Opinion
Civil No. 1:17-CV-1919
03-15-2019
ALEXANDER SAHAGUN, Petitioner, v. KATHY LANE, WARDEN, Respondent.
(Judge Rambo)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
The petitioner, a federal prisoner, invites this Court to review and revise the sentence credit calculation done by the Federal Bureau of Prisons in his case. In this petition Sahagun argues that prison officials have failed to properly account for time he spent in state custody, and have not given full effect to the sentencing judge's sentencing recommendations. While Sahagun's confusion on this score is understandable given the complexity of his sentencing proceedings, having conducted a review of this sentence credit calculation, we find no error in that calculation, which properly allocates time previously served by Sahagun between his various state and federal sentences. We also find that some of the sentencing issues raised by Sahagun may only be properly addressed by the sentencing court and are not matters which fall within the ambit of the Bureau of Prisons. Therefore we recommend that this petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.
In this case, the interplay of state and federal sentences that forms the basis for this sentence credit calculation began on June 22, 2007, when Sahagun was arrested by Oregon State Police in Woodburn, Oregon, on state drug charges. (Doc. 6 Ex. 1, Declaration of Forest Kelly, ¶ 6.) Ten weeks later, on September 5, 2007, Sahagun was also indicted by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, and was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine. (Id. ¶ 7; Attach. 2, Criminal Docket for Case Number 1:07-CR-10297, Doc. 11.)
Sahagun's state case drew to a close on December 4, 2007, when he was sentenced by the Marion County Court in Salem, Oregon, to a 34-month state sentence and was remanded to the custody of the Oregon Department of Corrections on December 6, 2007. (Id., Ex. 1 ¶ 8. ) For their part, Oregon correctional officials then calculated that Sahagun's sentence commenced on December 6, 2007, and credited him for 167 days of prior custody from the date of his state arrest on June 22, 2007. (Id., Attach.3, Oregon Department of Corrections, Information Systems Admission and Release History and Institution Division Face Sheet.)
Three months later, on February 26, 2008, Sahagun was transported to Massachusetts pursuant to a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to face his pending federal drug charges. (Id.¶ 9, Attach.4, USM-129, at 2.) While these federal proceedings were pending, Sahagun completed the service of his Oregon state sentence on September 25, 2009, and was released by the State of Oregon, into the exclusive custody of federal authorities. (Id.¶ 10, Attach.5, Oregon Department of Corrections, Offender Information Sentence Computation Unit.)
With Sahagun now in exclusive federal custody his federal case proceeded forward and on December 19, 2011, Sahagun was sentenced in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to a 176-month term of imprisonment for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine. (Id. ¶ 11.) This initial district court sentence court departed 34 months below the advisory guideline range prescribed for this offense, which had a minimum guidelines range of 210 months imprisonment. (Id.) It appears that this initial sentencing departure was based upon Section 5K2.23 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which provided the court with discretionary authority to fashion a sentence which took into account prior, related periods of incarceration and depart downward from the guidelines imprisonment range in order to take this prior incarceration into account.
Sahagun's 2011 federal sentencing, however, represented only the first step in what was a protracted sentencing process for this prisoner. Thus, on February 26, 2013, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts re-sentenced Sahagun and reduced his federal prison term to 144 months. In imposing this reduced sentence, the district court once again departed below the advisory guideline range in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 5K2.23. (Id. ¶ 12; Attach. 7, February 26, 2013, Judgment and Commitment Order.)
Two years later, on April 3, 2015, the sentencing court once again re-sentenced Sahagun and reduced Sahagun's term of imprisonment to 135 months. However, on this final occasion the district court elected not to depart below the rec-calculated advisory guideline imprisonment range of 135 months to 168 months. (Id. ¶ 13; Attach. 8, April 3, 2015, Judgment and Commitment Order.) Instead, the court sentenced Sahagun at the low end of this recalculated sentencing range. Thus, the final iteration of this federal sentence did not represent a guidelines departure but rather constituted a sentence at the low end of a revised guidelines imprisonment range.
The Bureau of Prisons has now calculated Sahagun's release date based upon this 135 month sentence. In making this sentence credit calculation, the Bureau of Prisons has determined that Sahagun's sentence commenced on December 19, 2011, the date upon which the sentence was imposed. The Bureau of Prisons has then credited Sahagun with prior custody credit from September 26, 2009, the date his 34 month state prison term expired, through December 18, 2011, the date before imposition of his federal term. Based upon these calculations, the Bureau of Prisons has determined that Sahagun's current projected good conduct time release date is July 25, 2019. (Id.¶¶ 4, 14; n.1; Attach.1.)
Dissatisfied with this sentence credit calculation, Sahagun filed the instant federal habeas corpus petition. In his petition Sahagun appears to advance two claims. First, Sahagun contends that the federal sentence credit calculation does not take into account the 34-months of state custody served by Sahagun in the State of Oregon. In addition, Sahagun argues that under Third Ccircuit precedent, Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2002), he is entitled to a sentencing departure based upon this state sentence which he served while awaiting the completion of the federal proceedings. This petition is fully briefed by the parties, and is, therefore, ripe for resolution.
While we can appreciate that the array of sentences imposed upon Sahagun over time may have been confusing for the petitioner in the final analysis we conclude that his current sentence credit has been properly calculated. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.
II. Discussion
A. This Petition Fails on its Merits.
This petition invites the court to review a sentence credit calculation conducted by the Bureau of Prisons for an inmate who was serving both state and federal sentences. There are two component parts to the legal analysis we are called upon to perform in a case such as this, where we examine a BOP sentence credit determination. It is well settled that: "The computation of a federal sentence requires consideration of two separate issues. Initially, we determine the commencement date of the federal sentence and then turn to the extent to which a defendant can receive credit for time spent in custody prior to commencement of sentence." Binford v. United States, 436 F.3d 1252, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 2006). As this Court has aptly observed: "Computing a federal sentence requires two separate determinations: first, when the sentence commences; and, second, to what extent the defendant in question may receive credit for any time already spent in custody." Chambers v. Holland, 920 F. Supp. 618, 621 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (quoting United States v. Smith, 812 F.Supp. 368, 370 (E.D.N.Y.1993) (internal quotations omitted).
Each of these legal determinations, in turn, is made against the backdrop of a specific statutory and regulatory system for calculating credit for time served by federal prisoners. A key component of this system involves the delegation of authority for initial sentence computations. By law:
The Attorney General is responsible for computing federal sentences for all offenses committed on or after November 1, 1987, United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992) and 18 U.S.C. § 3585, and has delegated that authority to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. 28 C.F.R. § 0.96 (1992). . . . [Thus], [t]he decision to grant or deny credit for time served prior to the date of sentencing vests initially in the BOP, not the
sentencing judge.Chambers, 920 F. Supp. at 621.
However, as the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992), in calculating credit for time served, the BOP is guided by statute; namely, 18 U.S.C. § 3585, which provides that:
(a) Commencement of sentence.-A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.18 U.S.C. § 3585(emphasis added).
(b) Credit for prior custody.-A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences-
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited against another sentence.
This statute, and case law construing the statute, then guide us in addressing the two questions which lie at the heart of this habeas petition: first, when did Sahagun's sentence commence; and, second, to what extent may Sahagun receive credit for any time already spent in state custody?
With respect to the first of these questions regarding when this sentence commenced, it is clear that "[a] sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). Therefore, as a general rule, "[a] federal sentence commences when the defendant is received by the Attorney General for service of his . . . sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). See also United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1118-19 (3d Cir.1990). As a result, a federal sentence [typically] cannot begin to run earlier than on the date on which it is imposed. See United States v. Labeille-Soto, 163 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir.1998)." Taylor v. Holt, 309 F. App'x 591, 592-93 (3d Cir. 2009). Applying this straightforward guidance, in this case the BOP correctly concluded that Sahagun's sentence commenced when it was first imposed, in December of 2011, and that sentence could not have commenced prior to its imposition.
Section 3585, and case law construing this statute, also define for us the answer to the second question we must examine: to what extent may Sahagun receive credit for any time already spent in custody against his federal sentence? In this regard, we begin with the proposition that Sahagun may not receive "credit for time spent in state custody prior to sentencing in a federal case because 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) prohibits this double credit." Taylor, 309 F. App'x at 593 (citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337 ).
It is also clear beyond any dispute that a defendant like Sahagun, who is serving a state sentence but is taken temporarily from state custody to federal court pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, does not come into federal "custody" for purposes of calculating prison sentence credit under § 3585 until he has completed his state sentence. Indeed, courts have repeatedly examined this question, and consistently held that temporarily holding a prisoner on a writ does not equate to custody for purposes of calculating sentence credit. See, e.g., Rashid v. Quintana, No. 09-4079, 2010 WL 1141386 (3d Cir. March 25, 2010); Taylor, 309 F. App'x 591; United States v. Hayes, 535 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2008); D'Amario v. Zenk, 131 F. App'x 381 (3d Cir. 2005); Thomas v. Whalen, 962 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1992); Chambers, 920 F. Supp. 618; Miller v. United States, 826 F. Supp. 636 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); United States v. Smith, 812 F. Supp. 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); United States v. Killion, 788 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Kan. 1992). Accordingly, these cases uniformly reject efforts by federal prisoners to secure jail-time credit for periods in which they were held temporarily in federal court on a federal writ while serving their state sentences. Id. The rationale for this rule, which enjoys broad acceptance by the courts, can be simply stated:
A federal sentence does not begin to run, . . ., when a defendant is produced for prosecution in federal court pursuant to a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Rather, the state retains primary jurisdiction over the prisoner, and federal custody commences only when the state authorities relinquish the prisoner on satisfaction of the state obligation. Thomas v. Whalen, 962 F.2d 358, 361 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1992); Hernandez v. United States Attorney General, 689 F.2d 915, 918-19 (10th Cir. 1982); Roche v. Sizer, 675 F.2d 507, 509-10 (2d Cir.
1982); see also Thomas v. Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1991) (producing state prisoner under writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does not relinquish state custody); Salley, 786 F.2d at 547-48 (defendant produced and sentenced in federal court via writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum did not begin to serve consecutive federal sentence until delivered into federal custody). This rule derives from the fact that the federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum merely loans the prisoner to federal authorities. Whalen, 962 F.2d at 361 n. 3; In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 79 (2d Cir. 1978); Crawford v. Jackson, 589 F.2d 693, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1978).United States v. Smith, 812 F. Supp. 368, 370-71 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
These basic legal tenets control here, and compel denial of Sahagun's petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this case, it is undisputed that Sahagun commenced his sentence for the federal drug trafficking offense on the date it was imposed and he was taken into custody to commence service of this sentence. This is undeniably the correct starting point for this sentence since, by law, a sentence "commences on the date the defendant is received in custody. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a).
At the time that he was sentenced for this federal offense, Sahagun had already been sentenced in state court and had served that state sentence to its conclusion on September 25, 2009. Sahagun then received credit against his current 135-month federal sentence for the time he spent in custody following the discharge on his Oregon state sentence. Since Sahagun received credit for the time he served, either as credit against his federal sentence or as credit against his state sentence, he was not entitled to any further credit for this period of imprisonment against his federal jail sentence. Indeed, it is well settled that Sahagun may not receive such "credit for time spent in state custody prior to sentencing in a federal case because 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) prohibits this double credit." Taylor, 309 F. App'x at 593 (citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337).
At bottom, Sahagun's complaints in this case do not seem to be directed at the Bureau of Prisons, which has faithfully calculated his sentencing credit. Instead, the root cause of Sahagun's dissatisfaction with his current sentence is a function of the actions taken by the sentencing court in his final re-sentencing. In 2011, and again in 2013, when the sentencing court sentenced and re-sentenced Sahagun that court departed below the guidelines. However, the final 2015 iteration of this sentence, which reduced Sahagun's term of imprisonment to 135 months incarceration, did not include a departure below the recalculated guidelines imprisonment range. While the sentencing court's prior practice may have created an expectation on Sahagun's part that his final 2015 sentence would also include a departure, the sentence as imposed by the court simply does not provide for any departure. This outcome, while doubtless disappointing to Sahagun, implicates the discretionary decision of the sentencing judge. It does not cast doubt upon the accuracy of the Bureau of Prisons' sentence credit calculation given the sentence imposed by that judge. In this setting, where the essence of an inmate's complaint is that the sentencing judge failed to confer a sentencing departure upon the prisoner, it has been long held that: "To the extent [the petitioner] is seeking to challenge an error made by the sentencing court, as opposed to the BOP in its implementation of a sentence, it is inappropriate for a § 2241 petition. See United States v. Eakman, 378 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir.2004); United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893-94 (6th Cir.1991)." Prescod, Jr. v. Schuylkill, 630 F. App'x 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2015). Simply put, " '[a] challenge to the sentencing court's application of the Guidelines is not cognizable in a § 2241 petition.' Savage v. Zickefoose, 446 F. App'x 524, 526 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)." Hall v. Stewart, No. CV 9105(RMB), 2018 WL 6523443, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2018). Therefore, since Sahagun's complaints are more properly addressed to the sentencing court, which declined in its final imposition of sentence to award him a sentencing departure, these complaints cannot be resolved through the guise of a habeas corpus petition which attacks the Bureau of Prisons' sentence credit calculation.
Sahagun's reliance upon Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2002) is also misplaced here. The decision in Ruggiano turned on an analysis of Section 5G1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines which permitted a sentencing judge to credit a defendant for some time served on other charges. However, the Ruggiano court's interpretation of Section 5G1.3 of the guidelines was later expressly abrogated by a 2003 amendment to the guidelines. The abrogation of the Ruggiano holding has been acknowledged by the court of appeals which has found that: "In Ruggiano, we stated that imposing a retroactively concurrent sentence under § 5G1.3 is permissible and is properly termed an adjustment, rather than a credit or downward departure. 307 F.3d at 131, 133. But a 2003 amendment to the 5G1.3 Application Notes provided that subsection (c) does not authorize an adjustment for time served on a prior undischarged term of imprisonment, and that a sentencing court may consider a downward departure in extraordinary cases. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3 app. note 3(E)." Escribano v. Schultz, 330 F. App'x 21, 23 (3d Cir. 2009). Thus Ruggiano simply does not have the legal force and effect that Sahagun suggests. --------
In sum, the sentence credit calculation undertaken in this case paid full fidelity to § 3585's mandate that: "A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences . . ., that has not been credited against another sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Moreover, in reaching this calculation of the petitioner's jail-time credit, the BOP closely followed both the spirit and the letter of the law. Consistent with case law, it declined to credit Sahagun for time that was already credited against his separate state sentence. Thus, this federal jail-time credit calculation provided Sahagun with proper credit for his prior custody while avoiding one of the evils condemned by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (1992), since it "made clear that [the] defendant could not receive a double credit for his detention time." Id. Further, to the extent that Sahagun's final sentencing outcome was disappointing, his disappointment lies with the sentencing court, which declined to exercise its discretion and award the petitioner a sentencing departure on the third, and final occasion when it passed sentence in this case. Sahagun's disappointment on this score may be directed to the sentencing court, but it cannot be cured through a claim that the Bureau of Prisons has erred in its sentence credit calculation of the sentence currently imposed upon the petitioner. Accordingly, since the Bureau of Prisons' sentence credit calculation fully comports with the law, and provides Sahagun all the credit he is entitled to receive, Sahagun's petition for writ of habeas corpus should be denied.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, upon consideration of this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition be DENIED, and that a certificate of appealability should not issue.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 15th day of March 2019.
S/Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge