Opinion
C085240
03-19-2018
In re S.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD, FAMILY, AND ADULT SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.F., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. JD235878)
Jennifer F. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights as to minor S.F. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends the court erred by finding that the sibling relationship exception to adoption did not apply. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) We shall affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. BACKGROUND
The Section 300 Petition
On April 2, 2015, the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the department) filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (d) as to the six-year-old minor. The petition alleged: (1) Domestic violence between mother and her live-in boyfriend, Dale, endangered the minor and her 12-year-old half sibling S.C., and mother had a history of domestic violence in prior relationships; (2) mother had a longstanding untreated substance abuse problem; (3) the minor's father, J.W., had a longstanding alcohol abuse problem and had recently relapsed after completing a residential treatment program; (4) Dale and mother had both sexually abused the minor.
S.C. is not a party to this appeal.
Detention Report
The minors were placed together in a confidential foster home. S.C. was in seventh grade and the minor was in kindergarten.
Mother denied substance abuse, but had recently tested positive for four controlled substances. She denied that she or Dale had sexually abused the minor.
The minor disclosed the sexual abuse by Dale, and once also by mother at his instigation, to the maternal grandmother and to Special Assault Forensic Evaluation (SAFE) interviewers. The minor and S.C. also confirmed a February 25, 2015, domestic violence incident.
J.W. lived in Virginia, where he and the family had moved several years ago. Mother and the minors returned to Sacramento after he was jailed for domestic violence against mother. He had been sober for two weeks after a relapse following residential alcohol abuse treatment. He wanted to reunify with the minor.
Initial Hearing
On April 7, 2015, the juvenile court set the jurisdiction/disposition hearing for April 28, 2015, and granted supervised visitation to J.W. and Robert C. (S.C.'s father) as to their respective children, but denied visitation to mother and ordered no contact between the minors and Dale.
Jurisdiction/Disposition Reports
The department recommended continued out-of-home placement for the minors and reunification services for mother, J.W., and Robert C. However, a later addendum recommended bypassing services to mother due to her lack of progress.
J.W. intended to return to California and to enter a residential treatment program there. He was diagnosed as bipolar and was seeing a psychiatrist and taking medication for that condition. He wanted to reunify with the minor and knew he needed to stay sober to do so. J.W. had a long history of involvement with Child Protective Services (CPS) in Virginia stemming from domestic violence, alcohol abuse, and bipolar disorder.
The minor and S.C. were doing well in their current placement. The minor had liked living with J.W. in Virginia and still stayed in touch with him, but the family had to leave after he pushed mother to the ground when he was drunk.
S.C. did not want to be placed anywhere without the minor, to whom she was closer than anyone else.
Disposition
On July 1, 2015, the juvenile court ordered the minors to remain in out-of-home placement. The court granted reunification services to J.W. and Robert C., but denied them to mother.
Robert C. and J.W.'s services were later terminated. They are not parties to this appeal.
Further Proceedings
The juvenile court ordered J.W. into Dependency Drug Court on July 28, 2015. On June 14, 2016, he was dismissed from the program for failure to participate.
The prepermanency review report, filed December 8, 2015, recommended continued out-of-home placement and continued services to the fathers. The goal was reunification of both minors with J.W., whom the minors said they wanted to live with. In light of that goal, no permanency/adoptability assessment was completed.
On December 15, 2015, the juvenile court adopted the department's recommended findings and orders.
The permanency review report, filed January 15, 2016, recommended continued out-of-home placement with the goal of reunification with J.W. for the minor (though his progress was only fair) and of legal guardianship for S.C., whom he no longer wished to take in. It also recommended termination of Robert C.'s reunification services.
The minor and S.C. continued to do well in their placement. No relatives had requested placement of S.C., but the current caregivers stated they were willing and able to provide her with a safe, stable, and permanent home.
The minor still wanted to live with her father. S.C. wanted to stay connected to her stepfather and her sister, but not to live with them. She wanted to remain with her current caregiver, to whom she felt bonded, and to stay in her present school district.
At the permanency review hearing on May 24, 2016, the juvenile court made the recommended findings and orders.
A permanency review report dealing only with the minor recommended placing her with J.W. under dependent supervision. J.W. had been discharged from Dependency Drug Court and still did not have acceptable housing for the minor, but the social worker called his progress "good." The minor and S.C. were still in the same placement and doing well there. Concurrent planning was "not needed at this time" because the recommendation was to place the minor with J.W.
At the permanency review hearing as to the minor only on October 4, 2016, the minor's counsel recommended terminating J.W.'s services for failure to complete his case plan and setting a section 366.26 hearing. County counsel stated that the department hoped to keep the minors together because they were very bonded, and the goal for both should be legal guardianship with the current foster parents. Counsel also stated that no attempt had yet been made to locate an adoptive home for either minor.
The juvenile court terminated J.W.'s services, found the minor adoptable, and set the matter for a selection and implementation hearing.
The Section 366.26 Report
The selection and implementation report, dated January 25, 2017, recommended termination of parental rights and requested a 90-day home-finding continuance because the minor's current caretakers did not want to adopt her or become her legal guardians.
In the context of discussing the minor's interactions with J.W., the report quotes the opinion of Aubrey Manongsong—J.W. and minor's counselor—received by the department on December 14, 2016. Manongsong opined that the minor should "remain in long term foster care and remain with her current foster family where she is thriving." The report does not indicate whether Manongsong was aware of the department's current recommendation for adoption or the current foster family's rejection of adoption and guardianship.
On January 12, 2017, the adoptions social worker spoke to the minor about the department's new plan. The minor said she did not want to be adopted; she wanted to stay with "her family," meaning S.C. and J.W. The social worker explained that the department had concluded J.W. was not prepared to complete the necessary steps to keep her safe, and that her relationship with S.C. would still be honored (and also with J.W., provided he had safeguards in place); a forever home would do a better job of keeping her safe and happy. The minor then said if she went to a forever home, she would want to have pets there. The social worker reported: "It is unclear at this time if [the minor] fully understands the impact of the upcoming changes to her life."
The February 24, 2017, Addendum
The department continued to recommend adoption for the minor and explained the progress made so far. Originally, the minor and J.W. were "in denial" that adoption was the new plan, but that obstacle appeared to have been overcome (at least as far as the minor was concerned).
Shortly after receiving the case on November 17, 2016, the adoptions social worker learned that the current foster mother was not interested in adoption or legal guardianship but wanted both minors to remain with her in long-term placement. In December 2016, S.C. confirmed that she did not want to leave her current placement and discussed her feelings of guilt about what the minor was going through. Also in December, the adoptions social worker determined that J.W.'s current girlfriend would not be an option for placement.
After meeting with the minor on January 12, 2017, as recounted above, the social worker began the home-finding effort immediately. Meetings with prospective adoptive families were scheduled for February 24, 2017 (the date of the addendum).
S.C.'s Request for Court Recognition as the Minor's Sibling
On March 21, 2017, S.C. requested a court order recognizing that she and the minor were siblings, which would allow her to participate in the minor's section 366.26 hearing. The juvenile court issued the order.
Pretrial Proceedings
S.C.'s pretrial statement opposed the termination of parental rights, raising the sibling relationship exception to adoption. The minor's counsel joined in this argument.
On April 3, 2017, the department and the minor requested a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing to transition the minor into a new adoptive placement. Over the other parties' objections, the juvenile court granted a continuance to April 25, 2017, but ordered that any move not take place before the next court hearing.
The April 24, 2017, Addendum
The department met with the family currently identified as adoptive on February 24, 2017. The department informed them that the minor had a sibling who did not wish to move from her current placement, and it was important to maintain the sibling relationship. The family agreed to encourage the relationship and to include the sibling in future visitations.
On March 15, 2017, the adoptions social worker met with the minor and the current caregiver to explain the process. The minor was excited about meeting the prospective adoptive family.
The first meeting, on March 17, 2017, involving the family, the minor, and S.C. at the current caretakers' home, went very well (as far as the minor was concerned) and was quickly followed by others.
On March 28, 2017, the adoptions social worker relayed an invitation to S.C. from the family to attend a visit at their home. As of the date of the addendum, S.C. had not done so.
On March 29, 2017, the foster family agency representative observed the minor's visit at the family's home and reported that she looked forward to sleeping over with the family. Successful overnight visits followed. The minor spent four weekends in a row with the family. There had been no reported concerns from the minor, her caregiver, or the family. However, S.C. felt the family did not like her. S.C. thought the family was " 'weird' " and not "a good fit," but could not explain why.
On April 24, 2017, the adoptions social worker met with the minor, who said she liked being in the family's home and wished she could spend more time there.
The Pretrial Hearing
On April 25, 2017, the minor's counsel submitted on the department's recommendation of adoption; because the family was open to having S.C. in their home and maintaining contact with the minor, counsel now thought adoption would not interfere with the sibling relationship. The juvenile court set a contested section 366.26 hearing.
The May 4, 2017, Addendum
On April 26, 2017, the minor reported that she had continued to visit with the family on weekends and would like to spend at least four days a week with them. However, S.C. had not attended a sleepover there.
On April 28, 2017, the foster agency social worker reported that the minor's visits continued to go well, but S.C. consistently rejected the family's invitations and avoided them when they came over to pick up the minor. The minor had asked the adoptive parents if she would still be S.C.'s sister after adoption. The adoptive father explained they would always be sisters and the family would always make a way for them to see each other.
The adoptions social worker believed the minor was ready to fully transition into the adoptive family's home over the following 3 weeks.
The Section 366.26 Hearing
At the contested section 366.26 hearing on May 18, 2017, testimony was given by supervising adoptions social worker Jennifer Crosetti, former case-carrying social worker Lora Saunders, S.C., and J.W.
Since J.W.'s testimony concerned only his parental bond with the minor, we do not summarize it here.
Crosetti testified that the minor and the adoptive family were eager to go forward and the move-in could happen the following weekend. The minor had expressed no hesitation or trepidation. Crosetti knew that the adoptions social worker had explained adoption to the minor, who understood it as well as a child at her stage of development could and did not ask for clarification. The minor agreed with the plan "indirectly," as she had said nothing to the contrary and "everybody ha[d] been checking in with her."
Crosetti had learned that after the last court hearing S.C. had started to participate in contact with the adoptive family and it seemed to go well. The adoptive family was "very open" to continued contact between the siblings and had continued to assure the minor that she and S.C. would still be sisters. The department had stated in writing to the foster family agency that they wanted at least once-a-week visits between the siblings after the move occurred, with the possibility of more frequent contact later. The department had looked for the "natural fit" of adoptive parents who would honor the sibling relationship without being forced to do so, and felt "very comfortable and confident" that this family would honor it.
Crosetti stated that the department did not typically tell eight-year-olds that it would be up to their adoptive parents whether their siblings could continue to visit. The department would do so if there were concerns about whether contact would happen, but there were no such concerns in this case. It was true under the law that an adoptive parent could decide to bar visitation after the adoption, but Crosetti believed this family would not do so.
S.C. testified that she and the minor had lived together all of minor's life. They were now in their second foster placement. They had always slept in the same bedroom until this proceeding. The minor looked up to S.C. for advice and guidance.
In a typical day in foster care, S.C. and the minor would get ready for school together, with S.C. helping the minor to pick her clothes. At the end of the day, S.C. would ask the minor how her day went and if anyone had bullied her. When S.C. was not busy or hanging out with her own friends, she would take the minor out and play sports with her. They celebrated birthdays and holidays together. The minor followed her around and wanted to do everything she did.
S.C. learned about the adoption plan for the minor from reading court papers; her social worker, Lora Saunders, had not told her about it. S.C. was "pissed." S.C. then told the minor, who "cried a lot."
Saunders was the social worker whose proposed plan of reunifying the minor with J.W. was rejected by the juvenile court.
The minor told S.C. about what the prospective adoptive family was buying for her, but not much else about the visits. Since the minor began the visits, her behavior had changed. She would throw tantrums and show attitude. She had also started drawing as a way of putting her tantrums down on paper. Once, the minor drew "a house and all of us" and told S.C., "she missed that." The minor worried about what would happen if she needed help and she and S.C. were not together.
Once, when the minor was throwing a tantrum, S.C. asked her what was wrong with her and the minor answered, "I don't want to be adopted." Minor had also told S.C. that "she didn't want to move. She didn't want to be alone." Minor said she had not told that to anyone else. S.C. believed minors comments about being adopted occurred the previous month. S.C. felt the minor was "being pressured into all of this" and not being given the chance to speak for herself.
S.C. had started to participate in visits with the prospective adoptive family. Recently she had gone out to dinner with them.
S.C. felt adoption would be detrimental to the minor because she would not have the opportunity to visit her family as much as she needed to.
Lora Saunders, assigned to the siblings' cases in August 2015 but now assigned only to S.C.'s case, testified that she had seen the siblings face to face at least once a month until the minor's case was transferred to the adoptions unit. Based on her observations, she believed their bond was closer than the typical sibling bond, despite the age gap between them.
At a subsequent hearing on May 30, 2017, the juvenile court heard argument.
County counsel acknowledged that the siblings were bonded, but the minor's adoption was unlikely to sever the bond because the adoptive family wanted to preserve it. Furthermore, the siblings were differently situated: The minor now wanted a forever home, but S.C. was close to adulthood. Even if they were to stay together, there was no guardianship home available for both of them; thus, the current placement was insecure and impermanent for the minor. Finally, there was no evidence that termination of parental rights and placement of the minor in the adoptive home would be severely detrimental to her, although there would be some detriment.
The minor's counsel stated that when she filed her original pretrial statement opposing adoption, she had just been appointed to the case and had not had the chance to review the current state of the evidence. Now, counsel believed the minor was both generally adoptable and placed in a prospective adoptive home that wanted to maintain the sibling relationship. In assessing the sibling relationship exception claim, what mattered under the law was the viewpoint of the child being adopted, not that of the child opposing adoption. The court could appropriately accept the prospective adoptive family's assurances that it would maintain the sibling relationship; to do otherwise would be pure speculation.
S.C.'s counsel cited the bond between the siblings, the opinion of counselor Manongsong that the minor should stay with the current foster family, the minor's rejection of adoption on January 12, 2017, and the lack of any later statements by her showing that she had changed her mind. She had not indicated a desire to be placed for adoption, but was "simply going along with it." After adoption, not only would the siblings not live together, but "[t]hey might not even live nearby," which would constitute a substantial interference in their relationship. After adoption was finalized, it would be entirely at the discretion of the adoptive parents whether the siblings still saw each other, and nothing could prevent the parents from barring further visitation. The detriment to the minor from being separated from S.C. was so great as to outweigh the benefits of legal adoption.
Mother's counsel also stressed the closeness of the sibling bond, shown by the testimony that S.C. " 'has always had time for' " the minor and the pet names they always called each other. Because the benefit to the minor of always having S.C. in her life was so great, the detriment to the minor from severing that bond would outweigh the benefit of adoption.
The Court's Ruling
On July 5, 2017, the juvenile court issued an extensive written ruling on all issues. As pertinent, the court stated:
"First, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence the child is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated. . . . [¶]
"Then the Court must look at whether there is a compelling reason for determining that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to certain identified circumstances. [The court rejected J.W.'s argument for the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption.] . . . [¶]
"The second reason argued in this case is the sibling relationship. The evidence must support a finding there would be a substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, and whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interest as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption. For purposes of taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, the court considers the evidence received regarding [the minor] and her sister being raised together, having significant common experiences and an existing close and strong bond. It is clear from the record the girls are bonded to each other as siblings are. In some ways though, [S.C.] occupies almost a parental role towards [the minor]. After finding there is a strong sibling relationship, the Court must look to whether there would be substantial interference with it. In some ways, there will be interference simply by moving [the minor] to a new home. However, the interference must be substantial. While the Court can consider the representations of the foster family with regards to their intentions, the Court is careful to consider in this case the limited nature of any track record with the foster family following through on their representations. The evidence shows the family was advised regarding the sibling relationship and asked to honor that. They expressed a desire to do such. They demonstrated actions consistent with that desire by seeking to include [S.C.] in activities and asking her to spend the night at their home to facilitate the relationship. It is [S.C.] who has declined to participate in these opportunities to maintain the sibling relationship until just recently. In assessing the totality of the evidence, it appears ongoing contact between the girls would be [the minor]'s best interest to maintain a relationship with her sister. However, the Court must then balance whether the severance of the sibling relationship would cause such detriment that it outweighs the benefit of the permanency and stability of an adoptive placement. In essence, the Court balances the benefit of maintaining the sibling bond with the child in a less stable placement versus the security and belonging an adoptive home can confer.
"In looking at all the evidence, the Court cannot conclude [the minor]'s best interest would be served by maintaining her relationship with her sister to the exclusion of an adoptive placement. While considering the entirety of the file, the following points are significant. At the outset of [the department]'s assessment regarding adoptability and permanency, they were clear [the minor] was still looking toward reunification with her father. Apparently, when the Court terminated reunification services and set the selection and implementation hearing, the case carrying social worker did not make the situation clear to the child, the foster parent, the father and even the therapist who felt she was working towards reunification at the [section] 366.26 hearing. When the initial conversation was had with [the minor], she was opposed to adoption. She wanted to keep her family—her father and her sister. Within a very short period of time, [the minor] demonstrated, through her words and actions, that she was in fact open to finding a forever home. She communicated with the social worker about her wishes for a forever home and became involved in the process of locating a good home. She was described as understanding adoption as an eight year old is able. She expressed no hesitation or trepidation about an adoptive home, and in fact, was ready to move, expressing excitement about meeting possible families, inviting one family to attend important life events, looking forward to a sleep over, and expressing a desire to have more time in the home of the potential adoptive family even though [S.C.] was not going with her to these visits. [S.C.] testified that [the minor] told her she did not want to be adopted. The Court did not find this testimony to be credible. It is clear [S.C.] spoke with [the minor] about adoption prior to the social worker having an opportunity to fully explain the concept and process. If [the minor] made such a statement, it was likely at that point in time. As noted, her later actions certainly disavow the purported statements. Finally, it is highly significant that it is [S.C.] that refused opportunities to meet the family that was interested in providing a permanent home to her sister and to develop a relationship with them and participate in ongoing sibling contact they were seeking. [The minor] has ten years of minority left. [S.C.] has only three. [The minor] deserves a home with parents that are able and willing to meet her needs, who are present to share in her life accomplishments, which will protect her, who will set limits with her and facilitate her growing up into a productive, law abiding citizen. An adoptive home can provide her with all these things. In an ideal world, it would be best for [the minor] to have an adoptive home and maintain a sibling relationship with [S.C.] However, if she cannot have both, her best interest is served by a permanent adoptive family.
"Without doubt, this will have a significant and detrimental impact on [S.C.] The Court recognizes that and wishes it could do something to ease the pain for [S.C.] [S.C.] is not obtaining a forever family out of this decision and as such is not receiving any benefit. [The minor] though is. The Court will order [ongoing] sibling visitation between [the minor] and [S.C.] because it is apparent sibling visitation would be in the best interest of both girls. The Court truly hopes [S.C.] will avail herself of the opportunity to participate in visits with [the minor] and work with [the department] towards establishing a good and productive relationship with [the minor]'s permanent home." (Italics added.)
Orders After Ruling
In addition to terminating parental rights and choosing a permanent plan of adoption, the court ordered sibling visitation to occur at least twice a month.
II. DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court's rejection of the sibling relationship exception to adoption was an abuse of discretion. We disagree.
"Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), if the court finds the child will be adopted within a reasonable time, adoption must be ordered ' "unless the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child" because "[t]here would be substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship . . . ." ' [Citation.] The purpose of this exception is to preserve longstanding sibling relationships that serve as 'anchors for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil.' [Citation.] The sibling relationship exception contains 'strong language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption.' [Citation.] Factors for the court to consider include the nature and extent of the sibling relationship, whether the siblings were raised in the same home, whether they share a close bond[,] and whether continued contact is in the child's best interests, as compared to the benefits of adoption. [Citation.] The court considers the best interests of the adoptive child, not the best interests of other siblings. [Citation.] We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the court's factual findings regarding the applicability of the sibling relationship exception, 'and the abuse of discretion standard to the court's weighing of competing interests.' [Citation.]" (In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 437-438 (Isaiah S.).)
In considering the sibling relationship exception, the juvenile court first determines whether terminating parental rights would create substantial interference with the sibling relationship. If the court so determines, it must then weigh the child's best interest in continuing the relationship against the benefits of adoption. (In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 173-174 (D.O.); In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 129.) In other words, because adoption is the choice preferred by the Legislature if the child is adoptable (a point not disputed here), a finding of substantial interference with the sibling relationship does not compel the court to reject adoption. (D.O, supra, at pp. 173-174; In re C.B., supra, at p. 129.) And the court may not prevent adoption solely because it might cause detriment to a sibling. (Isaiah S., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 438; In re Hector A. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 783, 791.)
When the Legislature adopted the sibling relationship exception, the provision's author anticipated that its use would be rare. (D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 174.) Case law bears out that expectation. Of all the decisions cited by the parties, only one finds the exception applicable, and that decision upholds a lower court ruling under the usual deferential standard of review. (In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808.) Thus, mother has a heavy burden in seeking to overturn the court's order. She does not meet that burden.
Mother's argument headings reveal the problem with her approach. She asserts that "[t]he sibling relationship exception applies to prevent termination of parental rights because [the minor] would benefit from continuing her relationship with [S.C.]," that "[t]here is substantial evidence that [the minor] will suffer detriment if her sibling relationship with [S.C.] is severed," and that "[t]he finding that the permanent plan of adoption would not substantially interfere with [the minor]'s sibling relationship must be reversed." Neither the benefit to the minor of continuing the sibling relationship nor the fact of substantial interference with that relationship is sufficient to prevent adoption if the benefits of adoption outweigh those of continuing the relationship, as the juvenile court found. (D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 173-174; In re C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) And mother's claim that substantial evidence supports her position is beside the point. Her burden is not to show that substantial evidence would have supported a different finding, but to show that, even when we construe the evidence most favorably to the judgment, substantial evidence does not support the finding actually made. (Cf. In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.)
The juvenile court assessed the sibling relationship exception claim exactly as the statute requires. The court first determined, by reference to the list of factors set out in Isaiah S., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pages 437-438, whether the sibling relationship was strong and whether adoption would substantially interfere with it. Having found that the relationship was strong and that adoption might substantially interfere with it, the court then weighed the benefits to the minor of continuing the relationship against the benefits she would gain from adoption. On that point, the court found: (1) adoption would probably not mean severing the bond because the adoptive parents had shown every indication that they intended to maintain it; but (2) even if it was not maintained, the benefits of adoption to the minor would outweigh the detriment to her of severing the bond. The court clearly laid out the evidence that supported each of these findings.
Mother argues at length that the sibling bond was close and should be maintained. But this argument does not show any error by the juvenile court, because it made those very findings and ordered frequent visitation between the siblings to maintain the bond.
We note that in making this argument mother presents an incomplete account of the record. She cites the minor's original statement to the adoptions social worker that she did not want to be adopted but to stay with S.C. and J.W., and the original pretrial statement of the minor's newly appointed counsel opposing the termination of parental rights. Mother fails to acknowledge either the evidence that the minor changed her mind later (as set out in the juvenile court's ruling) or the fact that the minor's counsel had completely changed her position by the time of the section 366.26 hearing.
Citing D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pages 175-176, mother appears to assert that the juvenile court could not properly rely on the adoptive family's promise to maintain the relationship because a promise of future sibling visits is legally unenforceable. However, D.O. does not so hold.
While the court stated that a juvenile court should not "rely exclusively on evidence regarding sibling visits" due to "the potential tenuousness" of such visits, the court also stated that it is entirely proper to rely on such evidence as a factor along with those enumerated in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). (D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 176.) That is what the juvenile court did here. Furthermore, D.O. expressly finds "persuasive" the holdings of other courts that "assurances of continued sibling visits are relevant to [the] determination" that terminating parental rights will not substantially interfere with a sibling relationship. (Id. at p. 175.) Finally, D.O. rejected the appellants' assertion that it was speculative whether the adoptive family would permit future visits: "This argument ignores that it was appellants' burden to establish there would be substantial interference, not the Agency's burden to establish there was not." (Id. at p. 176.)
We acknowledge that mother also cites this part of D.O.'s holding, but she fails to show that the juvenile court did not consider the statutory factors. Thus, mother has not shown that D.O. supports her position. --------
Mother asserts that weekly visits between the siblings, as proposed here, cannot substitute for the daily contact they have shared up until now. As the department points out, mother cites no authority for the proposition that weekly visits between siblings are insufficient as a matter of law to maintain a sibling relationship.
In any event, mother's point does not establish any error by the juvenile court. The court clearly stated that contact between the siblings will diminish and that in an ideal world that would not occur. The court also stated, however, that the minor needs the permanency of an adoptive home more than she needs to maintain the sibling relationship in an impermanent living arrangement, which was guaranteed by the refusal of the siblings' caregivers to consider adoption or legal guardianship for the minor. The court also pointed out that the only party who has been reluctant to participate in visitation so far is S.C. While recognizing the detriment to S.C. from the minor's separation from her, the court also recognized that it could not allow the possibility of detriment to a sibling to preclude adoption. (Isaiah S., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 438; In re Hector A., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 791.)
Mother has failed to show that the juvenile court's ruling was an abuse of discretion.
III. DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
/S/_________
RENNER, J. We concur: /S/_________
BUTZ, Acting P. J. /S/_________
HOCH, J.