The Eastern District first adopted the four-factor "test," utilized by Herod, in Jackson v. Christian Salveson Holdings, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Mo.App. 1996). The sources cited by Jackson for the four-factor test were the Eastern District's earlier case of Saganis-Noonan v. Koenig, 857 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Mo.App. 1993), and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's case of Spiegelv. Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1988). Jackson, 914 S.W.2d at 883.
Id. at 484-85. Although a trial court is given wide latitude in determining whether a partial summary judgment should be certified under Rule 74.01(b), where the circumstances of the case and the judgment entered are wholly inconsistent with a finding of "no just reason for delay," a finding to that effect by a trial court is an abuse of discretion. Saganis-Noonan v. Koenig, 857 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Mo.App.E.D. 1993) ( citing Committee for Educational Equality v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446, 452-53 (Mo. banc 1994)). In deciding whether the certification of a partial judgment was proper and whether there was no just reason for delay, courts apply a four-factor test: (1) whether the action remains pending in the trial court as to all parties; (2) whether similar relief can be awarded in each separate count; (3) whether determination of the claims pending in the trial court would moot the claim being appealed; and (4) whether the factual underpinnings of all the claims are intertwined. Saganis-Noonan, 857 S.W.2d at 501; Lynch v. Lynch, 966 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Mo.App.E.D. 1998).
A fundamental prohibition exists against piecemeal appeals. Saganis-Noonan v. Koenig, 857 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Mo.App.E.D. 1993). Rule 74.01 (b) is an exception to this rule, allowing the court to certify for appeal a judgment on fewer than all the claims or parties only upon a finding that there is "no just reason for delay."
The case is still pending before the trial court, which generally weighs against an early appeal. SeeSaganis-Noonan v. Koenig , 857 S.W.2d 499, 502 (Mo.App. E.D. 1993). However, because the three remaining factors weigh in favor of finding there was no just reason for delay, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in certifying its judgment for appeal.