Opinion
24A-JT-625
08-19-2024
In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: E.A., M.C., and G.A. (Minor Children) v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee/Petitioner and S.A. (Mother), Appellant/Respondent
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Luisa M. White Austin C. Harris Luisa White Law, LLC Lafayette, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana John R. Oosterhoff Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the White Circuit Court The Honorable Jason A. Thompson, Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 91C01-2307-JT-10, 91C01-2307-JT-11, 91C01-2307-JT-12
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Luisa M. White
Austin C. Harris
Luisa White Law, LLC
Lafayette, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
John R. Oosterhoff
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] S.A. ("Mother") gave birth to M.C. on September 1, 2015, and G.A. and E.A. on March 5, 2017. In May of 2022, the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS") received a report that M.C., G.A., and E.A. ("the Children") were being abused by Mother and her boyfriend. The Children were removed and placed in foster care. In September of 2022, the Children were found to be children in need of services ("CHINS"), and Mother was ordered to participate in several services, particularly services related to her history of substance abuse.
The Children's father is deceased. (Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53).
[¶2] In July of 2023, DCS petitioned to have Mother's parental rights to the Children terminated. While Mother had been somewhat compliant with ordered services on occasion, she had failed several drug screens, refused services related to her drug use, remained involved with her boyfriend, and eventually ceased participating in drug screens and visitation with the Children. In February of 2024, the juvenile court terminated Mother's rights to the Children. Mother contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile court's termination of her parental rights. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] Mother is the mother of the Children. DCS first became involved with Mother in February of 2017 after having received a report that she and the Children's father had been using methamphetamine and that Mother had tested positive for methamphetamine while pregnant with G.A. and M.A. That proceeding, in which the Children had been found to be CHINS, had ended with Mother's reunification with the Children in April of 2018.
[¶4] On May 15, 2022, DCS received a report that the Children were being physically abused by Mother and her boyfriend. The Children's aunt brought them to DCS, and G.A. reported that "my mommy did something very bad [and that] mommy and [her boyfriend] beat my butt." Tr. Vol. II pp. 71-72. DCS Family Case Manager ("FCM") Carrie Matthys interviewed the Children, who reported that they had been struck with a belt, a paddle that had holes in it, and a hand. FCM Matthys found handprint injuries on one child's buttocks and circular bruising on the backs of the other two children. On May 17, 2022, DCS initiated another CHINS proceeding, and the Children were moved into foster care on May 26, 2022.
[¶5] Once DCS was involved with the family again, there were additional substanceabuse concerns. Despite multiple positive screens for methamphetamine, Mother consistently denied using it and refused services to address her drug use. On June 15, 2022, DCS and Mother had a meeting, at which the Children's injuries and Mother's positive drug screens were discussed. Mother was "very aggressive" at the meeting, flipping chairs, attempted to flip a table, and eventually "storming out of the office." Tr. Vol. II pp. 92, 93.
[¶6] On September 13, 2022, the juvenile court found that the Children were CHINS. On October 6, 2022, the juvenile court issued a dispositional order, in which Mother was ordered to: remain accountable to her caseworker, participate in services and keep all appointments, maintain suitable housing and a legal source of income, obey the law, not use drugs and submit to random drug screens, participate in supervised visits, not commit domestic violence, refrain from using physical discipline or allowing others to use physical discipline with the Children, provide the Children with a safe environment, and participate in psychological assessments and treatments.
[¶7] Mother completed a substance-abuse assessment and was diagnosed with a substance-abuse disorder. Mother, however, refused to participate in treatment and ended up testing positive for methamphetamine at least twenty times during the proceedings. On one occasion, Mother "popped one of the girls in the mouth" during a supervised visit. Tr. Vol. II p. 115. Once, for approximately one month, Mother had tested negative for drugs and had been able to move to at-home visits, but then she had resumed missing screens and testing positive and the at-home visits had been terminated.
[¶8] On July 26, 2023, DCS petitioned for termination of Mother's parental rights to the Children. Mother stopped submitting drug screens in September of 2023. Mother stopped attending visits in October of 2023, and visitation was formally terminated in November. Mother had never been able to progress from fully supervised to semi-supervised visits because she had been unable to consistently pass drug screens or separate herself from her boyfriend. Mother had also been enrolled in a seeking-safety program, which focused on domestic violence, intervention, and substance abuse, but she had not completed it.
[¶9] On January 11, 2024, the juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing. At the time of the evidentiary hearing, Mother was still living with her boyfriend, which caused DCS concerns that there were drugs and other dangerous items in the home. FCM Lisa Swaney, who had initially been assigned to the case in May of 2022, testified that Mother had never given her an explanation for the Children's injuries, completed a substance-abuse assessment, or participated in individual therapy. FCM Hope Dodson, who took the case over in October of 2022, testified that Mother had also never given her a plausible explanation for Children's injuries of May of 2022, variously blaming the injuries on rocks striking the Children's buttocks while swimming, various family members and friends, or her mother (but only after she had passed away). FCM Dodson also testified that, although Mother had completed a substance-abuse assessment in January of 2023, she had continued to test positive for illegal drugs and, in May of 2023, was recommended for in-patient treatment, which she had refused. FCMs Swaney and Dodson and court appointed special advocate ("CASA") Kenneth Roswarski all testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the Children. On February 14, 2024, the juvenile court terminated Mother's parental rights to the Children.
Discussion and Decision
[¶10] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Moreover, we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is "one of the most valued relationships of our culture." Id. Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the children's interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parentchild relationship. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court has made clear that the "purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect the children." Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't. of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234-35 (Ind. 1992). Termination of parental rights is proper where the children's emotional and physical development is threatened. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d at 773. The juvenile court need not wait until the children are irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.
[¶11] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Invol. Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id. In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.
[¶12] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) governs what DCS must allege and establish to support the termination of parental rights, and, for purposes of our disposition of this case, that was:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied [or] (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child[, and]
[....]
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child[.]Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, DCS need only establish one of the circumstances described in the subsection, two of which are listed above. Mother contends that DCS failed to establish that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal will not be remedied, (2) there is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to their well-being, and (3) termination is in their best interests.
Although Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 has been amended, effective March 11, 2024, those provisions do not apply to this case.
I. Whether the Conditions that Resulted in Removal Will be Remedied
[¶13] Mother argues that DCS has failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for the Children's continued removal would not be remedied. In making such a determination, a juvenile court engages in a two-step inquiry. First, the juvenile court must "ascertain what conditions led to their placement and retention in foster care." K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). After identifying these initial conditions, the juvenile court must determine whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying the children's continued "placement outside the home will not be remedied." In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 266 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004) (citation omitted), trans. denied. The statute focuses not only on the initial reasons for removal "but also those bases resulting in continued placement outside the home." In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied. In making this second determination, the juvenile court must judge a parent's fitness to care for her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 266. DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it must establish that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18-19 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008), trans. denied. A parent's habitual patterns of conduct must also be evaluated to determine the probability of future negative behaviors. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234.
[¶14] Physical abuse of the Children, who reported that it had been done by Mother and her boyfriend, was the reason for the Children's initial removal from her care. The Children all contend that Mother and her boyfriend were the persons who abused them in May of 2022. Although Mother has denied abusing the Children, she has never provided a plausible explanation for their injuries. That said, even if we were to assume that Mother did not participate in the abuse of May of 2022, we would still be left with the fact that she failed to prevent it. In any event, other evidence indicates that Mother has a propensity for violence, having struck one of the Children in the face during visitation.
[¶15] Over the course of the case, Mother's substance abuse has rightfully become a concern, and the record contains ample evidence that little has improved. If anything, the record indicates that Mother's efforts to address her substance abuse have lessened over time. Mother has had a history of abusing methamphetamine, with at least twenty positive screens for it during this proceeding and the CHINS case from which it evolved. Moreover, while Mother completed a substance-abuse assessment and initially participated in screens, Mother ultimately failed to fully participate in any of the substanceabuse services offered to her, refusing in-patient treatment and failing to participate in drug screens after September of 2023. In light of the evidence that Mother is unwilling or unable to even acknowledge her substance-abuse issues (much less resolve them), her failure to complete ordered services, and her refusal to either accept responsibility for the Children's injuries or provide a plausible explanation, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that the reasons for the Children's removal would not likely be remedied.
Because of our disposition of this claim, we need not address Mother's claim that the juvenile court erred in concluding that there is reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(ii).
II. Best Interests
[¶16] Mother also argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in concluding that termination of her parental rights was in the Children's best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of the Children, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. "[W]e have previously held that the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests." A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of ChildServs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-59 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied. As mentioned, FCMs Swaney and Dodson and CASA Roswarski all testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests. While this testimony is possibly sufficient to support a finding that termination is in the Child's best interests, it does not stand alone.
[¶17] The record contains copious evidence of Mother's substance abuse and her unwillingness to address it, including noncompliance with services, serial refusal to submit to drug-screens, and refusal to take advantage of the services offered to her. As of the evidentiary hearing, Mother was still romantically involved with the man the Children had accused (along with Mother) of administering a severe spanking to them with a belt, a paddle, and a hand. The Children are currently in a pre-adoptive foster home, in which they are "happy" and "doing really well"; the Children have adjusted to the placement and refer to their foster parents as "mom and dad." Tr. Vol. II p. 120. This evidence, along with the testimony of the FCMs and the CASA, is sufficient to support a finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in the Children's best interests.
[¶18] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.