Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-12485 No. 6763
01-30-2019
RONALD DEAN SACKETT, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Megan M. Rowe, Denali Law Group, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Ann B. Black, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 3KN-10-1858 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Kenai, Anna M. Moran, Judge. Appearances: Megan M. Rowe, Denali Law Group, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Ann B. Black, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, and Allard and Wollenberg, Judges. Judge WOLLENBERG.
In 2012, Ronald Dean Sackett was indicted on twenty counts of first- and second-degree sexual abuse of a minor for repeatedly abusing his stepdaughter over a period of several years. On the first day of Sackett's jury trial, he sought to negotiate a plea agreement rather than face a long trial during which many of his friends and family members would testify against him.
The State and Sackett ultimately agreed to a resolution of the case. Sackett pleaded guilty to a consolidated count of attempted first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, encompassing acts of fellatio and digital penetration occurring in 2005. The State dismissed the remaining charges. Sentencing was left open to the court.
AS 11.41.434(a)(3)(A) & AS 11.31.100. Because the offense to which Sackett pleaded guilty occurred prior to 2006 (when the Alaska legislature amended the presumptive sentencing laws for sexual felonies), Sackett's sentencing was governed by the pre-2006 sentencing law. See former AS 12.55.125(i)(2) (2005).
Prior to sentencing, Sackett asked his attorney to move to withdraw his plea. Because Sackett alleged that his attorney had provided ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the plea negotiations, the court appointed conflict counsel to litigate the plea-withdrawal motion.
Sackett's new attorney argued that Sackett had received deficient representation from his prior attorney, that Sackett had not fully understood the elements of the offense to which he pleaded guilty (in particular, he had not understood the term "fellatio"), and that at the time of his change of plea, Sackett had been under the influence of medications that inhibited his ability to freely and knowingly enter his plea. The State opposed, arguing that Sackett had simply changed his mind.
Following an evidentiary hearing at which Sackett and his trial attorney testified, the court rejected each of Sackett's claims and denied Sackett's motion to withdraw his plea. The court credited defense counsel's testimony that he had hired an expert and had been ready to go to trial, that he had reviewed all the pretrial discovery with Sackett, and that he had conveyed numerous plea offers to Sackett — all of which Sackett rejected until the morning of trial, when Sackett himself sought to reach a plea agreement. In contrast, the court found that Sackett had a "very selective recollection" of events that the court did not find credible.
With respect to his medication-related claim, the court accepted that Sackett was taking medications to control his anxiety. But the court found that there was no evidence that these medications were not working effectively or that Sackett's anxiety had otherwise affected his decision-making. In particular, the court observed that Sackett had appeared "very relaxed" and under control at the change of plea hearing, and that he had given clear answers to all of the questions the court asked, including telling the court that he was not under the influence of any medication or suffering from any health issues. The court also noted that Sackett had not presented any medical evidence to suggest that he suffered from a condition that might have affected his decision-making or perception.
Ultimately, the court characterized Sackett's motion to withdraw his plea as "a mere rationalization and a change of mind."
Sackett now appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea.
We have previously advised courts that presentence requests to withdraw a plea "should be liberally granted." But this policy does not relieve a defendant of the burden of establishing "a fair and just reason for the withdrawal." Generally, a defendant's "mere change of mind" does not qualify as a fair and just reason to withdraw a plea, even in the absence of prejudice to the State.
Monroe v. State, 752 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Alaska App. 1988).
Id.
Shetters v. State, 751 P.2d 31, 35 (Alaska App. 1988) (citing McClain v. State, 742 P.2d 269 (Alaska App. 1987)).
As we mentioned earlier, the court found that Sackett's purported reasons for seeking to withdraw his plea were just "a mere rationalization and a change of mind" — primarily based on the court's assessment that Sackett's testimony was not credible. Such a finding of credibility is entitled to broad deference. The record amply supports the trial court's findings.
See Pease v. State, 54 P.3d 316, 331 (Alaska App. 2002).
On appeal, Sackett renews his argument that the medications he was taking at the time of his change of plea rendered his plea involuntary. Sackett argues that the court could not rely on his answers or on his assessment of his own mental state at the change of plea proceeding because "[i]t would not have been apparent to the judge in the brief and formal change of plea hearing that Mr. Sackett was under the influence" at the time of the hearing. We agree with Sackett that "[s]tatements made by a defendant in support of a plea withdrawal motion should not be rejected out of hand merely because they are inconsistent with statements made during the change of plea hearing; nor should statements automatically be credited merely because they were made in the course of a formal change of plea hearing." But ultimately, "[t]he accuracy of the defendant's representations is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial judge" based on the totality of the circumstances.
To the extent Sackett intended to renew his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the plea negotiations, we conclude that this claim is inadequately briefed.
Wahl v. State, 691 P.2d 1048, 1052 n.5 (Alaska App. 1984).
Shetters, 751 P.2d at 35 n.1 (citing Wahl, 691 P.2d at 1052 n.5).
Sackett provides no basis for concluding that the trial court's assessment was clearly erroneous. Aside from his own testimony, which the court did not find credible, Sackett presented no evidence about the medications themselves, nor any evidence that the medications actually impaired his cognition or otherwise rendered him unable to understand the proceedings and his guilty plea. Indeed, Sackett testified that, at the time of the change of plea, he had been regularly prescribed these medications for five years and that the medications generally calmed him down and limited his anxiety attacks.
Cf. Beilen v. State, 2018 WL 3059998, at *1-2 (Alaska App. June 20, 2018) (unpublished) (trial court sufficiently inquired into defendant's mental state, even after he told the court he was on medications, where the plea colloquy and the surrounding circumstances did not raise questions about the defendant's mental state and capacity to understand the proceedings). --------
At most, Sackett testified that the medications made him sleepy, and that, on the day he changed his plea, he was unable to focus. But based on its own observations and on the testimony of Sackett's trial attorney (which the court credited), the court rejected Sackett's claim that his medications affected his ability to enter a voluntary plea. We have reviewed the record, and we conclude that the trial court did not err in reaching this conclusion.
We therefore AFFIRM the superior court's judgment.