Opinion
May 21, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Emily Goodman, J.).
Having properly found that plaintiffs had a valid service easement, the motion court should have directed that defendant provide plaintiffs with a key to the front gate leading to that easement. The locking of the front gate by defendant at night and on Sundays without providing plaintiffs a key thereto constituted an unreasonable interference with plaintiffs rights as easement holders ( see, Green v. Mann, 237 A.D.2d 566; Messer v. Leveson, 23 A.D.2d 834).
The court, however, properly denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment insofar as it sought an order directing defendants removal of an inner gate situated in the service easement. There are questions of fact as to the revocability of the license for installation of the inner gate given by plaintiffs predecessor in interest. While it is true, as plaintiffs contend, that a bare license is revocable at the will of the licensor, it is not at all clear that the license at issue was in "fact a simple grant of permission. To the contrary, the license given for erection of the inner gate was apparently supported by consideration and defendant may thus have justifiably relied upon the continued validity of the subject license in designing its security system, a circumstance which, if established, might render summary revocation of the license inequitable ( see, Prosser v. Gouveia, 98 A.D.2d 992). There are additionally factual issues as to whether plaintiffs purchased the property in question subject to defendants license ( see, Bermann v. Windale Props., 10 Misc.2d 388).
The court also properly held that the rear open space easement had terminated and that defendants rights respecting the property formerly burdened by the easement were not adversely affected either by Real Property Law § 345 or RPAPL 612. As the court held, those statutory provisions apply only where there is an assertion of a reversionary right with respect to a possessory interest in property, and, accordingly, they are inapplicable where, as here, the interest at issue is merely an easement, a property interest not entailing, possession ( see, Di Leo v. Pecksto Holding Corp., 304 N.Y. 505, 511).
Concur — Rosenberger, J.P., Wallach, Tom and Saxe, JJ.