Sacco v. Eagle Finance Corp.

11 Citing cases

  1. Oppenheim v. I.C. System, Inc.

    695 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2010)   Cited 26 times
    Holding that thirty-five to forty telephone calls over a three month period regarding an outstanding debt did not constitute outrageous conduct

    Oppenheim has not cited any Florida cases in which a debt collector was found liable for intrusion based solely on telephone calls to a debtor's residence. Defendant relies on Sacco v. Eagle Finance Corp. of North Miami Beach, 234 So. 2d 406, 407-08 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). Sacco is distinguishable and therefore not instructive.

  2. Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc.

    867 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989)   Cited 229 times
    Holding that employer could not be held liable for sexual harassment and finding it of "special importance" that the "harassment ended after the remedial action"

    Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 11 (5th Cir. 1962). See Rawls v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 446 F.2d 313, 319 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038, 92 S.Ct. 712, 30 L.Ed. 2d 730 (1972); Sacco v. Eagle Finance Corp., 234 So.2d 406, 408 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1970). Bucknole did not physically invade privacy.

  3. Holmes v. Elks Club, Inc.

    389 F. Supp. 854 (M.D. Fla. 1975)   Cited 6 times
    In Holmes v. Elks Club, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 854 (M.D.Fla. 1975), the plaintiff charged the defendant with racial discrimination in violation of § 1983.

    However, the elements of the tort are ill-defined and the appellate opinions indicate conflict within the state court system on the division of function as between judge and jury. The diverse results reached in the following cases readily illustrate the problem: Mann v. Roosevelt Shop, Inc., Fla. 1949, 41 So.2d 894; Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, Fla. 1958, 100 So.2d 396; Korbin v. Berlin, Fla.App.3d 1965, 177 So.2d 551, cert. denied, 183 So.2d 835; and Sacco v. Eagle Finance Corp. of North Miami Beach, Fla.App.3d 1970, 234 So.2d 406. From the foregoing, it appears that the better course for this Court to take is to decline jurisdiction and allow the parties to litigate the pendent claim in the state court system and thereby obtain a more certain determination of the pertinent state law.

  4. Winegard v. Larsen

    260 N.W.2d 816 (Iowa 1978)   Cited 41 times
    Addressing the standards for each category of invasion of privacy claims under the Restatement except the category of appropriation finding it "plainly inapplicable"

    They reasoned that the injury from oral communications would ordinarily be so minor that courts might well disregard it. Although a few courts in older cases held or suggested privacy could not be invaded by mere spoken words, it is generally held today that the right of privacy can be violated by any means of communication. See, e.g., Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5 Cir. 1962); Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So.2d 321 (1961); Sacco v. Eagle Finance Corp., 234 So.2d 406 (Fla.App. 1970); Brown v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 110 Ga. App. 154, 138 S.E.2d 62 (1964); Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962); Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956); Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 386; Annot. 19 A.L.R.3d 1318; Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 Vand.L.Rev. 1093, 1103-1105 (1962); Prosser on Torts § 117 at 810 (Fourth Ed. 1971). Circumstances have changed since publication of the Warren-Brandeis article.

  5. Dominguez v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States

    438 So. 2d 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 44 times
    Relying explicitly on comments e and f to § 46 to conclude that the plaintiff's IIED claim met the outrageousness standard

    We are of the opinion that the majority view is the correct one and conclude that we are not only free to adopt it, but are bound to do so by our own precedent. We recognize that in Gellert v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 370 So.2d 802 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 381 So.2d 766 (Fla. 1980), and Sacco v. Eagle Finance Corp. of North Miami Beach, 234 So.2d 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970), this court stated that a cause of action for emotional distress based on outrageous conduct will lie only where it is coupled with other recognized tortious conduct. It appears, however, that in Sacco, we completely overlooked our earlier contrary precedent of Korbin v. Berlin, 177 So.2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), cert. dismissed, 183 So.2d 835 (Fla. 1966), and in Gellert, although paying lip service to Korbin, we incorrectly categorized Korbin as being a case where the outrageous conduct was coupled with an independent tort.

  6. Crowell v. Florida Power Corporation

    438 So. 2d 958 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 8 times
    Finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether utility company's agents violated the boundaries of an implied consent by "radically" and "improperly" trimming two of the plaintiffs' trees situated near the utility company's power lines, which resulted in one of the trees falling onto the plaintiffs' house

    Furthermore, upon reviewing the pleadings and depositions in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we hold that, assuming arguendo FPC had implied consent to act, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether FPC's agents violated the boundaries of that consent by trimming the Crowells' trees in the manner alleged. See Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1966); Cf. Sacco v. Eagle Finance Corporation of North Miami Beach, 234 So.2d 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (the trial court erred in directing verdict where evidence revealed the existence of a jury question as to whether the "boundaries of consent were overreached by any unreasonable conduct of [defendant's] agent"). Although consent or license is generally a defense to an action in trespass, Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938), consent or license implied from custom, usage, or conduct is "necessarily limited, however, to those acts that are within a fair and reasonable interpretation of the terms of the grant."

  7. Quest v. Barnett Bank of Pensacola

    397 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 25 times   2 Legal Analyses

    Second, permission to come upon one's premises may be implied from custom, usage, or conduct; but such implied consent is limited to those acts that are within a fair and reasonable interpretation of the terms of the grant. Sacco v. Eagle Finance Corp. of North Miami Beach, 234 So.2d 406 (Fla.3d DCA 1970); Boston Manufacturer's Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fornalski, 234 So.2d 386 (Fla.4th DCA 1970). Cf. Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1976).

  8. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sheehan

    373 So. 2d 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that evidence of the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct taken together with the plaintiff's testimony concerning his emotional state was sufficient to submit an intentional infliction case to a jury

    See Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d at 211. The author of the annotation places Florida with the minority, as do two cases from the Third District: Sacco v. Eagle Finance Corp. of Miami Beach, 234 So.2d 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) and Gellert v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 370 So.2d 802 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). However, another Third District case, Korbin v. Berlin, 177 So.2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), allowed an action to proceed on behalf of a six-year-old child for severe emotional distress against a defendant who allegedly accused the child's mother of adultery.

  9. Gellert v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.

    370 So. 2d 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that recovery for mental distress due to breach of contract is not allowed, unless it amounts to an independent and willful tort

    Such has been the uniform holding, and this rule appears to be one that is founded on sound policy. Kirksey v. Jernigan, supra, 45 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1950); Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc., 100 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1958); La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1964); Korbin v. Berlin, 177 So.2d 551 (Fla.3d DCA 1965); Sacco v. Eagle Finance Corporation of North Miami Beach, 234 So.2d 406 (Fla.3d DCA 1970); Henry Morrison Flagler Museum v. Lee, supra, 268 So.2d 434 (Fla.4th DCA 1972); Knowles Animal Hospital, Inc. v. Wills, 360 So.2d 37 (Fla.3d DCA 1978). In Kirksey v. Jernigan, supra, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of a complaint for damages for mental pain and anguish suffered by the plaintiff as a result of conduct of the defendant which the Court regarded as a separate actionable wrong.

  10. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rehurek

    317 So. 2d 857 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 1 times

    We have carefully reviewed the voluminous record on appeal and find that all issues were properly submitted to the jury on conflicting facts and under correct instructions from the court on the law. Sacco v. Eagle Finance Corp. of North Miami Beach, Fla.App.3d 1970, 234 So.2d 406; Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Company, 5th Cir., 1962, 306 F.2d 9. For a factually similar case brought under the tort of libel, see Vinson v. Ford Motor Credit Company, Fla.App.1st 1972, 259 So.2d 768.