Opinion
D058477
12-02-2011
JEANINE SACHS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SAN DIEGO CENTER FOR CHILDREN et al., Defendants and Appellants.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2010-00093951-CU-DF-CTL)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Steven R. Denton, Judge. Affirmed.
San Diego Center for Children (SDCC), Rachel Powers, Tara Davis, Danielle Domingue, and Amanda Bates (together Defendants) appeal from an order denying their special motion to strike Jeanine Sachs's complaint. They brought the motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, which allows the early dismissal of an action that is determined to be a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) and is thus known as the anti-SLAPP statute. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.) We conclude the anti-SLAPP statute is inapplicable because the complaint does not arise from acts in furtherance of the constitutional right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. (§ 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (e).) Accordingly, we affirm the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Background
SDCC is a nonprofit organization that provides mental health, educational, and social services to children in San Diego County. The mental health services are paid in part through Medi-Cal funds from the State of California and are provided through the San Diego County Mental Health Plan. SDCC's programs include the Discovery Hills Day Treatment Program, which is funded by San Diego County for the purpose of providing children with education, behavioral treatment and therapy. From 2007 to 2009, SDCC served approximately 2,400 children.
SDCC employed Sachs as a program manager for its Discovery Hills Day Treatment Program and she was responsible for supervising Davis, Domingue, and Bates. During her employment, she recommended that Powers, another program manager, be reprimanded for inappropriate conduct at work and be replaced by a licensed program manager. Similarly, Sachs reprimanded Bates for insubordination and failing to perform her job duties. Sachs believed that as a result of the reprimands, Powers and Bates felt ill will toward her.
Sachs worked at SDCC for over three years without receiving a reprimand or negative performance evaluation until her employment was terminated in February 2010. SDCC claimed that it had conducted an investigation into Sachs's job performance and treatment of children and employees. The investigation included speaking with employees and reviewing their letters and emails. According to SDCC, it concluded Sachs exhibited poor behavior and put children at risk and thus terminated her employment.
After her employment ended, Sachs learned of emails from other SDCC employees, including Domingue, Davis, and Powers, to SDCC's chief executive officer, human resources manager and others regarding her performance. In the emails, the employees complained that, among other things, Sachs disregarded client and staff safety, used profanity in front of children, violated policies and procedures, failed to intervene when children were abused by family members, told her staff not to document when restraints were used on children, stored old client medications in her unlocked desk, and intentionally harmed a client's feelings. In the emails, the employees also complained about Sachs's management of the program, such as her failure to support staff, delegation of duties to other employees, postponement or cancellation of appointments, and failure to spend time in the office. According to Sachs, the employee emails contained false statements. B. Legal Claims
Sachs filed a complaint asserting causes of action for libel against Powers, Davis, Domingue, and SDCC. She also asserted that Powers, Davis, Domingue, and Bates induced SDCC to breach its employment contract with her and intentionally interfered with her prospective economic advantage. Lastly, Sachs claimed SDCC breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by terminating her employment based on unfounded allegations of misconduct.
Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion seeking to strike the complaint in its entirety. Defendants argued that all causes of action were subject to an anti-SLAPP motion because the claims are "rooted to . . . three employee email privileged communications," which constitute statements made in connection with an issue of public interest. Specifically, Defendants claimed that the emails regarding Sachs's ongoing neglect of children were a matter of public concern because "[t]he state of California and society trust SDCC to care for San Diego County's emotionally and behaviorally troubled children." The trial court denied the motion on the basis that "[t]he general public interest in safeguarding the well being of children receiving mental health services is too amorphous and does not establish a 'public issue or an issue of public interest' for purposes of section 425.16."
DISCUSSION
I. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review
A special motion to strike under section 425.16 allows a defendant to gain early dismissal of a lawsuit that qualifies as a SLAPP. (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) The moving defendant must make a prima facie showing that the challenged claims arise from an act or acts in furtherance of his or her constitutional right of petition or free speech. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67 (Equilon).) These acts include "conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest." (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
Resolution of a special motion to strike "requires the court to engage in a two-step process. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. The moving defendant's burden is to demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken 'in furtherance of the [defendant]'s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue,' as defined in the statute. [Citation.] If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim." (Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67.) In other words, "the moving defendant's burden is to show the challenged cause of action 'arises' from protected activity. [Citations.] Once [but only if] it is demonstrated the cause of action arises from the exercise of the defendant's free expression or petition rights, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a probability of prevailing in the litigation." (Shekhter v. Financial Indemnity Co. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 141, 151.)
"Under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2), the trial court in making these determinations considers 'the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.' " (Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67.) The court, however, does not weigh credibility or compare the weight of the evidence; rather, it must accept as true that evidence favorable to the plaintiff. (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212.) Whether section 425.16 applies to a particular complaint generally presents a legal question subject to a de novo review standard on appeal. (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 906.)
II. Analysis
Defendants contend Sachs's complaint is subject to section 425.16 because all causes of action are based on "employee communications reporting Sachs'[s] neglect of children and staff which directly impact the health and welfare of children." Specifically, they contend neglect of children by a treating therapist in a state funded organization is a matter of public concern and child mistreatment by a licensed therapist impacts a large number of people in the San Diego community.
Here, we examine whether the employee statements were made in connection with a public issue or interest within the meaning of subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16. Courts have repeatedly rejected attempts to create a public interest issue under the anti-SLAPP statute merely because the moving party can identify an important public policy that relates to, or underlies, the subject matter of the particular statements or conduct at issue. (See Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1132-1136 (Weinberg); Commonwealth Energy Corp. v. Investor Data Exchange, Inc. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 26, 34 (Commonwealth); Consumer Justice Center v. Trimedica International, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 595, 601; Rivero v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 924 (Rivero).) Because the public interest element was intended to be a limitation on the applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute, the "assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest is not sufficient" to meet the requirements of the statute. (Weinberg, at p. 1132; Commonwealth, at p. 34.) Instead, in evaluating the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute, we must focus on "the specific nature of the speech rather than the generalities that might be abstracted from it." (Commonwealth, at p. 34.)
Here, in reviewing the specific nature of the speech, we conclude it did not concern a public issue or matter of public interest within the meaning of section 425.16. Although the mental health and treatment of children in a particular community can certainly be a matter of public interest, the employee communications at issue in this case were not about those broader concerns or designed to inform the public about an issue of public interest. Instead, the statements were merely complaints by employees about another employee and are essentially a workplace dispute that does not involve a matter of public concern. Defendants cannot turn the employee complaints into a public issue by asserting a broad public interest concerning the well being of children. The focus of the anti-SLAPP statute must be on the specific nature of the speech rather than generalities that can be drawn from it. (Commonwealth, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 34.) Likewise, the fact that Sachs was a state licensed therapist employed by a partially state funded organization providing mental health services to children in the community is insufficient to transform the matter into an issue of public interest. (See Rivero, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 924-925.) The dispute in this case is a private matter between the parties and does not involve a public concern.
To support their position, Defendants rely on M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 623, 629 (M.G.) and Terry v. Davis Community Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534 (Terry). Their reliance on these cases, however, is misplaced. In M.G., plaintiffs' claims arose from a Sports Illustrated story regarding incidents of child molestation in youth sports. (M.G., at p. 626.) In Terry, plaintiffs' claims arose from a report by a church group addressing allegations that they engaged in an inappropriate relationship with a minor. (Terry, at pp. 1541-1543.) The report recommended that the church update its sexual harassment policy, clarify appropriate boundaries for interpersonal conduct, and involve parents and youth in the selection of youth group leaders. (Id. at pp. 1542-1543.) In both of these cases, the statements were widely disseminated and used to address broad topics of public concern. Here, on the other hand, the employee emails did not focus on the broader or more general topics of the well being and mental health of children in the community. Rather, the emails were more narrowly focused on a situation at SDCC and their distribution was limited. On their own, the statements do not concern a matter of public interest and were not made in "furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest." (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
Having concluded that Defendants did not meet their initial burden of establishing that the complaint arises from protected activity, we need not consider whether Sachs met her burden of establishing a probability of success on the merits.
III. Attorney Fees on Appeal
Sachs seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), which provides in part: "If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion . . . ." We deny Sachs's request for attorney fees because the record does not support that Defendants' motion was frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to strike is affirmed. Sachs is awarded costs on
appeal.
MCINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.