We agree. With regard to the fourth factor listed above, appellant's counts for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and commission of acts of oppression, for declaratory judgment against Bank, for conspiracy to defraud, and for conspiracy to transfer in fraud of creditors all derive factually from the breach of fiduciary duty claims, fraud claim, and transfer in fraud of creditors claim that remain pending against the Nooney defendants. In other words, as demonstrated by the complex factual history set forth above, the factual underpinnings of these claims against Bank, dismissed by the trial court, are "inextricably intertwined" with those of the claims still pending in the trial court against the other Nooney defendants. See Saganis-Noonan v. Koenig, 857 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Mo.App.E.D. 1993). "A similarity of factual issues weighs against certifying dismissed claims for appeal."
In re Estate of Caldwell, 766 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Mo.App. 1989). The Eastern District has said that a trial court should specifically articulate why it finds "no just reason for delay," and absent such explanation, appellate review should be de novo with no deference. Saganis-Noonan v. Koenig, 857 S.W.2d 499, 500-01 (Mo.App. 1993). That said, we would dismiss the appeal under either standard.
Id. Thus, if the order disposed of "one claim for relief," the order is a final judgment and this Court has jurisdiction. Saganis-Noonan v. Koenig, 857 S.W.2d 499, 500[1] (Mo. App.E.D. 1993). Conversely, if the order merely disposed of a remedy, it is not a final judgment and this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Id.
A fundamental prohibition exists against piecemeal appeals. Saganis-Noonan v. Koenig, 857 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Mo.App.E.D. 1993). Rule 74.01 (b) is an exception to this rule, allowing the court to certify for appeal a judgment on fewer than all the claims or parties only upon a finding that there is "no just reason for delay."