Opinion
2013-02920, Index No. 29281/03.
01-14-2015
Ricardo SACARELLO, plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., defendants; Thomas Wilson, nonparty-appellant; Manuel A. Romero, nonparty-respondent.
Paul D. Creinis, LLC, Brooklyn, N.Y., for nonparty-appellant. Manuel A. Romero P.C. (Manuel A. Romero pro se of counsel, and Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & De Cicco, LLP, New York, N.Y. [Brian J. Isaac ], of counsel), for nonparty-respondent.
Paul D. Creinis, LLC, Brooklyn, N.Y., for nonparty-appellant.
Manuel A. Romero P.C. (Manuel A. Romero pro se of counsel, and Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & De Cicco, LLP, New York, N.Y. [Brian J. Isaac ], of counsel), for nonparty-respondent.
Opinion In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, nonparty Thomas Wilson, the plaintiff's former attorney, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Spodek, J.), dated December 10, 2012, which granted, without a hearing, the motion of the plaintiff's attorney, nonparty Manuel A. Romero, to quash a charging lien pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In June 2003, the plaintiff retained attorney Thomas Wilson to commence the instant action to recover damages for personal injuries. In May 2004, the plaintiff discharged Wilson and retained Manuel A. Romero to represent him in the personal injury action. In January 2011, Romero negotiated a settlement on the plaintiff's behalf. In June 2011, Romero moved to quash Wilson's charging lien pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475, arguing that Wilson had been discharged for cause. The Supreme Court granted the motion without a hearing, and Wilson appeals.
A client has “an absolute right, at any time, with or without cause, to terminate the attorney-client relationship by discharging the attorney” (Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 43, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239, 555 N.E.2d 611 ; see Schultz v. Hughes, 109 A.D.3d 895, 896, 971 N.Y.S.2d 536 ; Doviak v. Finkelstein & Partners, LLP, 90 A.D.3d 696, 698, 934 N.Y.S.2d 467 ; Coccia v. Liotti, 70 A.D.3d 747, 757, 896 N.Y.S.2d 90 ). “Where an attorney's representation terminates upon mutual consent, and there has been no misconduct, no discharge for just cause, and no unjustified abandonment by the attorney, the attorney maintains his or her right to enforce the statutory lien” (Lansky v. Easow, 304 A.D.2d 533, 534, 756 N.Y.S.2d 885 ; see Judiciary Law § 475 ; Klein v. Eubank, 87 N.Y.2d 459, 462, 640 N.Y.S.2d 443, 663 N.E.2d 599 ). In contrast, “[a]n attorney who is discharged for cause ... is not entitled to compensation or a lien” (Callaghan v. Callaghan, 48 A.D.3d 500, 501, 852 N.Y.S.2d 273 ; see Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d at 44, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239, 555 N.E.2d 611 ; Schultz v. Hughes, 109 A.D.3d at 897, 971 N.Y.S.2d 536 ; Coccia v. Liotti, 70 A.D.3d at 757, 896 N.Y.S.2d 90 ). “Where there are conflicting claims as to whether an outgoing attorney was discharged with or without cause, a hearing is necessary to resolve such dispute” (Byrne v. Leblond, 25 A.D.3d 640, 642, 811 N.Y.S.2d 681 ; see Teichner v. W & J Holsteins, 64 N.Y.2d 977, 979, 489 N.Y.S.2d 36, 478 N.E.2d 177 ; Schultz v. Hughes, 109 A.D.3d at 897, 971 N.Y.S.2d 536 ; cf. Braider v. 194 Riverside Owners Corp., 237 A.D.2d 147, 654 N.Y.S.2d 755 ; Hawkins v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 138 A.D.2d 572, 526 N.Y.S.2d 153 ).
On his motion to quash Wilson's charging lien, Romero submitted evidence in support of his contention that the plaintiff had discharged Wilson for cause. In opposition, Wilson failed to dispute or address Romero's factual assertions and, thus, there were no “conflicting claims” as to whether the discharge was for cause (Byrne v. Leblond, 25 A.D.3d at 642, 811 N.Y.S.2d 681 ). Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted, without a hearing, Romero's motion to quash the charging lien pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475 (see Hawkins v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 138 A.D.2d at 572, 526 N.Y.S.2d 153 ).
LEVENTHAL, J.P., CHAMBERS, HALL and DUFFY, JJ., concur.