Opinion
01 Civ. 3695 (JSM)
December 28, 2001
For Plaintiff, Louis C. Dujmich, Ostrolenk, Faber, Gerb Soofen, LLP New York, NY
For Defendants, David Dunn, Hogan Hartson L.L.P., New York, NY
OPINION and ORDER
Safe-Strap Company, Inc. brings this action against Martime de Naurois and a company she controls, RDN International, alleging patent infringement. Defendants move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion is granted.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant de Naurois offered to sell to Home Depot a child safety strap for use on a shopping cart, and that this safety strap infringed Plaintiff's patent. Defendant made this offer to Home Depot at a meeting in Atlanta, Georgia. Plaintiff does not contend that Defendants sold any of the infringing straps to Home Depot or to any party who distributed them in New York. Plaintiff claims it was injured by Defendants' action because it was required to lower the price at which it sold its patented safety straps to Home Depot. Plaintiff claims that it was injured in New York because the safety straps purchased from Plaintiff were used by Home Depot in New York.
Defendants deny certain facts alleged by Plaintiff. However, even if all of Plaintiff's allegations were uncontested, the facts would still not support the exercise of jurisdiction.
Under the familiar standard enunciated in International Shoe, a defendant must have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945) (internal quotations omitted)
Plaintiff contends that jurisdiction over Defendants is appropriate under New York State's long-arm statute, CPLR § 302(a), which provides that a New York Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary who in person or through an agent (1) "transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state;" (2) "commits a tortious act within the state;" or (3) "commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state." N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. R. § 302(a) (McKinney 1990). However, none of the cases cited by Plaintiff have extended jurisdiction under § 302 or any similar long-arm statute as far as would be necessary to confer jurisdiction over the defendants here.
Subsection three has the added requirement that the court may only exercise jurisdiction over the non-domiciliary if she (i) "regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state;" or (ii) "expects or should reasonably expect that act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce." N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. R. § 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1990).
Defendants' sole act of infringement was in the offering of the safety straps for sale to Home Depot in Atlanta Georgia. If Home Depot had accepted the offer and purchased safety straps with the intention of using them in New York, it might reasonably be argued that Defendants' conduct amounted to "contract [ing] anywhere to supply goods in the state." However, since Defendants' offer was never accepted, there never was a contract that could provide a basis for jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). See Niagara Mohawk Energy Marketing, Inc. v. Entergy Power Marketing Corp., 706 N.Y.S.2d 794, 796 (N.Y.App.Div. 2000).
There is similarly no basis for personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3) because there was no injury to Plaintiff in New York. Although Plaintiff alleges that the safety belts Home Depot purchased from Plaintiff were used in New York, there is no allegation that Plaintiff sold the safety belts to Home Depot in New York. Plaintiff is a New Hampshire Corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Thus, even if the principal place of business of the patent holder was considered the situs of the Plaintiff's injury, there would be no basis for jurisdiction in New York. In any event, the Federal Circuit has rejected the place of business of the patent holder as the situs of the injury in a patent infringement action and held that the situs is the place of the sale of the infringing goods. Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1571 (1994). See Art Leather Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Albumx Corp., 888 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). As the Federal Circuit explained in North American Phillips Corp. v. Lockheed Sanders, Inc., 35 F.3d 1577, 1579 (1994), "[T]he tort of patent infringement occurs where the offending act is committed and not where the injury is felt."
Here, Defendants committed the offending act of patent infringement in Atlanta, Georgia, where they offered the infringing product for sale. That is the place where Plaintiff was injured and that act does not provide a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants in New York.
Finally, there is no merit to Plaintiff's argument that Defendants' purchase of certain components of the safety belts from a supplier in New York can support jurisdiction over this patent infringement action. While a single act within the state may support personal jurisdiction, it does so only with respect to causes of action arising from that act. See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 811 (2d Cir. 1966); QRS 10-12 (TX). Inc. v. Calcomp Tech., Inc., 1999 WL 476448, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jul 08, 1999). Here, Plaintiff's claim does not arise from Defendants' purchase of components in New York, it arises from Defendants offer of the infringing product for sale to Home Depot in Atlanta.
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.