If any carpenter had worked for 210 days during the year immediately preceding appellee's injury, he would have received a total of $5,040.00. As this Court pointed out in Southern Underwriters v. Jordan, 122 S.W.2d 260, 261 (1938, no writ): 'It therefore becomes plain that whether the weekly was fixed under subdivision two or three, the result would have been the same. Plaintiff in error has shown no injury.

We think there was ample evidence to submit issue 19 to the jury, and ample evidence under the statute to prove the wage scale. It has been held that even slight evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie wage rate. Appellant here has not denied or contradicted the evidence offered, but contends that it was insufficient, and we think under the circumstances slight evidence would have been sufficient. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n v. Martinez, Tex.Civ.App., 284 S.W.2d 198; Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n v. Locke, Tex.Civ.App., 224 S.W.2d 755; Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n v. Clack, 134 Tex. 151, 132 S.W.2d 399; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Noble, Tex.Civ.App., 129 S.W.2d 778; Southern Underwriters v. Jordan, Tex.Civ.App., 122 S.W.2d 260. We therefore hold that appellee has substantially complied with the statute, and overrule appellant's first point.

The plaintiff's rate would be the maximum under any method of computation; hence, the defendant could not have been prejudiced. Lawler, Texas Workmen's Compensation Law, p. 312, sec. 152; National Indemnity Underwriters of America v. Rocamontes, Tex.Civ.App., 110 S.W.2d 228; Southern Underwriters v. Jordan, Tex.Civ.App., 122 S.W.2d 260; Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App., 135 S.W.2d 794. Judgment is affirmed.

Consequently, if error there was, it was manifestly harmless. See Southern Underwriters v. Jordan, Tex.Civ.App. 122 S.W.2d 260, wherein the exact question was involved. Appellant's next contention must be sustained.

Therefore, it is our opinion that by the passage of the quoted statute it was the intention of the Legislature to simplify the trial of compensation cases, to the end that jurisdictional matters under the Act would be presumed to be true as pleaded, unless such pleaded facts were traversed by a denial under oath, thereby eliminating such matters from the trial, unless there was a bona fide controversy regarding them. Upon a similar question, Mr. Justice Murray, speaking for this Court, in the case of Southern Underwriters v. Jordan, Tex. Civ. App. 122 S.W.2d 260, 261, said: "All jurisdictional facts with reference to matters occurring before the Industrial Accident Board are to be presumed, unless they are denied by verified pleadings of the defendant." Speaking with reference to the statute quoted, upon a similar question, Mr. Chief Justice Smith, in the case of Traders General Insurance Company v. Porter, Tex. Civ. App. 124 S.W.2d 900, 902, writ refused, said: "We hold that the allegations of the stated jurisdictional prerequisites [filing claim for compensation with the board], in appellee's petition, were sufficient, in the absence of special exceptions, and appellant effectually admitted the truth of them by failing to deny them by verified pleadings, as required in the quoted statute."

Referring to that testimony, appellees argue that even if appellees failed in their proof to establish a right to compensation under Section 1, subdivision 1 of Article 8309, Revised Statutes, they did show right to the same compensation awarded under section 1, subdivision 2 of that article, by uncontroverted testimony, and therefore the judgment should be affirmed on that theory. Citing such authorities as Johnson v. Breckenridge-Stephens Title Co., Tex.Com.App., 257 S.W. 223; Southland Greyhound Lines, Inc., v. Richardson, 126 Tex. 118, 86 S.W.2d 731; Bewley Mills v. First Nat. Bank, Tex. Civ. App. 110 S.W.2d 201; Southern Underwriters v. Jordan, Tex. Civ. App. 122 S.W.2d 260. We believe the argument is without merit, because the judgment, by its recitals, shows that it was rendered on the verdict of the jury and the undisputed evidence, and without any finding either by the jury or by the court that the deceased had not worked in the employment in which he was working at the time of his injury, during the whole of the preceding year, which was a condition for a right to compensation under section 1, subdivision 2 of Article 8309, nor was there any express or implied findings by the court of facts necessary to a recovery under said subdivision 2.