Opinion
No. 1:99-cv-287
December 15, 1999
OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case involves allegations that John Sabin, Jr. ("John Jr."), then a seven year-old emotionally impaired special education student at the Greenville Public Schools' Baldwin Heights Elementary School, was improperly and punitively confined in a time-out "box" within a classroom on May 1, 1997. In the First Amended Complaint, John Sabin, Sr. ("John Sr." or "plaintiff") acting on behalf of himself and as next friend of John Jr., asserts causes of action nominally under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, in addition to state law claims of gross negligence, assault and battery, false arrest and imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of Michigan's Handicappers' Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. §§ 37.1101 et seq. Plaintiff seeks, as relief, "special damages" in the form of medical expenses, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
The Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act, has, since the incident in question in this case, been renamed the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act.
The case is currently before the court on a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment filed by the defendants (docket no. 6). Plaintiff has opposed the motion. For the reasons to follow, the court grants the motion and dismisses this action without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies available under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA," formerly the Education of the Handicapped Act, or "EHA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
Although the motion was filed by all defendants with the exception of John Meyer, Meyer subsequently indicated his intention of joining in the motion (docket no. 13).
FACTS
John Jr. suffers from a disabling emotional impairment. According to plaintiff, the severity of John Jr.'s impairment is best summarized in a psychiatric consultation report compiled by Dr. V.J. DeSai, who examined the boy on behalf of the Montcalm Intermediate School District (ISD) on February 27, 1997. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) Dr. DeSai diagnosed John Jr. as suffering from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Depressive Disorder with associated obsessive compulsive features, and mixed developmental delays including speech and language disabilities, developmental motor coordination delays, and mental retardation. According to Dr. DeSai's report, a Teacher's Rating Scale stated that John Jr.'s behavior was "extremely inappropriate in most occasions," including frequent arguing, failure to comply, failure to complete tasks, defiance, inability to concentrate, humming and making odd noises, inability to sit still, disruptiveness, destruction of property, screaming, swearing, and "explosive and unpredictable behaviors." A rating scale completed by John Sr. also indicated that his son had problems with attention/concentration; inability to sit still; clinging to adults; cruelty to animals; destruction of property; and disobedience. John Sr. also reported that his son was "accident prone" as well as "impulsive, lies, cheats, is nervous, talks out of turn, screams a lot, has a difficult time sleeping, is unusually loud, whines, worries a lot, speech problems along with stealing." Because of his impairments and behavior, John Jr. receives special education services from the ISD and Greenville Public Schools through a series of Individualized Educational Plans (IEPs).
Plaintiff's responsive brief incorrectly lists this date as February 27, 1998.
An October 7, 1996 IEP governed John's education during most of the 1996-97 school year. The IEP specifically provided, among other things, that John Jr. would be subject to a "behavior plan." John Sr. approved the IEP by signing it on October 7, 1996. In signing the IEP, John Sr. checked a blank indicating as follows:
I have been informed of my procedural safeguards concerning the IEP process, program and services and I agree with the proposed determination[.]
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). The IEP provided that John Jr. would be placed in a program for emotionally impaired students, taught by Ms. Robin Bremby at the Baldwin Heights school, part of the Greenville Public Schools.
The relevant behavior plan had been developed in September, 1996. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) The plan established procedures to address John Jr.'s "challenging behaviors in the classroom" and listed "strategies" for dealing with such behaviors, including (1) instructing John Jr. to go to designated "cool down" areas, including an "in-class time out behind partition screen," or, in cases of severe escalation, (2) escorting the boy to a "private quiet room" until he became calm enough to return to his class. John Sr. states that although he "never signed" the "necessary documents" to implement the behavior plan, he admittedly "never challenged the behavior plan until the time of the incident" in question in this case. Plaintiff's Response at 2.
The incident in question occurred on or about May 1, 1997. According to John Sr., at the conclusion of school on that day he went to pick up his son. John Sr. further alleges that upon entering the classroom, he noticed that the room appeared to be empty but for the presence of a teacher's aide, defendant Christy Russell. According to John Sr., Russell was positioned near the middle of the room seated in a chair leaning against a closed door which opened outward to a windowless box approximately one yard square and six feet high. The following allegations also comprise John Sr.'s allegations regarding what he encountered upon entering the classroom on that day. John Sr. confirmed that his son, John Jr., was the occupant of the box. He was naked and covered with his own feces and urine. John Sr. took steps to dress his son, whose clothes lay outside the box. He then took the boy home.
The "on or about May 1, 1997" date is alleged in paragraph 18 of the First Amended Complaint. However, in his response to the present motion plaintiff gives the date as April 23, 1997. Plaintiff's Response at 3.
Christy Russell is a teacher's aide who was assigned to Ms. Bremby's class. According to Russell, during the 1996-97 school year, the emotionally impaired students in the class were provided "time-out" detentions in a classroom area isolated by office dividers. The "time-outs" were provided to allow students to calm themselves and regain self-control. However, Russell states that this particular time-out area caused student management problems because many students would not remain within the area, and needed to be physically restrained. In addition, students in the midst of a violent episode would often try to knock down or destroy the dividers. In March or early April, 1997, John Jr. managed to destroy this existing time-out area during such an episode.
Russell's affidavit is attached both as Exhibit 8 to defendants' motion and as Exhibit 5 to plaintiff's motion.
According to Russell, after John Jr. destroyed the existing time-out area, another time-out "room" was built within the classroom. The room, which was approximately 6 feet by 6 feet by 8 feet, was open at the top, well-lit (situated under a ceiling light), and outfitted with a bean bag chair. The walls of the room were fixed, and the room had a door with a large window. Although the door could not be locked, it had a spring-loaded latch which could be held shut to contain a student having a violent or otherwise uncontrollable episode. This was the time-out room or "box" in use on the day in question.
Russell indicated that the day of the incident began as a "typical day" for John Jr. Throughout the morning he had a number of episodes of being oppositional, defiant, and violent. As the day progressed, his violent episodes escalated; at one point he struck another student in the head with a game board, and tried to stab another student with a pencil. Because her efforts to calm John Jr. were unsuccessful, Russell decided to place the boy in the time-out room. At the time she did so, he was violent, yelling profanities, and had no self-control.
Immediately after being placed in the time-out room, John Jr. removed his clothes and urinated on the walls and floor. His behavior was such that Russell felt she needed to hold the door closed to keep him in the time-out room, to ensure his own personal safety as well as that of other students and staff. During this time, John Jr. wrapped his shoe laces tightly around his neck. Out of concern that he might injure himself with his own clothing, Russell then removed the clothing from the time-out room. Apart from this, Russell allowed John Jr.'s episode to "run its course" without further physical intervention.
While Russell was still holding the door of the time-out room, John Sr. walked into the classroom. After Russell opened the door of the time-out room, John Sr. saw that it was occupied by his son, who was naked and highly distressed. John Sr. dressed his son and took him home.
According to Russell, the other students were not removed from the classroom until John Sr. arrived. Russell Affidavit, ¶ 23. However, according to John Sr., no other students were in the room when he entered. Sabin Affidavit, ¶ 12.
Although John Sr. filed a complaint with the Greenville Police Department and a report with Child Protective Services describing what had happened, both entities informed him that they would not interfere in this type of situation. Subsequently, during May, 1997, John Sr. and his mother Lori Sabin (John Jr.'s grandmother) met with defendant John Meyer, the school's principal, and defendant Linda Van Houten, the district's supervisor of special education. At the meeting, John Sr. and his mother complained about the use of the time-out box and requested that it no longer be used as a time-out area for John Jr. Although Meyer and Van Houten indicated that they felt that use of the box was an appropriate means of controlling emotionally impaired children, they agreed that John Jr. would no longer be placed in it. Having obtained a concession that his son would no longer be placed in the box, John Sr. did not make a written complaint or appeal regarding the incident. However, he contends that during the meeting neither Meyer nor Van Houten informed him of his right to do so, nor did they inform him that they were "legally obligated" to assist him should he wish to pursue further action. John Sr. also contends that although he subsequently filed a complaint with the State Board of Education via e-mail, he was later contacted by Meyer, who told him that any complaints should be made directly to him and that he should not involve the state authorities. Plaintiff filed this action on April 15, 1999.
The box was eventually removed from the classroom.
STANDARD
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must construe all well-pleaded factual allegations favorably to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitled him to relief. Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.
Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the non-existence of any genuine issue of material fact and may satisfy this burden by showing — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). While inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, when the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The substantive law identifies which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Here, both sides have presented materials outside the pleadings which the court has not excluded. Therefore, the court is required to treat the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.
ANALYSIS
In support of their motion, the defendants argue that despite the manner in which plaintiff has pleaded his claims, he seeks only to enforce the rights protected by the IDEA. Moreover, the defendants argue, because the IDEA requires plaintiff to first exhaust his administrative remedies, which plaintiff has not done, the court should grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
Defendants argue that plaintiff's complaint is predicated solely upon an alleged failure to properly administer classroom discipline to John Jr., thereby violating his IEP.
Though ostensibly a funding statute, the IDEA, by conditioning federal financial assistance upon a State's compliance with the substantive and procedural goals of the statute, "confers upon disabled students an enforceable substantive right to public education in participating States[.]" Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310 (1988). The IDEA defines a "free appropriate public education" as special education and related services that
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge,
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.20 U.S.C. § 1401(18).
"Special education" is defined by the IDEA as specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability, including
(A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; and
(B) instruction in physical education.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(16). The term "related services" is defined as transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, and medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in children. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17).
The individualized education program, or "IEP," is the "modus operandi" of the IDEA. School Committee of the Town of Burlington, Massachusetts v. Department of Educ. of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 2002, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). The IEP is, in brief, a comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a [disabled] child and the specially designed instruction and related services to be employed to meet those needs. § 1401(19). The IEP is to be developed jointly by a school official qualified in special education, the child's teacher, the parents or guardian, and, where appropriate, the child. In several places, the Act emphasizes the participation of the parents in developing the child's educational program and assessing its effectiveness. Id. Under the IDEA, the State of Michigan is required to provide procedures "to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of free appropriate public education[.]" 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). The IDEA also specifies when a "party aggrieved" by a decision made by a State educational agency may file a civil action with respect to a complaint. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(2). Curiously, plaintiff denies that the first amended complaint asserts a claim under the IDEA. However, this cannot possibly be true. The initial factual allegation of the first amended complaint itself invokes the "modus operandi" of the IDEA, the IEP. Plaintiff has alleged that John Jr's IEP "allows teachers to discipline by placing him in a time-out room, such as a kitchen." First Amended Complaint, ¶ 17. Plaintiff also alleges that one or more of the defendants "condoned and approved of the use of the punitive confinement box for discipline grossly and wantonly exceeding the scope set by [the] IEP[.]" Id., ¶ 42. Given these clear allegations, the claims being made in this action clearly fall under the provisions of the IDEA.
This mandate is fulfilled by the Michigan Mandatory Special Education Act, M.C.L. §§ 380.1701 et seq, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Mich. Admin. R. 340.1701 et seq.
Paragraph 14 of the first amended complaint specifically alleges that John Jr. "was given an Individual Educational Planning Committee report ("IEP"), which outlined goals and objectives for [his] schooling, as he suffers a disabling emotional impairment."
Plaintiff also argues, however, that even assuming that his claims involve the IDEA, he is not required to exhaust administrative remedies because the relief sought in this action — purely monetary relief — is not available under the statute. This too, however, may not be accurate.
As a Seventh Circuit panel has observed, the IDEA "speaks of `available relief,' and what relief is `available' does not necessarily depend on what the aggrieved party wants." Charlie F. v. Board of Educ. of Skokie School Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). "The nature of the claim and the governing law determine the relief no matter what the plaintiff demand[,]" and "[i]f this principal is equally applicable for purposes of § 1415(f), then the theory behind the grievance may activate the IDEA's process, even if the plaintiff wants a form of relief that the IDEA does not supply." Id. at 991-92.
In Charlie F., a disabled student sued a school district and other individual district personnel, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and state tort law, alleging that plaintiff had been mistreated in his fourth grade classroom. Concluding that the IDEA could be construed to provide for services (such as psychological services) which could help the plaintiff overcome his adverse reaction to these events, the panel held that the complaint was subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust the IDEA's administrative remedies. 98 F.3d at 993. In holding that the plaintiff must first request relief under the IDEA, the panel stated as follows:
Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the fourth grade teacher had encouraged her class to participate in "gripe sessions" during which they complained about the plaintiff's behavior. 98 F.2d at 990.
Both the genesis and the manifestations of [plaintiff's] problem are educational; the IDEA offers comprehensive educational solutions; we conclude, therefore, that at least in principle relief is available under the IDEA.98 F.3d at 993.
A wealth of other cases have supported the application of the administrative exhaustion requirement to IDEA-related claims. See, e.g., Garro v. State of Connecticut, 23 F.3d 734, 737 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that IDEA claim should have been dismissed for lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies); Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying EHA, concluding that plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies under the statute before seeking judicial relief requiring school system to pay for student's tuition at a private residential facility); Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d 933, 935-37 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying EHA, concluding that action was subject to dismissal because plaintiffs had failed to avail themselves of state procedures for resolving dispute about disabled child's educational program). This is so even where the plaintiff fails to expressly invoke the IDEA but instead invokes other law, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Hayes v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 377, 877 F.2d 809, 814 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying EHA, concluding that plaintiffs were required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit based on children's placement in a three-by-five foot "time-out" room); Franklin v. Frid, 7 Supp.2d 920, 927 (W.D.Mich. 1998) (dismissing plaintiffs' § 1983 claim without prejudice to allow them to pursue administrative remedies under IDEA); Torrie v. Cwayna, 841 F. Supp. 1434, 1441-1444 (W.D.Mich. 1994) (applying IDEA and requiring exhaustion, where plaintiff asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Rehabilitation Act, and state tort law); Waterman v. Marquette-Alger Intermediate Sch. Dist., 739 F. Supp. 361, 369-70 (W.D.Mich. 1990) (remanding case under EHA for creation of a "substantive decision" through the administrative process).
The defendants argue that plaintiff has not invoked the relevant administrative remedies. As noted above, plaintiff disputes that he was required to do so on behalf of himself or his son. However, plaintiff argues, alternatively, assuming that he was required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, he did so by requesting an "informal hearing" during which Meyer and Van Houten granted the relief sought, namely, an agreement to discontinue the use of the "time-out" box for John Jr. Plaintiff assesses that because he "prevailed" at this level of the process, no further procedures were necessary. However, by conceding that this was all the relief sought administratively, plaintiff assures the dismissal of this action for lack of exhaustion. As the court observed in Charlie F., parents cannot assume, without asking the educational authorities, that they will not be afforded the services which will enable their child to overcome the results of the events in question and continue to pursue his free public education. 98 F.3d at 993.
In addition, John Sr.'s affidavit, which merely cursorily states that he "filed a complaint with the State Board of Education via e-mail, within a few days of the meeting," does nothing to dispel his suggestion that no further relief was sought. Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 (Affidavit of John Sabin Sr.), ¶ 22. It is noted that this statement is also contradicted by a statement which he makes two paragraphs earlier in his affidavit, where he states that "[a]s John, Jr. was no longer placed in the box, I did not pursue a written complaint or appeal." Id., ¶ 20.
The court notes that the first amended complaint alleges that the defendants' actions caused John Jr. damages and injuries including extreme mental anguish and distress, fear, anxiety and depression, and "special damages," including medical expenses. Since the alleged injuries are psychological in nature, presumably the medical expenses sought are for psychological services. The regulations implementing the IDEA provide that the psychological services available under the statute include counseling for children and parents. Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 993; see 34 C.F.R. § 300.24(b)(9)(v) and § 300.306(b).
The court also believes that plaintiff, by implication, wrongly assesses that the relief which he could obtain by virtue of alleging constitutional violations exceeds that which may be available under the IDEA. As one court has observed, under the IDEA, "the simple failure to provide a child with a free appropriate public education constitutes a violation of the statute. . . . By contrast, plaintiffs must meet a higher standard of liability to prevail on a constitutional claim." Sellers v. School Bd. Of the City of Manassas, Virginia, 141 F.3d 524, 530 (4th Cir. 1998). In the first amended complaint, plaintiff alleges constitutional violations in the form of (1) an "illegal seizure" of John Jr. in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) a "taking" of John Jr.'s liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 31(a) and (b); see also ¶¶ 41, 48, 53. However, the Fourth Amendment does not apply in this situation. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), the Court held that although corporal punishment as a form of discipline in public schools implicated a constitutionally protected liberty interest, "traditional common-law remedies are fully adequate to afford due process." Id. at 672. In so holding, the Court discussed a "relevant analogy in the criminal law":
In asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff would also face the hurdle of qualified immunity. See generally W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 499-500 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1990)).
Although the Fourth Amendment specifically proscribes `seizure' of a person without probable cause, the risk that police will act unreasonably in arresting a suspect is not thought to require an advance determination of the facts. In United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), we reaffirmed the traditional common-law rule that police officers may make warrantless public arrests on probable cause.
Although we observed that an advance determination of probable cause by a magistrate would be desirable, we declined `to transform this judicial preference into a constitutional rule when the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause. . . .' Id. at 423; see id., at 429 (Powell, J., concurring). Despite the distinct possibility that a police officer may improperly assess the facts and thus unconstitutionally deprive an individual of liberty, we declined to depart from the traditional rule by which the officer's perception is subjected to judicial scrutiny only after the fact. [footnote omitted]
There is no more reason to depart from tradition and require advance procedural safeguards for intrusions on personal security to which the Fourth Amendment does not apply. 430 U.S. at 679-80 (emphasis supplied). In addition, regarding plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Court has recognized that [T]here are recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon. Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be immediately removed from school. In such cases, the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable[.] Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1975). Here, the behavior plan proposed by the district contained guidelines, disciplinary in nature, regarding when the time-out room would be used, and the IEP process provided for a hearing if requested by plaintiff. And, plaintiff's own pleadings allege that the use of the time-out room by defendants is disciplinary in nature. First Amended Complaint, ¶ 17.
To the extent that plaintiff disputes that use of the time-out room was related to school discipline, as the Court observed in Ingraham, plaintiff could pursue State common-law remedies to obtain appropriate relief. 430 U.S. at 672. Cf. Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158-59 (6th Cir. 1987) (where the record showed that blows inflicted on student arose from anger or malice rather than discipline, summary judgment on plaintiff's claim under Fourteenth Amendment was inappropriate). See Rasmus v. State of Arizona, 939 F. Supp. 709, 717-18 (D.Ariz. 1996) (holding that placement of emotionally-impaired student in windowless "time-out" room was not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment; "Graham precludes Plaintiff's substantive due process claim because the Fourth Amendment places explicit limitations on the type of government conduct challenged").
Plaintiff also alleges, in his response, that the treatment of John Jr. constituted "medieval-like punishment." Plaintiff's Brief in Response at 6. However, in Ingraham v. Wright, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the paddling of children as a means of maintaining discipline in public schools. 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). The court does not doubt that the Eighth Amendment likewise does not apply to the circumstances alleged in this case.
Finally, the court notes that the defendants have asserted an additional argument in defense of teacher Robin Bremby. Specifically, they argue that Bremby is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims because she was on maternity leave at all relevant times — including the time of the incident — and therefore had no responsibility for or involvement in the challenged discipline on the occasion in question. This contention is substantiated by her affidavit. See Defendants' Exhibit 6, Affidavit of Robin Bremby, ¶ 18 (in which Bremby states that "I have never placed John Sabin, Jr. in the time-out room inaccurately described [in plaintiff's complaint], nor have I ever directed anyone else to do so"). For reasons unknown to the court, plaintiff chooses not to discontinue implicating Bremby in the incident. However, because the court must dismiss this action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies available under the IDEA, the court has no occasion to consider the merits of this argument.
CONCLUSION
The court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and dismisses plaintiff's federal claims without prejudice for lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies available under the IDEA.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where all claims over which the court had original jurisdiction are dismissed. This action is still in its early stages, and therefore the court concludes that dismissal of the non-federal claims is appropriate. In conclusion, the court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction here, and also dismisses plaintiff's state law claims without prejudice.