Opinion
568 TP 17–01992
04-27-2018
In the Matter of Deborah G. SADALLAH, Petitioner, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent.
RUPP BAASE PFALZGRAF CUNNINGHAM LLC, ROCHESTER (MATTHEW A. LENHARD OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (JONATHAN D. HITSOUS OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
RUPP BAASE PFALZGRAF CUNNINGHAM LLC, ROCHESTER (MATTHEW A. LENHARD OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER.
ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (JONATHAN D. HITSOUS OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., DEJOSEPH, CURRAN, AND WINSLOW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Memorandum:Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the determination revoking her driver's license for 30 days. The determination was based on the finding that petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146(a) by failing to exercise due care to avoid colliding with a pedestrian, who died as a result of the collision.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the determination is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter ofChu v. Fiala, 117 A.D.3d 585, 585–586, 986 N.Y.S.2d 105 [1st Dept. 2014] ). Initially, we reject petitioner's contention that she was deprived of her right to due process by the admission of hearsay evidence at the hearing (see Matter ofGray v. Adduci, 73 N.Y.2d 741, 742, 536 N.Y.S.2d 40, 532 N.E.2d 1268 [1988] ; Matter of Linton v. State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 92 A.D.3d 1205, 1206, 937 N.Y.S.2d 905 [4th Dept. 2012] ; Matter ofScaccia v. Martinez, 9 A.D.3d 882, 883–884, 779 N.Y.S.2d 680 [4th Dept. 2004] ). It is well settled that " ‘[h]earsay evidence is admissible in administrative hearings' ..., ‘and if sufficiently relevant and probative may constitute substantial evidence’ " ( Matter of Mastrodonato v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 27 A.D.3d 1121, 1122, 815 N.Y.S.2d 371 [4th Dept. 2006] ; see Gray, 73 N.Y.2d at 742–743, 536 N.Y.S.2d 40, 532 N.E.2d 1268 ). Here, the testimony of the witnesses who observed the collision and the hearsay statement of the other witness are sufficient to establish that petitioner "violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 by failing to exercise due care to avoid striking a pedestrian" ( Matter ofMontagnino v. Fiala, 106 A.D.3d 1090, 1091, 966 N.Y.S.2d 161 [2d Dept. 2013] ; see generally 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 181–182, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183 [1978] ).
Contrary to the further contention of petitioner, the penalty of a 30–day revocation of her license is not "so disproportionate to the offense ... as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness" ( Matter of Kreisler v. New York City Tr. Auth., 2 N.Y.3d 775, 776, 780 N.Y.S.2d 302, 812 N.E.2d 1250 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Gerber v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 129 A.D.3d 959, 961–962, 11 N.Y.S.3d 648 [2d Dept. 2015] ; Montagnino, 106 A.D.3d at 1091, 966 N.Y.S.2d 161 ; Matter of Gorman v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 34 A.D.3d 1361, 1361–1362, 824 N.Y.S.2d 526 [4th Dept. 2006] ). We reject petitioner's further contention that she did not receive adequate notice of the purpose of the hearing or the allegations against her (see Matter ofPratt v. Melton, 72 A.D.2d 887, 887–888, 422 N.Y.S.2d 169 [3d Dept. 1979], affd for reasons stated 51 N.Y.2d 837, 433 N.Y.S.2d 760, 413 N.E.2d 1174 [1980] ; Matter ofGregson v. Hults, 23 A.D.2d 911, 911–912, 258 N.Y.S.2d 1004 [3d Dept. 1965], affd 16 N.Y.2d 936, 264 N.Y.S.2d 923, 212 N.E.2d 440 [1965] ; Matter ofGiudice v. Adduci, 176 A.D.2d 1175, 1176, 575 N.Y.S.2d 611 [3d Dept. 1991] ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the determination is unanimously confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed.