Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. DP002235
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.
S.A., father of the child at issue here, has filed a petition for an extraordinary writ seeking review of the findings and orders of the juvenile court terminating reunification services for father and setting the matter for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. (§ 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Father contends that there is no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings that he was offered or provided reasonable services and that he failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress. Father further contends that the court abused its discretion when it reduced his visitation frequency prior to the section 366.26 hearing. As we find no abuse of discretion and that there is substantial evidence to support the court’s findings and orders, we will deny the petition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
On March 12, 2010, father and the child’s mother were arrested in their home for felony child endangerment and the child was taken into protective custody. Santa Cruz police officers found a large amount of marijuana being grown and harvested in the home. Dried marijuana covered the living room floor and the family’s bedroom floor, and was in the bedding of the then three-and-a-half-month-old child. The child had tested positive for marijuana at birth, and the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (the Department) had been working with father and the mother since December 2009 on an informal family maintenance case plan that included attending counseling, Alanon meetings, drug and alcohol assessments, and parenting classes. The mother had a history of mental health and drug use problems and had been discharged from three drug treatment programs and hospitalized once on a section 5150 hold during that time. She had tested positive for marijuana on March 3, 2010, and March 7, 2010. Father had not attended Alanon meetings, parenting classes, or counseling, and he admitted to social workers that he had been using and continued to use marijuana. Father had also violated a signed safety plan agreeing not to let the mother have contact with the child unless approved by the social worker.
On March 16, 2010, the Department filed a petition as to the child under section 300, subdivisions (b) [failure to protect] and (g) [no provision for support]. Following a hearing on March 18, 2010, the juvenile court ordered the child detained and ordered supervised visitation for both parents a minimum of three times per week.
The social worker’s jurisdiction/disposition report recommended that services not be offered to the mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) [parent has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs and had resisted court-ordered treatment for the problem during the previous three years], but that services be offered to father. It appeared that father had been the child’s primary caregiver, but he stated that he did not accept responsibility for the condition of the home or believe that the minor was in any danger. Father reported that he had begun attending a parenting class the week of March 29, 2010, and that he had attended some Alanon meetings. He was consistently visiting the child with and without the mother, and the visits were going well.
On April 20, 2010, father submitted the matter of jurisdiction on the social worker’s report, but the mother requested a settlement conference. On May 6, 2010, by stipulation of the parties, the court struck the section 300, subdivision (g) allegations in the petition, and the mother submitted the matter of jurisdiction on the social worker’s report. The court sustained the petition as amended and declared the child a dependent child of the court under section 300, subdivision (b). The matter was set for a contested disposition hearing on June 18, 2010.
On May 24, 2010, the social worker filed a section 388 petition seeking a reduction of the court-ordered visitation from three times to once each week. The social worker stated in the petition that the child sometimes cries inconsolably during the visits when the child is given to father, but does not cry like that when she is with the visits supervisor or the foster mother. On June 8, 2010, the court ordered that the section 388 petition be heard concurrently with the contested disposition hearing. The court also ordered three supervised visits between the parents and the child at a location other than the Parent’s Center.
The social worker’s report for the June 18, 2010 hearing stated that the child’s pediatrician recommended that supervised visits be reduced to once per week with the foster mother present. The child appeared unable to tolerate the parents’ physical touch or eye contact. At the June 18, 2010 hearing, both parents submitted the section 388 petition and the disposition on the social worker’s petition and reports. The court granted the section 388 petition, and adopted the recommendations in the social worker’s reports. It ordered no services for the mother, but did order services provided for father. Father’s case plan required that he: (1) participate in a course of therapy designed to “address any issues identified by either you or the therapist related to how to identify dangerous[] persons, places and things, and what barriers, if any, you may have to taking action towards protecting your child from those harmful persons and situations”; (2) successfully complete an approved parenting education program; (3) obtain and maintain safe, stable and appropriate housing; (4) obtain an appropriate childcare provider; (5) obtain and maintain employment; (6) participate in drug and alcohol testing; and (7) participate in a minimum of two NA/AA and two Alanon meetings each week. Supervised visitation for father was to occur a minimum of once a week.
The social worker’s report for the six-month review hearing scheduled for December 14, 2010, recommended that services for father be terminated and that a section 366.26 hearing be set. Father had completed his case plan activities and continued to meet weekly with his family therapist. The child was thriving with her foster family, and was having twice weekly supervised visits with father. With the increase in the frequency of visits, the child appeared to be more comfortable in father’s presence, although the child spent most of the visits playing at the park and participating in play groups. Father had not shown that he could organize, manage, and pay attention to the everyday needs of the child while working full time with few support systems. And, although father stated that he will do whatever it takes to get the child back, he continues to present himself as a couple with the child’s mother. The mother had been incarcerated for relapsing and violating probation. At the December 14, 2010 hearing, the court set the matter for a contested hearing.
The contested review hearing began on January 31, 2011. Lyn Graybill, who had been supervising father’s visits with the child since March 22, 2010, testified as an expert in the areas of parent/child supervision and parent skills coaching. She testified that she has not seen any changes in father’s abilities to console or comfort the child during their visits. The child continues to cry during the visits, but less so than she did at the beginning. The child looks to Graybill for comfort, not father. Sometimes after crying, the child has spent a large part of the visit sleeping even though it is early in the morning and not her regular nap time. Visits are ended early if the child cries inconsolably for 15 minutes.
Father does what he is coached to do during the visits, but he does not initiate activities, such as changing the child’s soiled diaper or offering her a bottle, on his own. He did not bring diapers or a blanket for the child to the visits. He has brought a diaper bag to visits after it was suggested that he do so, but he has not used anything in it. Father does not read the child’s cues, such as when she is pulling at her sweater on a warm day. Nor is he aware of safety issues; he does not ask the dog owner if the dog likes children or otherwise intervene when the child approaches a dog in the park. Graybill does not feel that father can take care of the child for a long period of time.
On February 2, 2011, Terre Schroeder, the child’s social worker, testified as an expert in the assessment of risk for children and in the placement and permanent plans selected for children. She believes that father is trustworthy, honest, and cooperative. She has let father know what the visit supervisors are not seeing so that he could “step up” and be the person he was being asked to be. Father was offered parenting skills information through his parenting education class, through suggestions from the visitation monitors and social workers, from the foster parent during early visits, and from his therapist. The Department held two “Difficult Case Staffings” to make sure that it was not missing a service or resource that could have been given to father. However, father is still struggling, so she cannot recommend that he be offered additional services or even unsupervised visits.
Father does not know the child outside of their visits. Nor has he shown a motivation to do so. He has not learned about the child’s likes and dislikes, about what makes her comfortable or uncomfortable, or about her medical concerns and issues. Although he was asked, father never gave the social workers any suggestions about where he could take the child during their visits so that she would feel comfortable. He does not follow up with the foster mother after their visits to find out how the child is, or ask about the child’s development or medical appointments. He also does not understand the risk the child’s mother poses or acknowledge his responsibility for having placed the child at risk, which led to the child’s removal. He has not said that he does not want to place the child back in that risky situation again, although he has filed for dissolution of his marriage to the mother.
On February 9, 2011, Schroeder testified that, after Schroeder told father’s therapist what the therapist could do to help father reunify with the child, father discussed with Schroeder the suggestions from his therapist. However, Schroeder did not see father actually implement Schroeder’s suggestions during his later visits with the child. Nevertheless, father has participated in drug testing and has consistently tested clean. He has also consistently told her that he wants to reunify with the child and she believes that father loves the child.
Father testified that prior to the child’s removal from his home, the child was healthy and happy, and they had a great relationship. He was her primary caregiver. The parenting class he attended as part of his case plan dealt generally with parenting techniques but there was no focus on infant care. He was not referred to any other parenting classes, but he would have taken another one if it had been offered to him. He has participated in counseling since June 2010, and has discussed with his therapist his difficulty in understanding the Department’s views regarding the child’s mother and why the child was removed from him. He now understands that the mother’s mental instability and substance abuse struggles show a difficulty in being able to take care of herself, which can impair her ability to parent the child. He also understands that it was due to his failure to protect the child from the mother that the child was removed.
Father has worked full time in San Jose since May 2010, and he has a one-bedroom apartment in Boulder Creek. He has visited the child as frequently as it has been offered, but the transition to not being the child’s caregiver and provider has been challenging for him and difficult for the child. The child is now more comfortable and engaged, and does not appear seriously distressed during their visits. They play with toys, he plays music or sings to her, and they go for a walk outside. He feels that he is able to address the child’s concerns or fussiness during their visits. He changed her diaper during the past week. She cried a bit but he was able to redirect her focus after the change. The last time he changed the child’s diaper was during a visit in October. He is in the process of rebuilding his relationship with the child, and he feels that the child has regained her trust in him to the point where she now goes to him when she wants to be held and she accepts food from him. He wants the court to give him more time to continue the momentum he has built.
He feels that he is not getting enough support from the Department. He feels that when he has asked for guidance, they do not understand his level of desire to make things work. He is unclear about some of the things they wanted him to do, such as his relationship with the child’s mother. He took infant care classes on his own prior to the child’s birth, but he has not taken any since her birth. He has not talked to the child’s pediatrician since she was removed from his care, and he has only attended one well-baby checkup with the foster mother since then. He plans to attend the next checkup in March. Despite his questioning of the visits supervisor and the social worker, a great amount of the information he has heard at this hearing was not information he had received previously. If the court were to give him more time to reunify with the child, he would not allow the mother to be in the child’s presence unsupervised due to the mother’s ongoing mental health and substance abuse struggles. However, he does not believe that the child is at risk for being physically hurt if she were to be left in the mother’s care.
On February 10, 2011, the court heard argument from the parties, including counsel for the minor, who concurred with the comments of counsel for the Department. The court ruled in part as follows. “When father was asked about why he felt he was in front of the Court, he did not say anything about the home condition. And it wasn’t until cross-examination when he was specifically asked about the home condition and his responsibility for the home condition[, h]e focused on the fact that he had not followed through with the informal case plan activities and that [the mother] was a danger to the child.
“He takes no responsibility for the home environment. Took no responsibility for the case plan activities that were failed and his lack of follow through on the safety plan. And is in complete denial regarding Mother’s continued danger to the child. He lacks insight. And after 15 months of Department and Court intervention, I would hope that there would be some appreciation and ownership of the situation he is in today.”
“He is unable, and has been unable, to understand what this process is about despite the informal activities which were outlined by the Department. The petition that was filed in March that laid out the concerns and the issues that this family was struggling with, the juris dispo report in April of 2010, which laid it all out and the areas that the family needed to improve on, the six month report which was two months ago in December of 2010, again, laying out all the issues and the lack of progress, two months later we’re here in the court process and Father is saying now I’ve got insight. Since I read the visit logs and sat through this hearing, I now have insight.
“In this case I am finding by a preponderance of the evidence that return of [the child] to the physical custody of her father would create a substantial detriment to the child’s safety, protection, physical or emotional well-being. There’s a prima facie showing that det[ri]ment is apparent in as much as the Father has failed to make progress on his Court ordered treatment program. In his case plan activities I don’t have progress. I have him following through with some of those activities and being successful in some of the activities, but not able to understand, gain the insight necessary to move forward with being a parent that I can return [the child] today.
“Another area that I’m basing that on is the fact that he has not stepped forward to act as a parent. He has tried during some of the visits. He has tried to placate the child, to understand and sooth[e] her. He’ll get down on the floor to her level. He’ll interact with her, show her the cell phone, try to distract her in that way, talk to her, interact with her. But when it comes down to the responsibilities of a parent, there hasn’t been follow through with what her needs are.
“In the case there has been notifications to Father that his child has special needs, or may have special needs. Looking at the jurisdiction dispo report of April [2010], Father read this report, we had court hearings regarding this report. And in March, the public health nurse... had noted that... [she] will arrange for the infant to be assessed by an occupational therapist.
“No follow-up. No inquiry by dad regarding that.
“Later... the six month review report of December 14th, 2010, ... indicated that [the child] had gone for a well-baby checkup.... There was a note that [the child] did complete a pediatric assessment for occupational therapy at Dominican Pediatrics and participated in six occupational therapy sessions, which she has since graduated and has not needed any further follow-up. I didn’t hear anything about the six sessions. I didn’t hear anything of Father about his follow-up, if he knew what those sessions were, that he practiced those techniques with the child, that he had talked to anybody regarding that.
“And then we have the letter from [the child’s pediatrician] in January outlining his concerns that the child is checking out, that she has put up barriers. And I asked dad what’s going on? Have you followed up on that? [He responded, ] I haven’t called [the pediatrician].
“So the concern is, I have a child which clearly by her behaviors during the visit indicate that she has emotional issues that we don’t know what is going on with her. She hasn’t been fully assessed. And I would expect the parent would be driving the train to get some answers.
“Instead, Father’s waiting for people to tell him what to do. So I do not have Father stepping up in his insight as far as putting his child’s needs, trying to advocate for his child’s needs and services on her behalf, which I would expect a parent to do.
“Also, the ongoing codependent relationship with Mother is of concern....”
“If [the child] is not returned to his care will he continue to see Mother? He’s not sure. Which means most likely he will, because he hasn’t understood that that is not a healthy relationship for him and would not be a healthy relationship for his daughter.
“He does not believe that [the mother] will use if the child is in her care. Yet he acknowledges that she’s failed at least ten treatment episodes, and even after that he married her to show his confidence in her ability to remain sober. And since that time she’s failed additional treatment episodes and been in custody. He continues to hold hope, which means he has not progressed at all in his insight as to dangers that she poses to the child with her substance abuse and use.
“I am finding by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services have been offered to Father. This case has had more adjustments and changes to visitation than any other case I have had in the past three years. Efforts have been made to facilitate a different relationship and interaction with Father. Parenting classes were offered. And while it is true that some of them were focused on older children, Father doesn’t even change a diaper on his own. He doesn’t self-start to that point to care for her. He’s afraid to.”
“I don’t have progress being made on the support that he’s been given and the types of reasonable services that were provided to him to understand that he needs to address. Also he’s responsible for educating himself to try to figure out other approaches, advocate for other assessments for his child, but reasonable services have been offered to him in this case.
“He has, by clear and convincing evidence, failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in his case plan activities as has already been previously outlined. He’s not capable of being protective. He can’t anticipate or recognize potential dangers for this child. And, therefore, there is no substantial probability that the child may be returned to him by mid May, which would be the deadline for the extension of services.
“It’s not an issue of love. I think he does love his daughter. He’s not able to grasp what we’ve been doing for 15 months. And that is, indeed, unfortunate and very sad.
“Therefore, the Court is setting the [section 366].26 hearing for a selection [and] implementation hearing. I’m terminating services for reunification. I’m adopting the findings contained in the order.
“Visitation will be modified. Each parent shall have a minimum of [one] visitation per month supervised. That’s consistent will all cases that I set for a [section 366].26 hearing. The selection and implementation hearing will be set for April 12, 2011.”
DISCUSSION
Substantial Evidence
Father contends that the juvenile court erred in determining that he was offered reasonable reunification services and there is not substantial evidence to support such a finding. Specifically, he argues that the Department failed to provide him reasonable parenting classes and failed to provide him “any real coaching during the majority of his visits.” “Clearly father needed and was not provided more education and training specific to infant and toddler growth and development, and the parenting skills necessary to navigate the early childhood years.”
Father also contends that the court erred in determining that he failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in his reunification plan. “The juvenile court ignored the progress father had made in visitation, counseling, and maintaining employment and housing, and focused on the issues of father’s perception of the condition of the home when the minor was removed and speculation that father would resume a relationship with mother if he were offered additional reunification services, reunified with the minor and the case was ultimately dismissed from the juvenile court. [¶] Reliance on these reasons for finding that father failed to participate regularly and make progress in his service plan is erroneous.”
The Department contends that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided or offered and that father had failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress. “The Juvenile Court’s finding that ‘reasonable services’ had been offered or provided was grounded in evidence that the social workers and other service providers were diligent in working with and for this family’s particular needs.” “Here, more than six months of services were provided to father, but his lack of ‘substantive progress’ permitted the court to end them and move the child toward a permanent plan without further passage of time. The Court’s determination was supported by the evidence presented at trial.”
The child has joined in the Department’s contentions.
“On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1525.)
“ ‘ “The sufficiency of evidence to establish a given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to be clear and convincing, is primarily a question for the trial court to determine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal.” ’ [Citation.] Thus, on appeal from a judgment required to be based upon clear and convincing evidence, the clear and convincing evidence test disappears and ‘the usual rule of conflicting evidence is applied, giving full effect to the respondent’s evidence, however slight, and disregarding the appellant’s evidence, however strong.’ [Citation.]” (In re I. W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1525-1526.)
When a child is under the age of three years at the time the child is removed from parental custody, “court-ordered services shall be provided for a period of six months from the dispositional hearing... but no longer than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care... unless the child is returned to the home of the parent....” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).) “At the review hearing held six months after the initial dispositional hearing, but no later than 12 months after the date the child entered foster care..., whichever occurs earlier, the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent... unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent... would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e), first par.) “The failure of the parent... to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental. In making its determination, the court shall review and consider the social worker’s report and recommendations...; and shall consider the efforts or progress, or both, demonstrated by the parent... and the extent to which he or she availed himself or herself to services provided....” (Ibid.)
“If the child was under three years of age on the date of the initial removal, ... and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan, the court may schedule a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 within 120 days. If, however, the court finds there is a substantial probability that the child, who was under three years of age on the date of initial removal..., may be returned to his or her parent... within six months, the court shall continue the case to the 12-month permanency hearing.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e), third par.) “If the child is not returned to his or her parent..., the court shall determine whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent... in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent....” (Id., subd. (e), eighth par.; see also subd. (g)(2) [before setting a § 366.26 hearing, the court must find that there is clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parent]; In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 306.)
Reunification plans “must have the objective of providing such services or counseling ‘as will lead to the resumption of a normal family relationship.’ [Citations.]” (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 414.) However, “[a] parent whose children have been adjudged dependents of the juvenile court is on notice of the conduct requiring such state intervention. If such a parent in no way seeks to correct his or her own behavior or waits until the impetus of an impending court hearing to attempt to do so, the legislative purpose of providing safe and stable environments for children is not served by forcing the juvenile court to go ‘on hold’ while the parent makes another stab at compliance.” (In re Michael S. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1463, fn. 5; In re ChristinaL., supra, at pp. 414-415.)
Here, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services had been provided or offered to father. We find that substantial evidence supports that finding. The record shows that the Department provided father with a parenting class, counseling, and supervised visitation in an effort to overcome the problems that caused the removal of the child from father’s custody and to facilitate a continuing father-child relationship. Adjustments to the location, time, and number of visits were made several times, and the court noted that more changes to visitation were made in this case than any other it had seen in the previous three years. The visits were moved from the Parent Center to the park and a market. Different people transported the child and supervised the visits. The foster mother attended some visits and made suggestions directly to father to help him understand what the child’s needs were. Suggestions were made to the father’s therapist as to what father needed to do to act as a parent both during his visits with the child and outside the visits. The visits were scheduled in the mornings when the child would normally be alert and responsive. The parenting class, counseling, and visitations all focused on teaching father how to recognize and respond to various risks of detriment to the safety, protection, and well-being of the child. And, the Department held two staff meetings to make sure that there were not other services or resources that it could refer father to. On this record, we find that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the Department provided or offered reasonable services to father. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576; In re Monica C., supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 306.)
The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that father failed to make substantive progress in his court-ordered reunification plan. We find that substantial evidence also supports that finding. The record shows that the child was removed from father’s care in March 2010, and the court’s findings were made in February 2011. However, even after receiving more than 11 months of services, father was not able to act as a parent during supervised visits until he heard the testimony of the social worker and the visits supervisor during the contested hearing. Even after several adjustments were made for his visitations, he was still having difficulty consoling the child when she cried. He continued to deny that the child would be at risk of detriment if left in the care of the child’s mother. While the court observed that father loved the child, father made no inquiry as to the child’s medical and occupational therapy needs. Nor did he follow-up on recommendations made to him or about the child. He was not able to read the child’s cues, he did not recognize situations where she might be at risk, and he made no suggestions as to where he could take the child during visits so that she would feel comfortable. Thus, he was not able to demonstrate that he understood or gained insight into the reasons why the child was initially removed from his care and into what he needed to do to provide the child a safe and secure environment. This record supports the court’s finding that father failed to make substantive progress in his case plan so that return of the child to father would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s safety, protection, and physical or emotional well-being. (In re Michael S., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1463, fn. 5; In re ChristinaL., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at pp. 414-415.)
Visitation
Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it reduced his visitation from twice a week to once a month prior to the section 366.26 hearing. “The court’s practice of automatically reducing the frequency of visits to one time per month upon the setting of a [section 366].26 hearing is in and of itself... an abuse of discretion, and extremely prejudicial to the parent-child relationship. Specifically, the court did not find that continuing visitation between [the child] and her father at the same level of visitation as had been occurring until the [section 366].26 hearing would be detrimental to her.”
The Department contends that the juvenile court’s order was within its sound discretion. “Given the court’s concurrent setting of a [section] 366.26 hearing to find a permanent plan – which is not going to be a return to parental custody – it was reasonable under the circumstances and within the court’s discretion to reduce the amount of time which this one-year-old would be spending with her parents.” The child has joined in the Department’s contention.
Generally speaking, it is the juvenile court’s role to “define the rights of the parties to visitation. The definition of such a right necessarily involves the balancing of the interests of the parent in visitation with the best interests of the child. In balancing these interests, the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion should determine whether there should be any right to visitation and, if so, the frequency and length of visitation.” (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757; see also In re Shawna M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1686, 1690.) The court must consider the possibility of adverse psychological consequences of an unwanted visit between a parent and child. (In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1238.) While a child’s aversion to visiting with a parent should not be the sole factor in determining visitation, it may certainly be an important factor in the court’s consideration. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 50-51.)
Prior to permanency planning, during reunification efforts, visitation generally must be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child. (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) When the court orders that a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 be set and terminates reunification services, “[t]he court shall continue to permit the parent... to visit the child pending the hearing unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (h).)
We review a juvenile court’s visitation order for abuse of discretion. (See e.g., In re Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 48-51.)
In this case, the juvenile court was aware that the child was demonstrating problems during her visits with father that her pediatrician and the Department needed to explore. The court stated that the pediatrician noted that the child was “checking out, that she has put up barriers, ” and that she has emotional issues, but that they did not know “what was going on with her.” The social worker recommended reduction of the visits, as father plays with the child but had not been acting as a parent during the visits and the child looked to the social worker or the visits supervisor for comfort and consolation, not father. Counsel for the child asked the court to reduce the visits to once a month because the child is not enjoying the visits and acts as if she wants them to end. While the court stated that its reduction of visitation to once per month was consistent with its usual practice, we understand this statement to be an explanation to father that the court was acting consistently with its usual practice in reducing visitation only after considering everything before it rather than a statement of the court’s reason for its decision to do so. Accordingly, we find that the court acted within its discretion in reducing the frequency of father’s visits with the child pending the section 366.26 hearing. (In re Jennifer G., supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 757; In re Shawna M., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1690.)
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied.
WE CONCUR: MIHARA, J., LUCAS, J.
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.