Opinion
FST-CV-15-6025758-S
10-17-2016
Karen Sadik-Khan v. Robert E. Griffith et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO OPEN
Donna Nelson Heller, J.
The court (Heller, J.) dismissed this action on December 8, 2015 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff Karen Sadik-Khan had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies (#117.01; #117.02; #117.03). On March 29, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion to open the December 8, 2015 judgment (#139.00). The defendants Robert Griffith (Griffith) and Ellen Woelfel (Woelfel) objected to the motion to open on April 1, 2016 (#146.00). The defendants William John MacMillan (MacMillan) and Eric Knott (Knott), MacMillan and Knott, the harbormasters of Greenwich and Stamford, respectively (collectively, the harbormasters), filed an objection to the motion on April 5, 2016 (#148.00). On April 7, 2016, the plaintiff filed a reply to the defendants' objections (#149.00).
The parties were before the court on May 31, 2016. The assistant attorney general advised the court at that time that the harbormasters were withdrawing their objection to the motion to open. The court heard argument from counsel for the plaintiff and for Griffith and Woelfel and reserved decision. By order entered on September 1, 2016, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to open and stated that this articulation would follow (#139.01).
I
The procedural history of this action and the underlying facts are set forth in detail in the court's articulation of its order granting the motion to dismiss (#117.03). To briefly summarize, the plaintiff, an owner of waterfront property in Old Greenwich, commenced this action, returnable July 28, 2015, for a declaratory judgment that General Statutes § 26-157a(e), which imposes criminal penalties for placing a mooring in an oyster bed without the owner's permission, does not prevent the plaintiff from maintaining a mooring seaward of her property in the Long Island Sound, as she did from 1979 until 2014, when her mooring was removed. The harbormasters relied on General Statutes § 26-157a(e) to deny the plaintiff's application for a mooring permit, based on Griffith's representations that he had rights to shellfish beds east of the plaintiff's property pursuant to an agreement with Woefel. The plaintiff also sought to quiet title to the seabed east of her property based on her common-law littoral rights, and, in the event that the court granted the relief that she was seeking, a writ of mandamus instructing MacMillan or Knott, as the case may be, to issue a mooring permit to her.
General Statutes § 26-157a(e) provides that " no person shall set, tend or assist in setting or tending any lobster pot, trap or similar device for the catching of lobsters or set any mooring on any oyster bed without the permission of the owner or lessee of such bed."
The plaintiff's claims are set forth in her three-count substituted complaint (#120.00), which is the operative complaint in this action.
On August 19, 2015, the harbormasters moved to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies (#117.00). The court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiff was required to seek a declaratory ruling from the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (DEEP) regarding the application of General Statutes § 26-157a(e) to her claims prior to this court's exercise of jurisdiction (#117.01). The court issued an articulation of its order on January 27, 2016 (#117.02; #117.03) . The plaintiff appealed the court's ruling to the Appellate Court on January 15, 2016 (#137.00). The appeal remains pending, although the plaintiff's attorney advised the court during oral argument on May 31, 2016 that the appeal would be withdrawn in the event that the court granted the motion to open.
The court's consideration of the plaintiff's motion is procedurally proper despite the pendency of the plaintiff's appeal. " It is well established that a trial court properly may open a judgment while an appeal is pending, even to address the issue raised on appeal." (Citation omitted.) RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, 278 Conn. 672, 682, 899 A.2d 586 (2006).
Following the court's ruling on the harbormasters' motion to dismiss, several of the plaintiff's neighbors (the petitioners) filed a petition for a declaratory ruling with DEEP pursuant to § 22a-3a-4 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. Specifically, the petitioners sought a determination from DEEP as to whether General Statutes § 26-157a(e) applied to the petitioners' moorings in the waters contiguous to their properties in Old Greenwich in view of the claims made by Griffith and Woefel. The petitioners characterized the plaintiff's action as concerning the same issues as raised in their petition.
The court derives these facts from the exhibits submitted by the plaintiff in support of her motion to open (#140.00; #141.00; #142.00).
Section 22a-3a-4(1) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in pertinent part that " [a]ny person may petition the [DEEP] Commissioner in writing to issue a declaratory ruling as provided by [General Statutes § 4-176]. The petition shall identify clearly and with particularity the facts and circumstances which give rise to the petition; any statute, regulation, or final decision of the Department at issue and the particular aspect of it to which the petition is addressed; and the question or questions as to which the declaratory ruling is sought."
On January 13, 2016, the plaintiff filed a request with DEEP to intervene in the petitioners' proceeding or, in the alternative, to seek a declaratory ruling regarding the application of General Statutes § 26-157a(e). DEEP allowed the plaintiff to intervene in the proceeding. Griffith and Woelfel were also granted intervening party status.
In a letter decision dated March 4, 2016, the DEEP commissioner declined to issue a declaratory ruling regarding General Statutes § 26-157a(e) pursuant to its authority to do so under General Statutes § 4-176(e)(5). The commissioner cited the following reasons for the decision: the pendency of the plaintiff's appeal of the court's ruling on the harbormasters' motion to dismiss; that even if the plaintiff had not filed an appeal, any declaratory ruling would be dependent upon the location of shellfish beds, which must first be determined by the Department of Agriculture as the " lead agency on shellfish in Connecticut"; that, " [a]t best, the only question within [DEEP's] jurisdiction concerns a determination as to whose rights are superior--the upland owners' littoral rights or the right of a shellfish bed owner or lessee"; and that this was " essentially a dispute between private parties, " that did " not implicate principles or policies of particular importance to [DEEP] . . ."
General Statutes § 4-176(e) provides that " [w]ithin sixty days after the receipt of a petition for a declaratory ruling, an agency in writing shall . . . (5) decide not to issue a declaratory ruling, stating the reasons for its action."
On March 29, 2016, the plaintiff moved to open the judgment of dismissal and reinstate her three-count substituted complaint on the ground that any defect in the court's subject matter jurisdiction was cured by the plaintiff's exhaustion of her administrative remedies with DEEP, based on the decision by the DEEP commissioner not to issue a declaratory ruling.
II
" Courts have an inherent power to open, correct and modify judgments . . . A civil judgment of the Superior Court may be opened if a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months of the issuance of judgment." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Martin, 99 Conn.App. 145, 155, 913 A.2d 451 (2007). " A motion to open a judgment is governed by General Statutes § 52-212a and Practice Book § 17-4. Section 52-212a provides in relevant part: 'Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed . . .' Practice Book § 17-4 states essentially the same rule." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fitzsimons v. Fitzsimons, 116 Conn.App. 449, 454-55, 975 A.2d 729 (2009).
" The provisions of § 52-212a do not operate to strip the court of its jurisdiction over its judgments, but merely operate to limit the time period in which a court may exercise its substantive authority to adjudicate the merits of a case." (Citation omitted.) Bridgeport v. Triple 9 of Broad Street, Inc., 87 Conn.App. 735, 744, 867 A.2d 851 (2005). The purpose of this limitation stems " from the common-law rule concerning jurisdiction over the parties. In the interest of the public as well as that of the parties there [must] be fixed a time after the expiration of which the controversy is to be regarded as settled and the parties freed of obligations to act further by virtue of having been summoned into or having appeared in the case . . . Without such a rule, no judgment could be relied on. Such uncertainty and instability in legal relations which have apparently been finally adjudicated does not commend itself as orderly judicial procedure." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) R.S. Silver Enterprises, Inc. v. Pascarella, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk, Docket No. FST-CV-06-5002499-S, (Sept. 24, 2015, Lee, J.).
General Statutes § 52-212a and Practice Book § 17-4 vest discretion in the trial court to determine whether a good and compelling reason exists to modify or vacate a judgment. As the motion to open is an equitable remedy vested in the discretion of the trial court, circumstances that constitute a good and compelling reason vary depending on the grounds for the motion. For example, our courts have found a good and compelling reason to grant a motion to open when newly discovered evidence proffered by the moving party would have been likely to affect the underlying verdict; see Tri-Coastal Lanthanides, Inc. v. Chang, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-95-0144760-S, (May 4, 2000, Hickey, J.) or when a jury award directly contravened a statutory mandate limiting the award of damages. See Dimmock v. Allstate Insurance Co., 84 Conn.App. 236, 853 A.2d 543, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 923, 859 A.2d 577 (2004).
III
The plaintiff contends that a good and compelling reason exists for this court to open its previous judgment of dismissal because she has now exhausted her administrative remedies with DEEP. The plaintiff maintains that the court should grant her motion in the interest of judicial economy and reinstate her substituted complaint rather than require her to commence a new action. Griffith and Woefel object on two grounds. First, they contend that the plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies with DEEP because she merely joined a " separate, unrelated, third-party petition" rather than filing her own petition for a declaratory judgment. Next, and more generally, they claim that a good and compelling reason does not exist for the court to open the judgment of dismissal because the plaintiff has failed to exhaust other potential administrative remedies available to her through the Connecticut Department of Agriculture or the Stamford Harbor Management Commission.
As this court explained in the articulation of its December 8, 2015 order dismissing this action (#117.03), when the application of a provision of the General Statutes to a specific set of circumstances concerns a matter within the jurisdiction of an administrative agency, a party must first seek a declaratory judgment from the agency pursuant to General Statutes § 4-176(a) prior to seeking relief in the Superior Court. After doing so, however, " [i]f a provision of the general statutes . . . or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff and if an agency . . . decides not to issue a declaratory ruling under [§ 4-176(e)(5)] . . . the petitioner may seek in the Superior Court a declaratory judgment as to . . . the applicability of the provision of the general statutes . . . in question to [the] specified circumstances." General Statutes § 4-175(a). In this case, the plaintiff sought a declaratory ruling from DEEP regarding the application of General Statutes § 26-157a(e) following the dismissal of this action. The DEEP commissioner subsequently elected not to issue a decision, citing General Statutes § 4-176(e)(5). The plaintiff has accordingly exhausted her administrative remedies, and she is free to seek relief in the Superior Court.
General Statutes § 4-176(a) provides in pertinent part that " [a]ny person may petition an agency . . . for a declaratory ruling as to . . . the applicability to specified circumstances of a provision of the general statutes . . . on a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency."
The arguments advanced by Griffith and Woefel to the contrary are not persuasive. The fact that the plaintiff intervened in an already ongoing administrative action with DEEP, rather than seeking her own declaratory ruling from the agency, is immaterial to the issue of whether the plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies. DEEP has discretion to allow a party to intervene in a petition for a declaratory ruling pursuant to General Statutes § 4-176(d), which provides in pertinent part that " [i]f [an] agency finds that a timely petition to become a party or to intervene has been filed according to [the regulations adopted by an agency to govern petitions for declaratory rulings], the agency . . . [m]ay grant a person status as a party if the agency finds that the petition states facts demonstrating that the petitioner's legal rights, duties or privileges shall be specifically affected by the agency proceeding . . ." General Statutes § 4-176(d). By allowing the plaintiff to intervene in the petitioners' proceeding, DEEP determined that the plaintiff's concerns were relevant to that proceeding. Moreover, the DEEP commissioner's March 4, 2016 letter decision plainly indicates that DEEP considered the same issues that the plaintiff now seeks to have adjudicated here.
Similarly unpersuasive is Griffin and Woelfel's argument that the plaintiff's motion should be denied because she did not seek declaratory relief from other administrative agencies that might have jurisdiction over the application of General Statutes § 26-157a(e). The court considered this issue when it granted the harbormasters' motion to dismiss and instructed the plaintiff to exhaust her administrative remedies with DEEP. The court will not revisit it here.
In declining to issue the rulings requested by the petitioners and the plaintiff, as an intervening party, the DEEP commissioner stated that " determining the boundaries of shellfish beds is beyond my authority, " citing the role of the Department of Agriculture under General Statutes § 26-192a. Section 26-192a provides in pertinent part that " [t]he Department of Agriculture shall be the lead agency on shellfish in Connecticut. The department: (1) Shall coordinate the activities of other state agencies with regard to shellfish; (2) shall act as a liaison on shellfish matters between the state and municipalities, including local shellfish commissions . . ." General Statutes § 26-192a. Even if the DEEP commissioner was correct as to the authority of the Department of Agriculture, however, that does not mean--as Griffin and Woelfel suggest--that the plaintiff must seek a ruling from that department or another state agency in order for this court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims.
DEEP declined to issue a declaratory ruling on the applicability of General Statutes § 26-157a(e); accordingly, this court now has jurisdiction to address the merits of the plaintiff's action. If it is later determined that a state agency other than DEEP should consider a particular issue, the court can stay the proceedings at that point to afford the agency an opportunity to do so. See Henry v. Imbruce, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X08-CV-12-5013927-S (July 11, 2014, Genuario, J.) (58 Conn.L.Rptr. 615, ) (in context of doctrine of primary jurisdiction, discussing four factors listed by Second Circuit in determining whether to stay judicial proceedings while awaiting administrative determination). It may well be that the application of General Statutes § 26-157a(e) to the facts of this case will not require input from another agency at all.
For example, the adjudication of issues regarding the superiority of littoral rights is within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court. See, e.g., Water Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Innopak Plastics Corp., 230 Conn. 764, 774-76, 646 A.2d 790 (1994) (determination of littoral rights as between two adjoining landowners was determination of fact for Superior Court).
The final consideration is whether the plaintiff's exhaustion of her administrative remedies with DEEP constitutes a good and compelling reason for this court to open its previous judgment of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction--the alternative being that the plaintiff would be required to commence a new action in order to have this controversy adjudicated. In general, " [a] judge should hesitate to change his [or her] own rulings in a case and should be even more reluctant to overrule those of another judge." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bowman v. Jack's Auto Sales, 54 Conn.App. 289, 293, 734 A.2d 1036 (1999) (discussing law of the case doctrine). This hesitation stems from " the important consideration of finality of judgments . . . [A] judgment should not be opened without a strong and compelling reason." (Citation omitted.) Martin v. Martin, supra, 99 Conn.App. at 156. While the court would ordinarily weigh several factors before disturbing a substantive ruling to grant a motion to open; see, e.g., R.S. Silver Enterprises, Inc. v. Pascarella, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-06-5002499-S, (applying four-factor test when considering motion for a new proceeding based on newly discovered evidence); these factors are not dispositive in the context of opening a judgment of dismissal entered on procedural grounds. Accordingly, the consideration in favor of the finality of the court's order dismissing this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not outweigh the interests of judicial economy and the value our jurisprudence places on the resolution of disputes on their merits.
" It is axiomatic that our system of law encourages the conservation of judicial time and resources." (Citation omitted.) State v. Arena, 235 Conn. 67, 80, 663 A.2d 972 (1995). Further, " [i]t is the policy of the law to bring about a trial on the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to secure for the litigant his day in court." Snow v. Calise, 174 Conn. 567, 574, 392 A.2d 440 (1978). In the interest of these strong policies--and considering that a denial of the plaintiff's motion to open would merely result in her refiling her lawsuit, thereby increasing the costs for all parties involved and delaying the resolution of this dispute--the court finds the plaintiff's exhaustion of her administrative remedies with DEEP to be a good and compelling reason to open the judgment dismissing this action.
IV
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff's motion to open (#139.00) is hereby GRANTED.