Opinion
Civil No. 3:CV-03-200.
May 13, 2005
MEMORANDUM
I. Introduction
Stephen Saccoccia, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania ("USP Lewisburg"), commenced this action with a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Named as Respondents are the Warden of USP Lewisburg and the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
Petitioner claims he was denied due process in two disciplinary hearings, held on November 20, 2000 and June 10, 2001. Saccoccia "challenges disciplinary proceeding, No's 830939 and 888794, conducted by Donald Emory, hereafter ("DHO") on November 20, 2000 and June 10, 2001, charging him with running a business andtalking in code on the telephone while running a business resulting in a 27 day disallowance of good time." (Doc. 1 at 1.) (emphasis in original). He claims the DHO denied his due process rights as articulated in Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). For relief, Petitioner seeks expungement of the misconduct reports and restoration of his good conduct time. Respondent asserts that the hearings complied with due process requirements, and the petition should be denied. The matter has been briefed, and it is ripe for consideration. For the reasons that follow, the petition will be denied.
II. Discussion A. Fourteenth Amendment Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." The Supreme Court has mandated a two-part analysis of a procedural due process claim: first, "whether the asserted individual interests are encompassed within the . . . protection of `life, liberty or property(,)'" and second, "if protected interests are implicated, we then must decide what procedures constitute `due process of law.'" Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977); Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000). If there is no protected liberty or property interest, it is obviously unnecessary to analyze what procedures were followed when an alleged deprivation of an interest occurred. Liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise either from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Torres v. Fauver, 292 F. 3d 141, (3d Cir. 2002).
1. Existence of Protected Liberty Interest
It is well-settled that "prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found that there can be a liberty interest at stake in disciplinary proceedings in which an inmate loses good conduct time. Id. Since Saccoccia's sanctions included the loss of good conduct time, Petitioner has identified a liberty interest in this matter. Therefore, this Court must review the procedures afforded to Petitioner in the disciplinary hearings.
2. Procedural Due Process
In Wolff, the Supreme Court set forth minimum procedural due process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings: (1) the right to appear before an impartial decision-making body; (2) twenty-four hour advance written notice of the charges; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided the presentation of such does not threaten institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) assistance from an inmate representative, if the charged inmate is illiterate or if complex issues are involved; and (5) a written decision by the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and the rationale behind their disciplinary action. Id.
The Court noted that broad discretion is accorded to the prison officials, with limited judicial review of institutional due process to determine if their decision is arbitrary or capricious. Id. In Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 453-56 (1985), the Supreme Court added a procedural requirement, holding that there must be some evidence which supports the conclusion of the disciplinary tribunal. Id.
After Hill, the Third Circuit indicated that the standard to be applied in disciplinary proceedings was that contained in 28 C.F.R. § 541.17(f), which at the time was a "substantial evidence" test. Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 879 (3d Cir. 1987). Subsequently, the Bureau of Prisons amended its regulations to be more akin to the Hill holding by requiring only that the DHO's decision be "based upon at least some facts," with the decision to be "based on the greater weight of the evidence." 28 C.F.R. § 541.17(f) (1995).
The due process requirements of Wolff, as they relate to federal prisoners, have since been codified under the Code of Federal Regulations. Under Title 28, § 541, inmate discipline and special housing units, staff shall prepare an Incident Report when there is reasonable belief that a violation of Bureau regulations has been committed by an inmate and the staff considers informal resolution of the incident inappropriate or unsuccessful. 28 C.F.R. § 541.14.
The BOP regulations provide that each BOP institution shall have an independent hearing officer (DHO) assigned to conduct administrative fact-finding hearings covering alleged acts of misconduct and violations of prohibited acts. 28 C.F.R. § 541.16(a). Furthermore, the DHO shall conduct hearings, make findings, and impose appropriate sanctions for incidents of inmate misconduct. 28 C.F.R. § 541.16(c). Based on the record, the Court concludes that Saccocci was afforded the full requirements of due process in his disciplinary hearings.
B. Incident Report No. 830939
On November 8, 2000, Petitioner was issued disciplinary incident report # 830939 ("IR 830939") for allegedly conducting a business. The officer that issued the report ("issuing officer) testified that, while monitoring prisoner telephone calls, he heard Petitioner say "[w]here are we, 49? It might go up, maybe 40 points you sell two. Then I'll have a cushion." (Doc. 1, Ex. 1 at 2.) The other person on the phone said "I'll do that. 50 now, 14 jump up. You might get a 10 point rally. Do that give them one or two, what the hell." (Id.) As a result, the issuing officer concluded that Petitioner was involved in a stock exchange business, asking for advice, and buying and selling stocks. ( Id.) Petitioner received a copy of the incident report the day it was issued. ( Id. at 1.)
A review of the record reveals that Petitioner appeared at the hearing, he received written notice of the charges two days prior, the DHO heard all of the evidence presented by Petitioner (including Doc. 1, Ex. 2, the written statement of Duke Dumaine), Petitioner waived his right to an inmate representative, and he received a written decision setting forth the evidence relied upon and the rationale for the decision. (Doc. 1, Ex. 1). Thus, the Court concludes that Petitioner received the requisite due process requirements set forth in Wolff. C. Incident Report No. 888794
On May 31, 2001, Petitioner was issued disciplinary incident report # 888794 ("IR 888794") for allegedly using a telephone for abuses other than criminal activity (Doc. 1, Ex. 3). The officer that issued the report ("issuing officer) testified that, while monitoring prisoner telephone calls on May 29, 2001, he heard Petitioner speaking to Duke Dumaine, and Petitioner mentioned a "northern girl" and Duke told Petitioner that "she is about forty inches on the plus." (Doc. 1, Ex. 3 at 2.) Petitioner stated "forty seven on the plus at one point huh ok ah listen um I believe if its been confirmed or not but in any event lets go uh lets go neutral on one." ( Id.) As a result, the issuing officer concluded that Petitioner and Duke were talking in code.
A review of the record reveals that Petitioner again appeared at the hearing, he received written notice of the charges six days before the hearing, the DHO heard all of the evidence presented by Petitioner, Petitioner waived his right to an inmate representative, and he received a written decision setting forth the evidence relied upon and the rationale for the decision. ( Id. at 1-2.) Thus, the Court concludes that Petitioner again received the requisite due process requirements set forth in Wolff. D. Evidence Supporting Decisions
Since petitioner was afforded all of his procedural rights, the only remaining issue is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the decisions. See Hrbek v. Nix, 12 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 1993). After a review of the record, the Court concludes that there was more than ample evidence to support the DHO's decisions. The DHO relied upon testimony from the issuing officer, witness statements, and the Petitioner's statements. In the second hearing, Petitioner's statement included an admission that he was, in fact, talking in code. Additionally, the DHO listened to the audiotaped conversations leading to the issuance of charges. This evidence sufficently supports the outcome of the two hearings. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, THIS 13th DAY OF MAY, 2005, in accordance with the foregoing memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED.
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.