The court seems to have completely forgotten that a jury had been impaneled and was present to try the fact issue, as the court constituted itself a fact-finding instrument and completely ignored the jury, although the evidence was sufficient to carry the issue to the jury. Theago v. Royal Indemnity Co., Tex.Civ.App., 70 S.W.2d 473; Southern Underwriters v. Hoopes, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 924; Brodtmann v. Zurich General Accident Liability Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 90 F.2d 1; Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Polson, Tex.Civ.App., 148 S.W.2d 956. The purpose of these laws, of which the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law is one of the best, is to in some sort prevent the many petty and grievous damage suits that constantly arise and vex both employer and employee, and to fix a just and equitable compensation for employees where they have been injured.

But it is also too well settled to require any detailed statement of the principle by us, that the fact that disease contributes to a death or disability is no reason for denying compensation for it, if something unforeseen occurred in the course of the employment which, acting with the disease, caused the injury; that it is only where the disease is the sole cause of the injury that a recovery is denied. Fidelity Casualty Company of New York v. Neas, 5 Cir., 93 F.2d 137; Brodtmann v. Zurich Accident Liability Insurance Company, 5 Cir., 90 F.2d 1; Hartford Accident Indemnity Company v. Jones, 5 Cir., 80 F.2d 680; Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Polson, Tex.Civ.App., 148 S.W.2d 956; Southern Underwriters v. Hoopes et al., Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 924; Travelers Insurance Company v. Johnson et al., Tex.Civ.App., 84 S.W.2d 354. The authorities on which appellant relies are not in conflict with these.

I will cite a few of the more recent cases in this field. Donlan's Case, 317 Mass. 291, 58 N.E.2d 4; Yawdoshak v. Somerville Iron Works 20 N.J.Misc. 412, 28 A.2d 478; Eisen v. Jacquard Fabrics, 19 N.J.Misc. 526, 21 A.2d 614; Amend v. Amend, 12 N.J.Super. 425, 79 A.2d 742; Juhl v. Hussman-Ligonier Co., Mo.App., 146 S.W.2d 106; Simon v. Village of Plainview, Minn., 54 N.W.2d 32; Southern Underwriters v. Hoopes, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 924; Jones v. California Packing Corp., Utah, 244 P.2d 640; Bussey v. Globe Indemnity Co., 81 Ga. 401, 59 S.E.2d 34; see also Workmen's Compensation Text, Schneider, Vol. 4, Sec. 1332. Contrary to the inferences in the majority opinion, death when the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment is compensable though death may not occur while on the job.

We note that "opinions of medical experts are an exception to the rule against inference stacking." Welch v. McLean, 191 S.W.3d 147, 161 n. 7 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (citing Tex. Empl. Ins. Ass'n v. Talmadge, 256 S.W.2d 945, 951-52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e); S. Underwriters v. Hoopes, 120 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1938, writ dism'd); White v. Presnall, No. 05-93-01029-CV, 1994 WL 416724, at *6 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 10, 1994, writ denied)). By categorizing the jury's finding that Lyons did not sustain a compensable injury on April 5, 2004 as a "vital fact," Lyons attempts to establish the existence of inferences that the jury was prohibited from making.

In his motion for rehearing, however, Simeon correctly points out that the opinions of medical experts are an exception to the rule against inference stacking. See Tex. Empl. Ins. Ass'n v. Talmadge, 256 S.W.2d 945, 951-52 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.); S. Underwriters v. Hoopes, 120 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1938, writ dism'd) (both holding that medical expert testimony is exception to inference stacking rule); see also White v. Presnall, No. 05-93-01029-CV, 1994 WL 416724, at *6 (Tex.App.-Dallas, Aug.10, 1994, writ denied) (not designated for publication) (holding application of prohibition against inference stacking to medical expert testimony "untenable" because courts are incapable of assessing relationship between direct and inferred facts established by such testimony). Because the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict, we overrule Dr. Welch's first and second issues.

The contention, however, has been repeatedly rejected by the courts as being unsound. See Henderson v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1976); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Talmadge, 256 S.W.2d 945, 952 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1953, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Southern Underwriters v. Hoopes, 120 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex.Civ.App. Galveston 1938, writ dism'd). It is well established that "overexertion" or strain causing a heart attack is an accidental injury to the physical structure of the body within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra; Baird v. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex. 1973).

's Compensation Law of Texas is not open for dispute. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. v. Gant, Tex.Civ.App., 346 S.W.2d 359, 363, a coronary occlusion case very similar to the instant case; Midwestern Insurance Company v. Wagner, Tex.Civ.App., 370 S.W.2d 779, writ ref. n.r.e.; United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Herzik, Tex.Civ.App., 359 S.W.2d 914, writ ref. n.r.e.; Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company v. Redd, Tex.Civ.App., 397 S.W.2d 321, writ ref. n.r.e. From Traders General Ins. Co. v. Rooth, Tex.Civ.App., 268 S.W.2d 539, 541, writ ref., n.r.e., we quote: "Compensation benefits can be awarded if the workman, as a result of job exertion, sustains hemorrhages, ruptures or heart attacks, notwithstanding the fact that predisposing factors contribute to the incapacity or death. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W.2d 234; Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Polson, Tex.Civ.App., 148 S.W.2d 956, W/E Dis.; Southern Underwriters v. Hoopes, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 924, W/E Dis.; Carter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 132 Tex. 288, 120 S.W.2d 581." In Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Rogers, Tex.Civ.App., 368 S.W.2d 21, writ ref., n.r.e., a heart case, the accidental injury occurred December 1, 1960, but the resulting heart attack did not take place until December 27, 1960.

The court held that the fact that disease contributes to death or disability is no reason for denying compensation if something unforeseen occurs in the course of the employment which, acting with the disease, causes the injury. The following authorities are in accord with the rule announced in the case of Massachusetts Bonding Ins. Co. v. Massey. Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Polson, Tex.Civ.App., 148 S.W.2d 956; Southern Underwriters v. Hoopes et al., Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 924; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Johnson et al., Tex.Civ.App., 84 S.W.2d 354. Under the above authorities the evidence in this case was, we think, sufficient to support the verdict of the jury and the judgment rendered.

In many cases courts have held that facts similar as here related (and in many cases where not nearly so strong) were sufficient to sustain findings of the jury and support the judgment; holding, in effect, that such evidence left an open question for the trier of facts, and the jury having answered in favor of the injured party, courts of appeal have no authority to disturb the judgment. We cite a few: Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Woody, Tex. Civ. App. 80 S.W.2d 771, writ dismissed; Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Godsey, Tex. Civ. App. 143 S.W.2d 639, writ refused; Traders General Ins. Co. v. Wright, Tex. Civ. App. 144 S.W.2d 626, writ refused; Southern Underwriters v. Hoopes, Tex. Civ. App. 120 S.W.2d 924, writ dismissed; Gulf Casualty Co. v. Bostick, Tex. Civ. App. 116 S.W.2d 915, writ dismissed; United States Casualty Co. v. Vance, Tex. Civ. App. 91 S.W.2d 465, writ refused; American General Ins. Co. v. Smith, Tex. Civ. App. 163 S.W.2d 849, writ refused; Traders General Ins. Co. v. Turner, Tex. Civ. App. 149 S.W.2d 593, writ dismissed judgment correct; Traders General Ins. Co. v. Ray, Tex. Civ. App. 128 S.W.2d 80, writ dismissed judgment correct; Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Stricklin, Tex. Civ. App. 151 S.W.2d 612, writ dismissed judgment correct; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Funderburk, Tex. Civ. App. 81 S.W.2d 132, writ dismissed; Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Polson, Tex. Civ. App. 148 S.W.2d 956, writ dismissed judgment correct; Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Davidson, Tex. Civ. App. 5 S.W.2d 1008; Roland v. Employers Casualty Co., Tex. Civ. App. 290 S.W. 895, affirmed, Tex.Com.App., 1 S.W.2d 568; Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Mask, Tex. Civ. App. 180 S.W.2d 369; Maryla

While the facts of other cases may not be of considerable value in arriving at a conclusion on such questions, we are of the opinion that similar verdicts based on less testimony have been sustained. We call attention to the following authorities: Carter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 132 Tex. 288, 295, 120 S.W.2d 581; Roland v. Employers' Casualty Co., Tex. Civ. App. 290 S.W. 895, 899, affirmed Tex.Com.App., 1 S.W.2d 568; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Davidson, Tex. Civ. App. 5 S.W.2d 1008, 1009; Zurich General Accident Liability Ins. Co. v. Wood, Tex. Civ. App. 10 S.W.2d 760, 761; Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Polson, Tex. Civ. App. 148 S.W.2d 956, 960; Southern Underwriters v. Hoopes, Tex. Civ. App. 120 S.W.2d 924; Traders General Ins. Co. v. Wright, Tex. Civ. App. 144 S.W.2d 626, writ refused. We have given careful consideration to all of appellant's contentions.