Sadruddin v. City of Newark

4 Citing cases

  1. Elfar v. Twp. of Holmdel

    Civil Action 22-5367 (RK) (JBD) (D.N.J. Jul. 6, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    Zirger, 676 A.2d at 1071; see also Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F.Supp.2d 923, 928 (D.N.J. 1999) (“However, privity requires that the parties have such a connection of interest in the litigation and the subject matter that reason and justice precludes a relitigation of the issues.”).

  2. Boyd v. Fiberglass

    Civil Action No. 03-cv-3716 (JLL) (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2005)

    To prevail in a Title VII religious discrimination case, a plaintiff must show that: "(1) he or she had a bona fide belief that compliance with an employment requirement would be contrary to his or her religious belief or practice; (2) he or she informed the employer about the conflict; and (3) he or she was discharged or penalized for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement." Saruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F. Supp. 2d 923, 925-926 (citations omitted). The Court need not reach the merits at this juncture, as the Court has deemed that the claim is dismissed as a matter of law for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

  3. DOWNEY v. COALITION AGAINST RAPE AND ABUSE, INC.

    CIVIL NO. 99-3370(JBS) (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2000)

    The Court is not required to accept as true unwarranted inferences and unsupported conclusions. Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F. Supp.2d 923, 925 (D.N.J. 1999). The Court finds that an inference of gender stereotyping cannot reasonably be drawn from plaintiff's complaint as it is presently worded, nor can it be inferred that plaintiff was fired because she engaged in an activity protected by the NJLAD.

  4. Doerr v. Easter Seal of New Jersey

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-2858 (JBS) (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2000)

    Moreover, the court notes that Oshiver's three situations are "not exclusive," 38 F.3d at 1387. This court disagrees, however, with the holding of Judge Walls in Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F. Supp.2d 923, 927-28 (D.N.J. 1999), that the plaintiff's pro se status alone is sufficient reason to equitably waive the 90-day limitations period. In that case, no consideration other than plaintiff's pro se filing status were present, and plaintiff apparently made no allegation that he was frustrated from timely compliance due to factors beyond his control; it would thus appear to be well-settled that Sadruddin's pro se status would be insufficient to excuse his untimely filing where he had correct notice and no reason not to have complied.