Summary
stating that ratification is not required as a matter of law where not required by union bylaws
Summary of this case from Abdullayeva v. Attending Homecare Servs. LLCOpinion
7299N Index 150642/16
10-11-2018
FordHarrison LLP, New York (Philip K. Davidoff of counsel, New York), for appellant. Virginia & Ambinder, LLP, New York (LaDonna M. Lusher of counsel, New York), for respondent.
FordHarrison LLP, New York (Philip K. Davidoff of counsel, New York), for appellant.
Virginia & Ambinder, LLP, New York (LaDonna M. Lusher of counsel, New York), for respondent.
Sweeny, J.P., Tom, Gesmer, Kern, Moulton, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen A. Rakower, J.), entered January 19, 2017, which denied defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stay this action, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion to compel granted, and the parties are directed to proceed in accordance with the alternative dispute resolution provision in the December 2015 memorandum of understanding.
Plaintiff is bound by the arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement because the agreement was entered into while she was still employed, even though it was not ratified until after she resigned. "[A] union ratification vote is not always required for provisions in a [collective bargaining agreement] to be considered validly formed" ( Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters , 561 U.S. 287, 296 n. 4, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 177 L.Ed.2d 567 [2010] ). Here, ratification was not a condition precedent to formation of the memorandum of agreement (MOA). While the MOA was "subject to ratification by the Union and its membership and by the Board of Directors of the Employer," the ratification provision does not provide that the MOA would become effective only upon ratification by the Union (cf. Adams v. Suozzi , 340 F.Supp.2d 279, 283 [E.D. N.Y.2004], affd on other grounds by 433 F.3d 220 [2d Cir.2005] [holding that ratification was a condition precedent to contract formation where MOA stated that it "shall be inoperative as to any union which fails to ratify within 45 days"] ).
Plaintiff's contention that she is not bound by the MOA because her resignation was effective December 1, 2015 is without merit. Although plaintiff did not perform work between December 1, 2015 and December 17, 2015, the date she submitted her resignation, she was still employed by defendant until the later date.
We reject plaintiff's contention that her claims that had accrued prior to December 1, 2015 were not covered by the clause (see Lai Chan v. Chinese-Am. Planning Council Home Attendant Program, Inc. , 180 F.Supp.3d 236, 241 [S.D. N.Y.2016] ).