" Damages in personal injury cases cannot be computed mathematically, nor does the law furnish any precise, definite rule for their assessment." Sadonis v. Govan, 132 Conn. 668, 670, 46 A.2d 895 (1946); Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484, 494, 464 A.2d 847 (1983). The court has, and must exercise, a wide discretion in the amount of damages for personal injuries, and the amount awarded in each case depends largely on the judgment of the trier.
Levin v. Ritson, 179 Conn. 223, 228, 425 A.2d 1279 (1979); Ball v. Pardy Construction Co., 108 Conn. 549, 551, 143 A. 855 (1928); Leabo v. Leninski, 2 Conn. App. 715, 727, 484 A.2d 239 (1984); see J. Stein, Damages and Recovery (1972) 8. An award of damages for pain and suffering is peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact and the fact that it is difficult to measure pain and suffering in terms of money does not prevent a recovery for that element of damages. Manning v. Michael, 188 Conn. 607, 616, 452 A.2d 1157 (1982); Sadonis v. Govan, 132 Conn. 668, 670, 46 A.2d 895 (1946); Leabo v. Leninski, supra. Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of fact, but "[p]roper compensation [for pain and suffering] cannot be computed by a mathematical formula . . . there is no iron-clad rule for the assessment of damages. Manning v. Michael, supra.
There is no precise mathematical formula by which a jury can arrive at an award of damages for pain and suffering, or loss of earning capacity. Nair v. Thaw, 156 Conn. 445, 453, 242 A.2d 757; Kekac v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 149 Conn. 731, 732, 179 A.2d 832; Sadonis v. Govan, 132 Conn. 668, 670, 46 A.2d 895; Nailor v. C. W. Blakeslee Sons, Inc., 117 Conn. 241, 246, 167 A. 548. The determination is within the sound discretion of the trier. Davis v. P. Gambardella Sons Cheese Corporation, 147 Conn. 365, 373, 161 A.2d 583.
Lopez v. Price, 145 Conn. 560, 568, 145 A.2d 127; Fairbanks v. State, 143 Conn. 653, 661, 124 A.2d 893. On the evidence presented, there was no error in the refusal of the court to set the verdict aside. See Verrillo v. Green, 155 Conn. 694, 695, 230 A.2d 20; Sadonis v. Govan, 132 Conn. 668, 670, 46 A.2d 895.
In the absence of an express finding by the court in that case, the fact that these items were mentioned in the memorandum of decision did not establish that they entered into the judgment rendered. Sadonis v. Govan, 132 Conn. 668, 669, 46 A.2d 895. The facts expressly stated in the finding must furnish the basis on which this appeal is determined. Zitkov v. Gorsky, 106 Conn. 287, 289, 137 A. 751; Barlow Bros. v. Lunny, 102 Conn. 152, 154, 128 A. 115. Both because the court has failed to find that any specific amount was included in the judgment in case No. 107443 to cover property damage to Conlon vehicle and because the court's conclusion that the judgment did include an award in some undisclosed amount is unsupported by the subordinate facts, the judgment in the company's favor cannot stand.
Lavieri was faced with a difficult problem of proof on this point, as would be so in the case of anyone who had had the misfortune to sustain disabling injuries in previous accidents. See cases such as Federman v. Stamford, 118 Conn. 427, 431, 172 A. 853. Although the burden of proof was on him, proof equivalent to a mathematical demonstration was not required. Sadonis v. Govan, 132 Conn. 668, 670, 46 A.2d 895. Here the evidence was meager, but it was not so inadequate that the jury could not have made any allowance on the basis of it. Nor is there anything to indicate that the allowance which they made was excessive. The jury could find medical special damages in the amount of slightly over $3000.
Damages in personal injury cases cannot be computed mathematically, nor does the law furnish any precise, definite rule for their assessment. Sadonis v. Govan, 132 Conn. 668, 670, 46 A.2d 895. The award of damages in such cases lies peculiarly within the province of the trier and will not be disturbed unless the sum assessed is clearly shown to be unreasonable. This is particularly so where the amount is determined by the court in a trial without a jury. Tarzia v. Koopman, 147 Conn. 540, 545, 163 A.2d 320; Stults v. Palmer, 141 Conn. 709, 711, 109 A.2d 592; Squires v. Reynolds, 125 Conn. 366, 369, 5 A.2d 877.
Such a claim raises a question of law. The issue here is not whether this court would have awarded more or less. It is whether the total amount of the verdict falls within the necessarily flexible limits of fair and reasonable compensation or is so large as to offend the sense of justice and compel a conclusion that the jury were influenced by partiality, prejudice or mistake. Slabinski v. Dix, supra; Sadonis v. Govan, 132 Conn. 668, 670, 46 A.2d 895. It is not essential to this opinion that the nature and extent of the plaintiff's claims as to his injuries be set forth in full detail.
An award of damages for pain and suffering is peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact and the fact that it is difficult to measure pain and suffering in terms of money does not prevent a recovery for that element of damages. Id., 533; Manning v. Michael, 188 Conn. 607, 616, 452 A.2d 1157 (1982); Sadonis v. Govan, 132 Conn. 668, 670, 46 A.2d 895 (1946). Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of fact, but proper compensation for pain and suffering cannot be computed by a mathematical formula, and there is no ironclad rule for the assessment of damages.
"Damages in personal injury cases cannot be computed mathematically, nor does the law furnish any precise, definite rule for their assessment." Sadonis v. Govan, 132 Conn. 668, 670, 46 A.2d 895 (1946); Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484, 494, 464 A.2d 847 (1983). The court has, and must exercise, a wide discretion in the amount of damages for personal injuries, and the amount awarded in each case depends largely on the judgment of the trier.