Saari v. Winter Sports, Inc.

16 Citing cases

  1. Lee v. Great Divide Ins. Co.

    342 Mont. 147 (Mont. 2008)   Cited 10 times
    Interpreting a policy that “limit coverage to the corporation and to anyone else occupying a covered auto or temporary substitute for a covered auto”

    Hiebert v. Cascade County, 2002 MT 233, ¶ 21, 311 Mont. 471, ¶ 21, 56 P.3d 848, ¶ 21. "An absence of evidence simply cannot-under law or common sense-establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." Saari v. Winter Sports, Inc., 2003 MT 31, ¶ 17, 314 Mont. 212, ¶ 17, 64 P.3d 1038, ¶ 17. ¶ 11 A cross-motion for summary judgment is not required for a court to enter summary judgment in the non-moving party's favor where it is apparent that no genuine issues of material fact exist.

  2. Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Bd. v. Crumleys

    341 Mont. 33 (Mont. 2008)   Cited 73 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that “most consumers would consider diesel a pollutant when it leaks into the ground and contaminates soil and groundwater.”

    Thus, "we must pursue the intent of the Legislature and that intent is determined by interpreting the plain meaning of the language used." Saari v. Winter Sports, 2003 MT 31, ¶ 22, 314 Mont. 212, ¶ 22, 64 P.3d 1038, ¶ 22. Where the language used in the statute is "clear and unambiguous, the statute speaks for itself and we will not employ other means of interpretation."

  3. Mt. Soc. of Anesthesiologist v. Bd. of Nursing

    339 Mont. 472 (Mont. 2007)   Cited 3 times

    " Section 1-2-101, MCA. "In doing so, we must pursue the intent of the Legislature and that intent is determined by interpreting the plain meaning of the language used." Saari v. Winter Sports, Inc., 2003 MT 31, ¶ 22, 314 Mont 212, ¶ 22, 64 P.3d 1038, ¶ 22 (citing In re R.L.S., 1999 MT 34, ¶ 8, 293 Mont. 288, ¶ 8, 977 P.2d 967, ¶ 8). ¶ 37 Furthermore, this Court has routinely stated that the interpretation by administrative boards over statutes under their respective domains should be given deference.

  4. Sikorski v. Johnson

    333 Mont. 434 (Mont. 2006)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that the State was not liable because it had no duty, and concluding that it was therefore unnecessary to reach the State's quasi-judicial immunity argument

    ¶ 15 In interpreting statutes, we pursue the intent of the Legislature, which we determine, if possible, by the plain meaning of the language used. Saari v. Winter Sports, Inc., 2003 MT 31, ¶ 22, 314 Mont. 212, ¶ 22, 64 P.3d 1038, ¶ 22 (citation omitted). A court's function is to construe statutes as it finds them, not to insert what has been omitted.

  5. State v. Hirt

    329 Mont. 267 (Mont. 2005)   Cited 7 times

    Consequently, we will not address for the first time on appeal the State's argument that this Court should apply the 2003 version. See Saari v. Winter Sports, Inc., 2003 MT 31, ¶ 26, 314 Mont. 212, ¶ 26, 64 P.3d 1038, ¶ 26. ¶ 14 The general rule is that sentencing statutes in effect at the time of the offense control.

  6. Bonilla v. University of Montana

    328 Mont. 41 (Mont. 2005)   Cited 11 times

    Further, Hughes noted that the University had selected the chairs for their durability and quality. ¶ 20 In light of Bonilla's inability to establish how or why the chair collapsed and whether the University played any part therein, his own statements that the chair appeared durable, and Michaud's and Hughes' testimony, the University was able to meet its burden of demonstrating the absence of material fact regarding breach of its duty of care. While Bonilla asserts that the "chair was not going to fall apart unless there was a problem with the chair," this statement is conclusory and speculative and fails to present material and substantial evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Saari v. Winter Sports, 2003 MT 31, ¶ 15, 314 Mont. 212, ¶ 15, 64 P.3d 1038, ¶ 15. Thus, Bonilla did not meet the burden which shifted to him upon the University's showing.

  7. Weinert v. City of Great Falls

    322 Mont. 38 (Mont. 2004)   Cited 6 times
    Sledding in city park considered recreational purpose for which city was immune from liability

    The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present material and substantial evidence establishing the existence of material issues of fact which preclude summary judgment. Saari v. Winter Sports, Inc., 2003 MT 31, ¶ 7, 314 Mont. 212, ¶ 7, 64 P.3d 1038, ¶ 7. In addition, when affidavits and other supporting documents have been offered in support of a motion for summary judgment, we draw all reasonable inferences from the offered proof in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.

  8. Arrowhead School District No. 75 v. Klyap

    318 Mont. 103 (Mont. 2003)   Cited 59 times
    Defining expectancy damages as the amount necessary to compensate for what the nonbreaching party "would [have] receive[d] if the contract were performed"-noting that expectancy damages limitation preserves efficient breach theory of contracts

    Mont. 507, ¶ 30, 16 P.3d 391, ¶ 30; Baldauf v. Arrow Tank and Engineering Co., 1999 MT 81, ¶ 48, 294 Mont. 107, ¶ 48, 979 P.2d 166, ¶ 48; State v. Brown, 1999 MT 133, ¶¶ 19-20, 294 Mont. 509, ¶¶ 19-20, 982 P.2d 468, ¶¶ 19-20; Johnson v. Barrett, 1999 MT 594, ¶ 18, 295 Mont. 254, ¶ 18, 983 P.3d 925, ¶ 18; State v. Sattler, 1998 MT 57, ¶¶ 47-48, 288 Mont. 79, ¶¶ 47-48, 956 P.2d 54, ¶¶ 47-48; Unified Industries v. Easley, 1998 MT 145, ¶¶ 15-18, 289 Mont. 255, ¶¶ 15-18, 961 P.2d 100, ¶¶ 15-18; State v. Adams (1997), 284 Mont. 25, 31, 943 P.2d 955, 958-59; Jones v. City of Billings (1996), 279 Mont. 341, 347, 927 P.2d 9, 13; Buhr v. Flathead County (1994), 268 Mont. 223, 237-38, 886 P.2d 381, 389-90 — with raising an entirely new approach to a question of law ourselves and then applying it to a pending appeal? How can we reconcile requiring parties to advance authority for their arguments on appeal and refusing to consider arguments not so supported — see, e.g., Rule 23(a)(4), M.R.App.P.; Saari v. Winter Sports, Inc., 2003 MT 31, ¶ 14, 314 Mont. 212, ¶ 14, 64 P.3d 1038,¶ 14; State v. Strauss, 2003 MT 195, ¶ 51, 317 Mont. 1, ¶ 51, 74 P.3d 1052, ¶ 51; In re Marriage of Clark, 2003 MT 168, ¶ 25, 316 Mont. 327, ¶ 25, 71 P.3d 1228, ¶ 25; In re Marriage of McMahon, 2002 MT 198, ¶¶ 5-6, 311 Mont. 175, ¶¶ 5-6, 53 P.3d 1266, ¶¶ 5-6; In re Estate of Spencer, 2002 MT 304, ¶ 20, 313 Mont. 40, ¶ 20, 59 P.3d 1160, ¶ 20; State ex rel. Mazurek v. District Court, 2000 MT 266, ¶ 31, 302 Mont. 39, ¶ 31, 22 P.3d 166, ¶ 31; State v. Anderson, 1999 MT 60, ¶ 21, 293 Mont. 490, ¶ 21, 977 P.2d 983, ¶ 21; State ex rel. Booth v. District Court, 1998 MT 344, ¶ 35, 292 Mont. 371, ¶ 35, 972 P.2d 325, ¶ 35; State v. Sol (1997), 282 Mont. 69, 76, 936 P.2d 307, 311; Rieman v. Anderson (1997), 282 Mont. 139, 147, 935 P.2d 1122, 1126-27; Small v. Good (1997), 284 Mont. 159, 163, 943 P.2d 1258, 1260; State v. Carter (1997), 285 Mont. 449, 461, 948 P.2d 1173, 1180 — with then ignoring the parties' supported arguments and striking out on our own

  9. Young v. ERA Advantage Realty

    2022 MT 138 (Mont. 2022)   Cited 3 times
    In Young, a home buyer sued a realty company for negligence, constructive fraud, and violations of the MCPA due to its alleged failure to disclose the home's zoning limitations and history of water damage.

    "An absence of evidence simply cannot-under law or common sense-establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." Saari v. Winter Sports, 2003 MT 31, ¶ 17, 314 Mont. 212, 64 P.3d 1038 (emphasis omitted). She instead attempts to draw an inference from Wutzke's familial relation with the previous owner.

  10. Truck Ins. Exch. v. O'Mailia

    378 Mont. 231 (Mont. 2015)   Cited 8 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding district court properly summarily dismissed insured's counterclaims for unfair claim settlement practices, bad faith and breach of contract after granting insurer summary judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify

    ¶ 21 Further, the assumption that pyrolysis occurred during the policy period is itself speculative, and thus insufficient to avoid summary judgment. See Saari v. Winter Sports, 2003 MT 31, ¶ 7, 314 Mont. 212, 64 P.3d 1038. Hagan did not suggest a time frame during which exposure to high temperatures likely occurred, other than to say it may have been “a couple of days or longer” before the fire. The policy period ended over three months before the fire.