This is true unless, as pleaded in the case at bar, the instrument is delivered up to the person primarily liable thereon. Saab v. Clawson, 138 Okla. 126, 280 P. 598, establishes the rule in this state that such renunciation may be proved by parol testimony where, as alleged in the case at bar, the note has been surrendered and delivered to the principal debtor. Daniel on Negotiable Instruments (6th Ed.) par. 1288, lays down the rule thus: `If the holder of a bill or note renounces his claim and gives up the instrument, the drawer and indorsers are as much discharged as by payment and he cannot sue the maker or makers on it.'
This is true unless, as pleaded in the case at bar, the instrument is delivered up to the person primarily liable thereon. Saab v. Clawson, 138 Okla. 126, 280 P. 598, establishes the rule in this state that such renunciation may be proved by parol testimony where, as alleged in the case at bar, the note has been surrendered and delivered to the principal debtor. Daniel on Negotiable Instruments (6th Ed.) par. 1288, lays down the rule thus:
Iowa. 557, 89 N.W. 12; 1 R. C. L. p. 177, sec. 1); something to which it had no previous right, or defendant was thereby deprived of something that he was not bound to part with before, as the delivery of property (Reeves Co. v. Phillips, 53 Okla. 375, 156 P. 1179); an article of personal property or a conveyance of real property (First National Bank v. Latham, 37 Okla. 286, 132 P. 891; Lilly v. Verser, 133 Ark. 547, 203 S.W. 31; Page on Contracts (2nd Ed.) vol. 4, p. 4427, sec. 2509); the forbearance of the prosecution of an action (Stuart v. Edwards, 84 Okla. 207, 202 P. 1032); extinguishment of a bona fide disputed claim (First National Bank v. Harkey, 63 Okla. 163, 163 P. 273); the surrender of a legal right, — a benefit to one or a detriment to the other (4 Page, on Contracts, p. 4416, sec. 2501); or the doing or suffering of something not required to be done or suffered by the terms of the note (Walker Drilling Co. v. Carlew Drilling Contractors, 109 Okla. 7, 234 P. 598, 590; Saab v. Clawson, 138 Okla. 126, 280 P. 598, 599); such new or additional consideration would constitute sufficient legal consideration to enforce the oral promise of plaintiff to release the debt, and would discharge the note and bar any further action thereon. Bradley Metcalf Co. v. McLaughlin, 87 Okla. 34, 208 P. 1032; Gasper v. Mayer, supra; Savage v. Edgar, 86 N.J. Eq. 205, 98 A. 407, 3 A. L. R. 1021; 1 R. C. L. p. 201, sec. 38; our inquiry being as to the existence of any such additional consideration and not as to the adequacy thereof.
" This court has held that a party to a negotiable instrument can only be discharged in the manner and form provided for in the Negotiable, Instrument Act. Smith v. Minneapolis Instrument Machine Co., 89 Okla. 156, 214 P. 178; Saab v. Clawson, 138 Okla. 126, 280 P. 598. The facts relied upon by the defendants to support either novation or renunciation may be summarized as follows: