Such is the view of a substantial majority of jurisdictions in the United States, and to this view Pennsylvania has long adhered. See: Fields v.Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 273 Pa. 282, 117 A. 59 (1922); Fisher v. Hill, 368 Pa. 53, 81 A.2d 860 (1951); Saber v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 181 Pa. Super. 167, 124 A.2d 620 (1956). As pointed out in Sanchez v. City of Philadelphia, supra, 302 Pa. Super. 184, 448 A.2d 588, 589, footnote 1:
The defendants did not, however, face a risk of incurring double or inconsistent obligations by reason of Ellwood's subrogation rights, since under Pennsylvania law an injured party and his subrogee may bring only one action against a wrongdoer for damages arising out of an alleged tort, and a judgment on the merits would constitute a bar to any subsequent action against defendant by either. Fields v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 273 Pa. 282, 117 A. 59 (167, 124 A.2d 620 (1956). Further, the defendants cannot, under Pennsylvania law, have any hope of recovering some or all of any judgment awarded against them from Ellwood in indemnification, since Ellwood's liability is statutorily limited to the schedule of workers compensation awards.
And these were the facts held to be controlling. Levitt v. Simco Sales Service of Pa., 1957, Del.Super.Ct., 11 Terry 552, 135 A.2d 910; Mims v. Reid, 1957, Fla., 98 So.2d 498; Sibson v. Robert's Express, Inc., 1962, 104 N.H. 192, 182 A.2d 449; Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Arlt, 1953, N.D., 61 N.W.2d 429; Aubill v. Rowles, 1961, Ohio Com.Pl., 180 N.E.2d 643, 87 Ohio Law Abst. 353; Saber v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 1956, 181 Pa. Super. 167, 124 A.2d 620; Sprague v. Adams, 1926, 139 Wn. 510, 247 P. 960, 47 A.L.R. 529; cf. Kidd v. Hillman, 1936, 14 Cal.App.2d 507, 58 P.2d 662; Coniglio v. Wyoming Valley Fire Ins. Co., 1953, 337 Mich. 38, 59 N.W.2d 74; Hayward v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 1942, 212 Minn. 500, 4 N.W.2d 316, 140 A.L.R. 1236; Rush v. City of Maple Heights, 1958, 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599; Shaw v. Chell, 1964, 176 Ohio St. 375, 199 N.E.2d 869. Rosenthal v. Scott, 1961, Fla., 150 So.2d 433, 1963, 150 So.2d 436; Travelers Indem. Co. v. Moore, 1947, 304 Ky. 456, 201 S.W.2d 7; Underwriters at Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg Traction Co., 1913, 106 Miss. 244, 63 So. 455; General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Young, 1948, 357 Mo. 1099, 212 S.W.2d 396; Teper v. Rackman, 1942, 264 App. Div. 981, 37 N.Y.S.2d 203; Underwood v. Dooley, 1929, 197 N.C. 100, 147 S.E. 686; Hoosier Gas Co. v. Davis, 1961, 172 Ohio St. 5, 173 N.E.2d 349; Vasu v. Kohlers, 1945, 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707, 166 A.L.R. 855; LeBlond Schacht Truck Co. v. Farm Bur
Furthermore, while a settlement and discontinuance by the insured of an action for personal injury does not preclude a suit by the subrogee for property damage, Smith v. Yellow Cab Co., 288 Pa. 85, 135 A. 858 (1927), it is another matter when the subrogee is confronted by a judgment which has been satisfied rather than a settlement and discontinuance. See Saber v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 181 Pa.Super. 167, 124 A.2d 620 (1956); Moltz, to Use of Royal Indemnity Co. v. Sherwood Bros., 116 Pa.Super. 231, 176 A. 842 (1935). In Moltz, the insured was injured in a motor vehicle collision.
These cases stand for the proposition that only one cause of action arises when an individual simultaneously suffers injury to his person and his property, caused by a single tortious act. Spinelli v. Maxwell, 430 Pa. 53 (478, 243 A. 2d 425) (1968); Fisher v. Hill, 368 Pa. 53 (81 A. 2d 860) (1951); Fields v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 273 Pa. 282 (117 A. 59) (1922); Saber v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 181 Pa.Super, 167 (124 A. 2d 620) (1956). All of these cases are significantly distinguishable from this case because none of them involved, as does this case, the occurrence of a single act which caused injury to more than one person.
Such is the view of a substantial majority of jurisdictions in the United States and to this view Pennsylvania has long adhered. See Fields v. Philadelphia Transit Co., 273 Pa. 282, 117 A. 59 (1922); Fisher v. Hill, 368 Pa. 53, 81 A.2d 860 (1951); Saber v. Supplee Wills-Jones Milk Co., 181 Pa. Super. 167, 124 A.2d 620 (1956).Id., 430 Pa. at 480-481, 243 A.2d at 427.
Such is the view of a substantial majority of jurisdictions in the United States, and to this view Pennsylvania has long adhered. See: Fields v. P.R.T. Co., 273 Pa. 282, 117 A. 59 (1922); Fisher v. Hill, 368 Pa. 53, 81 A.2d 860 (1951); Saber v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 181 Pa. Super. 167, 124 A.2d 620 (1956). See: 62 A.L.R. 2d pp. 982-989, inc. As to the minority jurisdictions, see: 62 A.L.R. 2d pp. 1001-1008, inc.
The only contention advanced by Bell is that its single act of negligence causing damage to Lawrence's property gave rise to but one cause of action, and that recovery of judgment by Lawrence for a portion of the claim barred the later action by Allstate to recover the balance of the claim. In support of this argument Bell cites Moultroup v. Gorham, 113 Vt. 317, 34 A.2d 96; Dearden v. Hey, 304 Mass. 659, 24 N.E.2d 644, 127 A.L.R. 1077; Saber v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 181 Pa. Super. 167, 124 A.2d 620. Whatever may be the rule elsewhere, we are controlled by the decision in United States v. Aetna Casualty Surety Company, 338 U.S. 366, 382, 70 S.Ct. 207, 94 L.Ed. 171.
"* * * when the defendant, chargeable with notice of plaintiff's rights * * *, made a settlement with the [insured] to which the insurer was not a party, [he] must be regarded as having made such settlement subject to and with a reservation of the rights possessed by plaintiff, and with the implication of a consent that the rights of the two parties should become separated even though originally part of an indivisible cause of action." See also Potomac Ins. Co. v. MacNaughton, footnote 4; Saber v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 181 Pa. Super. 167, 124 A.2d 620. We must agree, although in fastening ultimate responsibility on the tort-feasor we are mindful that Bahn was also aware that Farm Mutual occupied the position of subrogee and had a right of action against Shalev not under Bahn's control. Notwithstanding this, we think an insurer who has had to pay the insured damages should be reimbursed by the party whose negligence caused such damages.
ΒΆ 6 Further, while our caselaw does not speak directly to the issue before us, the caselaw is clear that a subrogated insurer is prohibited from pursuing its lien after its insured obtains a judgment against the tortfeasor for damages unreimbursed by the insurer when both the subrogation claim and the unreimbursed damages action arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. See e.g., Spinelli v. Maxwell, 430 Pa. 478, 243 A.2d 425, 428 (1968); Saber v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 181 Pa.Super. 167, 124 A.2d 620, 622 (1956); Erie Ins. Exchange v. Gouse, 180 Pa.Super. 488, 119 A.2d 672 (1956); Moltz v. Sherwood Bros., Inc., 116 Pa.Super. 231, 176 A. 842 (1935). State Farm does not allege there is a principled distinction between prohibiting a subrogated insurer from pursuing a claim subsequent to its insured obtaining a judgment and prohibiting a subrogated insurer from pursuing a claim independent of an insured's pending action when the insurer has notice of the pending action.