Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is required to accept as true the facts and allegations contained in the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F. Supp. 2d 923, 925 (D.N.J. 1999); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. New A Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 325 (3d Cir. 2001). While the Court will accept as true all reasonable inferences and well-pleaded allegations, it will not accept "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences" or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is required to accept as true the facts and allegations contained in the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F. Supp. 2d 923, 925 (D.N.J. 1999); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. New A Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 325 (3d Cir. 2001). While the Court will accept as true all reasonable inferences and well-pleaded allegations, it will not accept "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences" or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.
Moreover, the claimant must set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of its claims or to permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (quoting Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F. Supp. 2d 923, 925 (D.N.J. 1999)). Where a District Court exercises jurisdiction over IDEA cases, they are to give due weight to the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ").
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is required to accept as true the facts and allegations contained in the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F. Supp. 2d 923, 925 (D.N.J. 1999); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. New A Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 325 (3d Cir. 2001). While the Court will accept as true all reasonable inferences and well-pleaded allegations, it will not accept "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences" or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is required to accept as true the facts and allegations contained in the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F. Supp. 2d 923, 925 (D.N.J. 1999); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. New A Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 325 (3d Cir. 2001). While the Court will accept as true all reasonable inferences and well-pleaded allegations, it will not accept "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences" or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.
Zirger, 676 A.2d at 1071; see also Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F.Supp.2d 923, 928 (D.N.J. 1999) (“However, privity requires that the parties have such a connection of interest in the litigation and the subject matter that reason and justice precludes a relitigation of the issues.”).
To prevail in a Title VII religious discrimination case, a plaintiff must show that: "(1) he or she had a bona fide belief that compliance with an employment requirement would be contrary to his or her religious belief or practice; (2) he or she informed the employer about the conflict; and (3) he or she was discharged or penalized for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement." Saruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F. Supp. 2d 923, 925-926 (citations omitted). The Court need not reach the merits at this juncture, as the Court has deemed that the claim is dismissed as a matter of law for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
LEGAL STANDARD In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court "must take all the well pleaded allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); see Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989). The question is whether the plaintiffs can prove any set of facts consistent with their allegations that will entitle them to relief, not whether they will ultimately prevail. See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). Moreover, the claimants must set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of their claims or to permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2);Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F. Supp. 2d 923, 925 (D.N.J.,1999) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). A motion to dismiss may be granted only "if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46 (1957). DISCUSSION
Moreover, the court notes that Oshiver's three situations are "not exclusive," 38 F.3d at 1387. This court disagrees, however, with the holding of Judge Walls in Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F. Supp.2d 923, 927-28 (D.N.J. 1999), that the plaintiff's pro se status alone is sufficient reason to equitably waive the 90-day limitations period. In that case, no consideration other than plaintiff's pro se filing status were present, and plaintiff apparently made no allegation that he was frustrated from timely compliance due to factors beyond his control; it would thus appear to be well-settled that Sadruddin's pro se status would be insufficient to excuse his untimely filing where he had correct notice and no reason not to have complied.
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 (3d Cir. 1994). The question is whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts consistent with her allegations that will entitle him to relief, not whether she will ultimately prevail.See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). While a court will accept well-pleaded allegations as true for the purposes of the motion, it will not accept legal or unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. See Miree v. DeKalb County, Ga., 433 U.S. 25, 27 (1977); Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993). Moreover, the claimant must set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of her claims or to permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (quoting Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F. Supp. 2d 923, 925 (D.N.J.,1999). DISCUSSION