq. Dr. Arie Rakusin was a physician and shareholder in Radiology Associates for several years until his death in January 2007. At the time of his death, the decedent owned 1,500 shares of the common stock of Radiology Associates.